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ABSTRACT 
Derivatives have been using widely in the world over the last 30 years as an important risk 
management instrument. Although theoretical researchers suggest that derivatives usage can enhance 
value of a firm by alleviating costs arising from several market imperfections, the existing evidence 
is not quite consistent among empirical studies up to date. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, aims 
to examine determinants of derivatives use, a relationship between derivatives use, firm value, and 
exposures for a sample of 881 non-financial firms in eight East Asian countries in the 2003- 2013 
period. The analysis is based on a novel and manually collected data. 
We find that firms in countries with lower corruption have more incentive to use financial 
derivatives and use derivatives with greater intensity than those firms located in highly corrupt 
countries. Better governance induces firms to use derivatives to hedge exposure and mitigate costs. 
Firms in countries with weak governance use derivatives for speculating and/or selective hedging or 
self-management purposes. Overall, our findings provide strong evidence of the role of countries’ 
governance quality in driving firms’ derivatives-related behaviors. This macro-based effect on 
derivatives use is independent from firm-specific factors, which are frequently invoked by hedging 
theories.  
Regarding relationship between firm value and derivatives use, using Tobin’s Q as a proxy of 
firm value, we find that low corruption level of home country (host country) induces the use of 
financial derivatives and rewards domestic firms and domestic MNCs (foreign affiliates) with higher 
value; this finding holds after controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias. Hedging behavior 
of domestic MNCs outperforms domestic firms and foreign affiliates in terms of firm value. 
Derivative usage is value-enhancing activity for domestic firms and domestic MNCs, but it does not 
add value for foreign affiliates. During the crisis, the effect of low level of corruption on alleviating 
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negative impacts of the crisis on derivatives usage is very modest. Yet, low corruption level of home 
country is positively associated with hedging premiums of domestic firms and domestic MNCs in 
the post-crisis period. 
Finally, we measure exposure to home (host) country risks, and provide novel evidence that 
financial derivatives use of domestic firms and domestic MNCs reduces exposure to home country 
risks by 11.4% and 13.4% per 1% increase in notional derivative holdings, respectively, while 
foreign affiliates fail to mitigate exposure to host country risks. The use of foreign currency and 
interest rate derivatives by domestic firms and domestic MNCs is effective in alleviating firms’ such 
exposures to varied degrees, but foreign affiliates using derivatives only can lower interest rate 
exposures. Domestic MNCs have the smallest exposures, and domestic MNCs with derivatives 
activities reduce exposures in the largest magnitude compared to other firms. The financial crisis 
weakens the effect of derivative usage on exposures, but it is stronger after the crisis than in pre-
crisis period. 
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis focuses on one of the most talked-about financial instruments among both 
academics and policy makers:  derivatives.  A key feature of derivatives is that their prices are 
dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying financial assets. The most common 
types of financial derivatives include foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price 
derivatives. These instruments aim to protect participants in financial markets from adverse 
movements in prices of the underlying assets. Following the deregulation of interest rate controls 
and the adoption of floating exchange rate system in many countries, especially the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, the movements of interest rates and foreign exchanges rates have 
become much more volatile. Facing increasing volatility of financial risks, managers in many 
companies have been using derivatives as one of the most important hedging strategies.  
Derivatives have been using widely in the world, and contributing significantly to the strong 
growth and innovation of financial markets over the last 30 years. Given the global scale and 
trading volume of derivative markets, derivatives have become more complicated and 
interconnected. The Bank for International Settlement reports that at the end of June 2015, and at 
the end of December 2014, the global OTC derivatives notional amount outstanding contracts are 
USD 553 trillion, and USD 630 trillion (BIS, 2014, 2015). These figures indicate that derivatives 
are one of the main pillars in the global financial system. In addition, globalization and capital 
liberalization speeding up enormously over the past decades have encouraged firms to 
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increasingly involve in international operations, many firms are no longer uni-national domestic 
firms but multinational corporations (henceforth MNCs). By going global, firms are increasingly 
exposed to market and financial risks. Thus, risk management is going hand-in-hand with the 
globalization, and one of the strategies that firm apply is to use financial derivatives. The survey 
of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association shows that over 94% of the world’s top 
500 companies actively use financial derivatives to hedge their various exposures (ISDA, 2009). 
However, the rationales for hedging have not been well sustained. According to the 
irrelevance proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1958), in an efficient market, hedging 
activities should have no impact on a firm value. Some studies have theoretically shown that 
hedging can increase firm value by reducing costs arising from several market imperfections 
such as taxes, agency problems, bankruptcy and financial distress, managerial incentives, 
information asymmetries, and economies of scale. Nevertheless, many empirical studies do not 
find evidence supporting those propositions. For example, Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Charumathi and Kota (2012). Moreover, Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009) indicate that 
traditional theories have little power to explain firm’s decision on using derivatives. 
Yung-Ming Shiu (2010) classifies derivatives use studies into 2 categories. The first is to 
identify the determinants of decisions on derivatives use. Another strand of research is to 
examine the effect of derivative use on risk exposure, and firm value. In fact, the extant 
empirical evidence on this area is still mixed. Some studies find positive relationship between 
derivatives use and firm value (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Clark and Judge, 2009; 
Campello, Lin, and Zou, 2011; Chen and King, 2014), and negative association between 
exposures and derivatives usage (see Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Zhou and Wang, 2013). However, 
some researchers find opposite evidence or no evidence (e.g., Fauver and Naranjo, 2010; Clark 
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and Mefteh, 2011). Therefore, the incentives for using financial derivatives and the effect of 
derivatives use on firm value or exposures are still an open question. Judge (2006b) indicates that 
whichever it is, one thing is certain, existing research has only touched the surface and many 
unresolved issues remain.  
Although there is a wide range of literature on country and international evidence on this 
area, most empirical studies focus on the derivatives usage of U.S non-financial firms. Besides, 
there is a growing literature on derivatives in developed countries, and emerging countries, but 
the research East Asian firms is still relatively scarce, even though there have been large increase 
in using derivatives in these countries. The annual survey of the Future Industry Association in 
2015 reveals that trading in Asia-Pacific is $7.25 billion, accounting for about one-third of global 
trading volume (FIA, 2015). 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, aims to examine determinants of derivatives use, 
impacts of derivatives usage on firm value, and a relationship between derivatives use and 
multifaceted exposures in eight East Asian countries over the period of 2003- 2013 by using the 
unique hand-collected data containing information about derivatives activities of 881 non-
financial firms across 34 different industries. Our sample consists of countries with different 
economic and financial development levels, from the world’s third and second largest economies 
(Japan, China) to newly industrialized countries (Singapore, Hong Kong) and then emerging 
markets (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia).  
Additionally, these sample countries are also heterogeneous in terms of economic, political 
and business environments. In particular, governance mechanism varies among East Asian 
countries. Some countries share the same governance quality as that by U.S, and other developed 
countries. Some are more problematic because of less transparent markets, weaker law 
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enforcement and lower government effectiveness. Such variation provides us a natural laboratory 
to explore the effect of country governance mechanism on derivatives use. Further, there is huge 
difference in corruption levels of the sample countries. For example, according to the most recent 
2015 survey of the Transparency International, in which a higher score represents less 
corruption, Philippines and Indonesia are at low scores of 35 and 36 out of 100, respectively, 
while Singapore scores a high 85 relative to Japan at 75. Likewise, our sample countries have 
different degrees of country risks, for example Singapore has AA grade while grades of 
Indonesia and Thailand are B1. Such heterogeneity allows us to examine whether differences in 
firms’ behaviors of using derivatives across countries can be explained by differences in 
institutional environments. Doing so, our study may provide further insights into an emerging 
literature linking macro and firm-specific factors. 
Our first study in the chapter 4 investigates the link between incentives to use derivatives of 
non-financial firms and countries’ governance quality. Determining a firm’s motivation for using 
derivatives is vital for at least two reasons. First, it helps managers diagnose what sources 
enhancing firm value, because given a type of market imperfection benefits of derivatives use 
differ across different firms. Second, it induces managers to figure out what type of risk(s) 
should be hedged and identity targets of hedging, so that they can conduct an effective hedging 
strategy. 
Differentiating from prior studies, we focus on the role of country-specific factors, 
specifically governance quality, in shaping firms’ decisions on using derivatives. The reason 
motivating us to conduct this study is that the sample countries are heterogeneous in terms of 
economic, political and social environments. The relatively large variation in country-specific 
                                                     
1 Euler Hemes. 2015. Country risk rating March 2015 
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characteristics gives us a unique opportunity to explore other determinants than firm’s specific 
factors - which frequently invoked by hedging theories. Additionally, as a matter of fact that 
although the literature on derivatives use has been blossoming, most empirical studies focus on 
U.S non-financial firms. Meanwhile, research on hedging behavior of East Asian firms is still 
very limited, even though they have become the world’s key derivative users as we presented 
above. Further, given many of our firms (nearly 45%) are domestic, 48.23% is domestic 
multinational corporation (MNC) headquarters, we would expect the role of country’s specific 
characteristics to become more salient in determining derivatives use. 
In our second study, we explore the value implication of derivatives usage on domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates conditional on corruption environments in home 
and host countries. The motivation behind this research comes from the following reasons. First, 
although the previous studies provide significant insights into the relationship between 
derivatives use and firm value, drivers of value implication are not limited to the structural 
characteristics of firm-specific resources and capabilities, as all firms are embedded in 
institutional environments. As a matter of fact that corruption becomes the norm rather than 
exception worldwide today and firms regularly engage in corrupt practices such as bribery 
(Beets, 2005). In East Asian countries, corruption is a serious problem2. Thus, without directly 
taking into account corruption environment, it would be difficult to determine whether the use of 
derivatives is value-enhancing activity. 
Second, scholars have neglected what type of firm in which the value effect of derivatives 
use is greater (or less), and what factors determining such difference. Undertaking this research 
                                                     
2 According to the Transparency International, in 2013, 64% of these countries scored below 50 in perceived level of 
public corruption 
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need, we shed new light on this gap by examining how value effects of derivatives use vary 
across domestic firms, domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates. Third, although there are numerous 
studies on effects of financial crisis on economic area, little has been done to analyze its impacts 
on derivatives use. Thus, we investigate the dynamic of relationship between derivatives use and 
firm value when firms face exogenous shocks brought about by the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis. Our study does not merely investigate consequences of the global financial crisis on value 
implication of derivatives usage, but focus on the role of corruption levels in mitigating adverse 
effects. 
Our third study in the chapter 6 scrutinizes the impact of derivatives usage on exposures to 
country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks by types of firm:  domestic firms, domestic 
MNCs, and foreign affiliates. Our research is inspired by the following reasons. First, while we 
have long learned over the last decades about exposures to exchange rate, and sometimes interest 
rate exposures; to the best of our knowledge, the research linking derivatives use with exposure 
to country risk is nonexistent in the current literature. Thus, our study aims to estimate exposure 
to home (host) country risks and investigate the relationship between derivatives use and those 
types of exposure.  
Second, whether MNCs are more exposed than domestic firms and other firms is not well 
understood because most of the prior studies on exposures and derivatives use rule out domestic 
firms by explicitly focusing on MNCs, while a purely domestic firm still is exposed to market 
risks. Therefore, we examine the link between derivatives use and exposures on the comparison 
of domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. We also consider how this link is 
moderated by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.  
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Third, in recent years many interest rates exhibit as volatile as exchange rates, presenting a 
comparably important source of risk to firms as exchange rate risks, but up to date little has been 
done on interest rate exposure of non-financial firms in general, and on link between that 
exposure and derivatives use in particular. Thus, we aim to present comprehensive analysis of 
the relationship between derivatives use and interest rate exposure for a large sample of cross-
country non-financial firms.  
1.2. Meaning and characteristics of financial derivatives 
There are many definitions of derivatives. Hull (2012, pp.1) defines derivatives as a 
financial instrument whose prices are dependent on or derived from the value of other, more 
basic, underlying variables. According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) No.133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, derivative is a 
contract with the following distinctive characteristics: a) it has one or more underlying assets; b) 
it has one or more notional amounts; c) its value to the holder changes by direct reference to the 
underlying assets; c) it requires no initial net investment; d) it can readily be settled net or its 
equivalent.  
An underlying is not, per se, an asset or liability that appears on the balance sheet; an 
underlying is a market-related characteristic of the asset or liability that gives increase in value 
changes (Smith, Gastineau, and Todd, 2001). More specifically, Gupta (2006) states that the 
underlying assets or instruments can be equity shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, treasury bills, 
foreign currencies, interest rates, commodity prices, or different market indices such as stock 
market index, consumer price index, etc. Thus, derivatives have no intrinsic value rather their 
value is determined by volatility of the underlying’s prices. 
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A notional amount is a number of currency units, shares, units of commodities, or other 
units specified in the contract. Notional amount, in sense of Stulz (2003), is quantity of the 
underlying used to determine the payoff of derivative. Because a derivative does not require the 
holder or writer to invest or receive the notional amount at the time of entering contract, so the 
contract may require no initial investment or a small investment relative to other instruments that 
are sensitive to movements of the same market factors.  
There have been a large number of financial derivatives being used extensively all over the 
world in the last few decades. However, in the context of this thesis, we focus on the types most 
widely used by non-financial firms in different countries to manage market risks: foreign 
currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives. When the underlying instruments are 
foreign currencies, interest rates, and commodity prices, the types of derivatives will be foreign 
currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives, respectively.3 
1.3. Aim and research questions 
The aim of the thesis is to provide a deep analysis of whether the use of derivatives increases 
firm value to non- financial firms in East Asian countries.  
To realize this aim, our research questions are as below: 
(1)- What are the determinants of the derivatives use among East Asian non-financial firms? 
We investigate the link between governance quality and non-financial firms’ incentives to 
use all types of derivatives: foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity price derivatives. In 
particular, we propose the following hypotheses: 
                                                     
3Foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives are settled at a specific future date, and their values 
are derived from changes in foreign currencies (exchange rates), interest rates, and prices of commodities, 
respectively. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms located in countries with higher corruption levels are less likely to 
use derivatives 
Hypothesis 1a: High levels of corruption discourage firms from using derivatives to 
reduce    exposure as stated by hedging theory 
Hypothesis 2: Firms located in countries with higher governance quality are more prone 
to use derivatives  
Hypothesis 3: Firms in countries with higher country risk have more incentive to use 
derivatives. 
(2)- What is the value effect of derivatives use on non- financial firms in East Asian 
countries? 
We explore the unique value effect of derivatives use on domestic firms, domestic MNCs 
and foreign affiliates from different aspects of corruption environments, and in the context of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 to answer the following research questions:   
Hypothesis 4: The lower is the corruption level; the higher is the likelihood that the use 
of financial derivatives increases firm value 
Hypothesis 5a: In light of corruption environment, the use of financial derivatives is 
more valuable in domestic MNCs than in domestic firms  
Hypothesis 5b: Under influence of corruption environment, the use of financial 
derivatives rewards domestic MNCs with higher value than foreign affiliates 
Hypothesis 6a: The global financial crisis worsens the value effect of derivatives usage 
under corruption environment, and there is positive relationship between derivatives use 
and firm value in post-crisis period 
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Hypothesis 6b: Low level of corruption mitigates negative impacts caused by the global 
financial crisis on the value effect of derivatives use 
 (3)- Does the use of derivatives of East Asian non- financial firms reduce exposures that 
firms face? 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between derivatives use and 
exposures to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks on the comparison of domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates. To do so, we test the hypotheses as below: 
Hypothesis 7a: The use of foreign currency derivatives reduces exchange rate exposure  
Hypothesis 7b: The use of interest rate derivatives reduces exposure to interest rate risk 
Hypothesis 8: There is negative relationship between the use of financial derivatives and 
exposure to country risk 
Hypothesis 9: The use of derivatives by domestic MNCs decreases a larger magnitude of 
exposure than domestic firms and foreign affiliates 
Hypothesis 10a: The global financial crisis weakens the relationship between derivatives 
usage and exposures. 
Hypothesis 10b: Derivatives use is negatively related to exposures in the post-crisis 
period 
1.4. Structures of the thesis 
This thesis consists of 7 chapters including this chapter. It is structured as follows.  
Chapters 2 and 3 review the vast part of theoretical and empirical literature on this topic 
over a few decades, which provides a critical review of the theoretical determinants of 
derivatives use, relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value, and its association 
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with exposures. In addition, chapter 3 presents a big picture of empirical analyses with important 
findings both outside and in East Asia context.  
Chapter 4 attempts to empirically scrutinize the role of country-level governance quality of 
eight countries in East Asia on shaping non-financial firms’ motivations for using derivatives. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates thoroughly analysis of the effects of derivatives use on firm value under 
influence of corruption environment of home (host) countries with a focus on comparing such 
effects across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates.  
Chapter 6 contains empirical study on the association between the use of derivatives and 
exposures to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks on the comparison of domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. Finally, chapter 7 concludes by summarizing main 
findings from empirical investigations, presents contributions of this thesis including theoretical 
contributions, empirical contributions, and managerial implications, and it also makes some 
suggestion for the future research based on some limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
Modigiliani and Miller (1958) indicate that in an efficient market, financing policy is 
irrelevant. Because derivatives use or hedging is a part of corporate financing policy, their 
arguments imply that in the absence of market imperfections, hedging does not affect firm value. 
The value of a firm equals its expected cash flows discounted at the appropriated costs of capital. 
Thus, to increase firm value, management can engage in activities to increase the expected cash 
flows and/or to lower the cost of capital. Theories for incentives of hedging, therefore, build on 
market imperfections and focus on situations that hedging can increase the expected cash flows.  
This chapter examines the literature on hedging theory, and theoretical association between 
exposures and the use of derivatives. The aim of this chapter is to identify characteristics that 
theories suggest may determine a firm’s decision to use derivatives, and then affect firm value. 
This review will ultimately opt the concentration of research in this thesis. Particularly, findings 
of this chapter will be employed in the latter empirical chapters to identify hypotheses testing the 
case of non-financial firms in eight East Asia countries. 
The chapter begins with discussion of derivatives use with risk management and examines 
whether empirical literature shows that derivative instruments are used for hedging or 
speculation. Then it looks at overview of baseline theories, that is to say Modiglian-Miller 
theorems.  This is followed by a review of hedging theory, and a look at theoretical relation 
between derivatives usage and exposures. Finally, the chapter concludes. 
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2.2. Derivatives use, hedging and speculation 
2.2.1. Risk management, hedging and derivative usage 
 Smith et al. (2001) defines risk management as the process of assessing and modifying 
many trade-offs between risk and reward that face a firm. These trade-offs can be evaluated 
based on whether they are done for purpose of hedging, speculation or arbitrage. Focusing on 
instruments of risk management, Hillier, Grinblatt and Titman (2012, p.684) interpret risk 
management to be a process that “entails assessing and managing, through the use of financial 
derivatives, insurance, and other activities, the corporation’s exposure to various sources of risk”. 
Bekaert and Hodrick (2011, p.590) even define risk management “is the use of derivatives to 
take positions in financial markets that offset the underlying sources of risks that arise in a 
company’s normal course of business”. Consequently, most of extant literature considers “risk 
management”, “hedging” and “derivative use” as synonyms. 
So, how is hedging defined? In the fact that hedging comes in many different forms. Smith 
and Stulz (1985, pp.392) use a quite general definition of hedging, where firm’s value is 
preserved regardless of any state changes. In their words, “a firm can hedge by trading in a 
particular futures, forwards, or option market…” and “hedging reduces or eliminates the 
dependence of firm value on changes in state variable”. They also suggest that a firm can hedge 
through its operating strategies; for instance, a merger can produce effects similar to those of 
hedging via derivatives. According to Smith et al. (2001, pp.3), actions taken to reduce risk are 
known generally as hedging, and the broader use of the term “hedging” applies to options as well 
as forwards, futures, and swaps.  
All these above explanations support the argument of Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) that 
hedging is always interpreted as the use of any derivative contract aimed to eliminate or reduce 
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an open market risk position. Hence, the terms “hedging” and “derivative use” are used 
interchangeably. On the other hand, Guay and Kothari (2003) emphasize the importance of 
considering a multifaceted approach to hedging as their study find evidence that the use of 
derivatives by many U.S non-financial firms is too small relative to their risk exposures, they 
point out that using derivatives to “fine tune” firms’ overall risk management program which 
likely cover other means of hedging, so they argue that derivatives use is a noisy proxy for firms’ 
risk management activities. However, the empirical studies on hedging from earlier to date have 
been adopting derivatives use to measure hedging activities. Most of earlier studies investigate 
the determinants of corporate hedging by conducting surveys (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 
1993; Dodle, 1993; Berkman, Bradbury, and Magan, 1997; Hakkarainen, Kasanen, and Puttonen, 
1997).  
Over the last decades, when firms in many countries have been encouraged to disclose 
information about their hedging policies and their methods of hedging in their annual reports, 
empirical studies collect data of derivatives use from firms’ annual reports. It is possible for 
empirical studies to employ quantitative data on the use of derivative to measure the “extent of 
hedging” or how much firms hedge. Some empirical studies use fair value of derivatives such as 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Spano (2007), but most of researchers use notional value of 
derivatives as proxy for extent of hedging (e.g., Nguyen and Faff, 2002; Guay and Kothari, 2003; 
Campello et al., 2011; Lel, 2012). 
2.2.2. Speculation and derivatives use 
Together with hedging, speculation is the main types of activity taken by participants in the 
derivative markets. Smith et al. (2001, pp.6) interprets speculation as an action to increase 
expected reward, even though it increases the degree of uncertainty about achieving that 
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outcome. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2006) interprets speculation as action 
of not hedging, but trading with the objective of making profits through the successful 
expectation of price movement.  
From these general understanding, hedging and speculation are considered as opposite sides 
of a risk management coin. However, hedging and speculation, in their purest sense, are more 
like endpoints on a continuum of risk management. At one end of the continuum, one can regard 
hedging a situation where hedgers enter into a derivative position with anticipation that they can 
perfectly remove any exposure in a physical market position. At the other end are the pure 
speculators taking a derivative position that exposes them to market risk that they otherwise do 
not hold (Kolb and Overdahl, 2010). Therefore, a crucial issue whether studies on derivatives use 
have been measuring hedging or speculation. If the incentives of hedging and speculation are 
correlated, it is sometimes not easy to distinguish hedging from speculation.  
To determine whether firms use derivatives for hedging or speculation, researchers find 
considerable evidence that firms use derivative for hedging. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999), 
Bodnar et al., (2008), among others, survey and find that firms in different countries use types of 
derivatives such as forwards, options, futures, and swaps for hedging purposes. Replacing 
surveys with empirical analysis, Bartram et al. (2011) show that that 90% companies of Fortune 
500 use derivatives for risk management, not for speculation. Supporting that finding, 
Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012) also demonstrate that well governed firms from 39 countries 
in their sample from 1990 to 1999 are more likely to use derivatives to hedge rather than to 
speculate. 
Judge (2006) suggests that a far better approach to determine whether firms hedge or 
speculate is measuring a firm’s risk exposure and then investigate the impact of derivative usage 
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on this exposure. Remarkable studies on exposures and the use of derivatives (e.g., Allayannis 
and Ofek 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Bartram and Bodnar, 2007; Treanor et al., 2014) find 
that there is negative association between them, suggesting that firms use derivatives to hedge 
rather than to speculate in the markets.  
In short, although firms can use derivatives for the purposes of hedging or speculation, both 
evidence from surveys and empirical analyses indicate that most of firms in fact are hedging and 
using derivatives for this purpose. Furthermore, even though there remain subtle differences in 
exact meanings of “risk management”, “hedging” and “derivative use”, in this thesis, we do not 
distinguish these terms and use them interchangeably. 
2.3. A review of the the Modiglian-Miller Theorems 
Dufey and Srinivasulu (1984) summed up the arguments of modern theories that oppose 
hedging at the firm level were that “risk does not exist; even if it exists, it needs not be hedged; 
even if it is to be hedged, corporations need not to hedge it”. A convenient starting point in 
discussion the conditions under which firms hedge and hedging can add value is Modigliani and 
Miller (MM) theorem on corporate finance and optimal capital structure, that inspired many 
improvements in finance. 
Under assumption that financial markets are perfect, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue 
that firm’s financial policies and strategies become irrelevant and have no influence on the firm’s 
market value. Modigliani (1980) states that “with well-functioning markets (and neutral taxes) 
and rational investors, who can “undo” the corporate financial structure by holding positive or 
negative amounts of debt, the market value of the firm- debt plus equity- depends only on the 
income stream generated by its assets. It follows, in particular, that the value of a firm should not 
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be affected by the share of debt in its financial structure or by what will be done with the returns-
paid out as dividends or reinvested (profitably)”. 
The use of derivatives or hedging policy is a part of a firm’s financial policies, thus, MM 
theorems can be extended to the treatment of derivative uses or hedging. In the context of 
hedging, it implies that hedging is inessential, as an investor can do what the firm does. 
Specifically, if an investor can sell or buy on the similar terms as the firm does, or he/she can 
make “homemade hedging” for his or her own account, then the corporate hedging policy 
becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, because value is created on the asset side of the balance 
sheet, namely through the positive NPV projects, hedging as a component of firm’s financial 
policies can not create value per se (Judge, 2001).  
2.4. Hedging theory 
The academic perspective to hedging conventionally accepts the propositions of MM theory 
as the baseline model, but then proceeds to identify sets of conditions that justify hedging when 
the restrictive assumptions are relaxed. The conclusion is that hedging can add value, in theory, 
if there are market imperfections that make a firm’s profit function convex in some states. 
According to Froot, Scharfstaein, and Stein (1993), this is necessary condition for hedging to 
increase firm value because volatility will be costly under such circumstances. 
The research on hedging theory can be categorized into a few mainstreams. In Tufano 
(1996) view, the two main streams of incentives to hedge include maximization of shareholder 
value and maximization of managerial utility. The former may consist of motivations related to 
market imperfections such as convex tax function, financial distress costs, underinvestment 
costs, and economies of scale. The latter may include market imperfections related to 
information asymmetry and managerial risk aversion.  Schrand and Unal (1998) classify the 
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research on hedging by focusing on the practicality of hedging studies that investigate the need 
and cost of hedging. Following them in this section, we will review the theoretical rationales of 
value creation through hedging, each of which is associated with cost reductions for one type of 
market imperfections.  
2.4.1. Bankruptcy costs and costs of financial distress 
Bankruptcy costs are defined as the costs incurred as a result of a bankruptcy fillings (Stulz, 
2003). Stulz (2003) argues that the degree to which bankruptcy costs affect firm value depends 
on their extent and on the possibility that the firm will have to file for bankruptcy. More 
specifically, Warner (1977) demonstrates that leveraged firms are exposed to risk that their cash 
flows are not sufficient to make all fixed payment in a timely manner and in full. The higher 
leverage or more volatile cash flows, the higher this risk increases. A company that is unable to 
execute its fixed payment obligations is forced into bankruptcy. Additionally, in the fact that 
firms encounter many of bankruptcy costs as soon as its financial situation becomes unhealthy, 
even before it actually files for bankruptcy or even if the firm never files for bankruptcy or never 
default. These costs are called financial distress costs. 
Mayer and Smith (1982) point out that although evidence of Warner (1977) argues that in a 
large firm even transactions costs associated with bankruptcy (financial distress cost) are a small 
portion of assets, it will be sufficient to induce firms to hedge if the present value of a reduction 
in expected bankruptcy costs is greater than the present value of the contract’s loading fees.  
The probability of encountering financial distress is determined by two factors. The first one 
is that the larger the ratio of fixed claims of a firm relative to its cash flows, the higher the 
probability of incurring financial distress. The second one is that if a firm’s cash flow is more 
volatile, it is more likely for that firm to encounter financial distress. Therefore, by reducing 
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volatility of cash flows, hedging lowers the probability of financial distress, and in turn lowers 
the expected financial distress costs. This reduction in expected costs increases the firm’s 
expected cash flows, hence increasing firm value. Consequently, firms with high probability of 
bankruptcy costs and costs of financial distress will be more likely to hedge.  
2.4.2. Corporate taxes 
Mayer and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that with progressivity in the tax 
schedule, and after-tax incomes are convex, hedging will reduce expected taxes if a firm’s 
effective tax schedule is convex, and the more convex the effective tax schedule, the larger the 
reduction in expected taxes, and then increases after-tax cash flows and value. In addition, Mayer 
and Smith (1982) show that there are some provisions in the tax code having the effect of 
changing the firm’s effective marginal tax bracket so that hedging is favored. The structure of the 
tax code can make it beneficial for the firms to take positions in futures, forward, or option 
markets. If effective marginal tax rates on firms are a progressive function of the firm’s pre-tax 
value, the after-tax value of the firm will be a convex function of its pre-tax value. If hedging 
reduces the volatility of pre-tax firm value, then lowering the expected corporate tax liability, 
hence the expected after-tax value of the firm is increased, as long as the cost of hedging is not 
too large (Smith and Stulz, 1985) 
Furthermore, the progressive tax structure has generally created a convex statutory tax 
function for firms. The greater progressivity, the more convex tax function. As Nance et al. 
(1993) indicate that although the statutory progressivity specified in the corporate profit tax allies 
over a relatively small range of taxable income, firms with more of range of their pretax income 
in the progressivity region of tax schedule have greater tax-based incentives to hedge. Therefore, 
a greater convexity of  tax schedule should lead to a higher possibility of hedging. 
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However, Mayers and Smith (1990) point out that statutory progressivity is comparatively 
limited in most of tax systems, but indirect effects can give rise to convex tax function. Most 
often, these indirect effects come through tax preference items such as tax carry-back, tax loss 
carry-forwards, investment tax credits and foreign tax credit. In particular, Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand (1997) indicate that tax preference items, which are deducted from pre-tax income, 
indirectly create convexity in the tax liability and concavity in the value of firm, because the 
present value of unused preference items reduces as they are carried forward to the future 
periods. Hedging reduces variance, thereby increasing the expected value of tax benefits because 
the probability of using preference items increases with the level of a firm’s taxable income.   
2.4.3. Agency cost of debt 
Agency costs were first introduced to corporate finance theory by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)’s seminal paper. They argue that agency cost may arise from conflicts between 
shareholders and debt holders, and such investments lead to a decrease in value of the debt. 
Consequently, prospective lenders persist in legal safeguards to protect them. Costs involved in 
monitoring actions of shareholders are one type of agency costs. It is likely that these costs are 
borne by equity holders in terms of higher interest rates required by creditors. In such way, other 
things are equal, the higher the expectation of monitoring costs by creditors, the higher interest 
rates, and the lower the firm value to shareholders. Thus, they indicate that firms have 
motivations for mitigating agency costs to maximize the current market value of the firm. 
A somewhat argument correlated to Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s agency costs is the 
underinvestment analysis of Myers (1977). He finds out the underinvestment problem by noting 
that shareholders can reject positive net present value projects, when the debt is risky and the 
probability of financial distress is high. Such a loss due to underinvestment is considered as a 
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type of agency costs connected to the corporate leverage. In addition, Jensen (1986) also builds 
an agency costs model, which is based on conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
managers. He argues that conflicts between shareholders and managers can create a free cash 
flow or overinvestment problem because managers might have motivations to invest in negative 
net present value projects to avoid distributing excess cash flow back to shareholders.  
According to Dobson and Soenen (1993), there are three reasons why firm’s managers 
should increase firm value by reducing agency costs through hedging. Firstly, hedging reduces 
volatility of cash flows by smoothing the cash flow streams, thereby lowering the firm’s cost of 
debt. Because agency costs are borne by managers, supposing that there is asymmetric 
information between managers and bondholders, hedging will increase the firm value. 
Consequently, managers will rationally induce to hedge. Secondly, given that debt financing 
exists, cash flow smoothing through hedging will tend to reduce the risk-shift as well as the 
underinvestment problems. Finally, hedging reduces the possibility of financial distress and 
increases duration of contractual relations between shareholders and managers. By strengthening 
corporate reputation acquisition, hedging directly reduces the moral-hazard agency problem. 
In short, given that hedging is a value-enhancing activity by reducing agency costs, the 
agency cost hypothesis expect that firms with more investment growth opportunities and 
financial constraints are more likely to hedge. 
2.4.4. Other factors 
In addition to the above rationales, several factors have been identified being related to 
derivatives use in prior empirical studies. These factors consists of economies of scales, and 
substitutes hedging with derivatives 
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2.4.4.1. Economies of scales 
Even though there is no theoretical model investigating the relationship between hedging 
and economies of scale, several arguments from empirical studies have provided a link between 
them (e.g., Warner, 1977; Nance et al., 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Many prior studies 
suggest that firm size is a good proxy for economies of scale. 
Nance et al. (1993) argue that the probability of encountering financial distress is directly 
related to the size of the firm’s fixed claims relative to the value of its assets. Therefore, firm size 
affects firm’s motivations to hedge. There are competing arguments about relationship between 
firm size and the probability of using derivatives, some researchers argue that smaller firms are 
more likely to hedge than larger firms, because financial distress can result in bankruptcy, 
restructuring, or liquidation, or circumstances that the firm encounters direct legal costs. While 
direct costs of bankruptcy are less than proportional to firm size, so it implies that smaller than 
are more prone to hedge than larger firms (Warner, 1977). On the other hand, smaller firms have 
more incentives to hedge because it is likely that they have taxable income in the progressive 
region of the tax schedule. In addition, large firms have fewer motivations to pursue hedging 
than small firms as they may encounter a lower probability of financial distress as they are 
enabled to diversify (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
However, Nance et al. (1993) point out some explanations for positive relationship between 
firm’s size and hedging. The first reason is that there are economies of scales in transaction costs 
related to derivatives use that makes it cheaper for larger firms to hedge. Large firms can be 
advantageous to these economies of scales, because they are more likely to employ professional 
managers with the specialized information to manage a hedging program (Block and Gallagher 
1986; Booth, Smith, and Stolz, 1984). Second, as the derivative markets exhibit significant scale 
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economies in the structure of transactions costs, implying that large firms have more motivations 
for hedging.  
2.4.4.2. Substitutes to hedging with derivatives  
The preceding studies show that a firm’s decision to use derivatives is also affected by other 
financial policies. Three substitutes to hedging with derivatives consist of natural hedging, the 
dividend policy and liquidity, and diversification. 
In terms of natural hedging, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) is the first to discuss the 
usage of preferred stocks and convertible debt as substitutes to hedging with derivatives. They 
argue that preferred stocks and convertible debt will reduce the demand for using derivatives, as 
they do not cause the underinvestment problem related to the use of straight debt. This is because 
convertible debt involves an embedded option on the firm’s assets, which makes this liability 
more sensitive to changes in firm value, and thereby reducing the sensitivity of equity to changes 
in the value of the firm. In the same manner, preferred stocks decrease the probability of 
financial distress due to periodic dividend payment, instead of paying interests like debts.  
A firm’s incentive to hedge with derivatives can also be influenced by its dividend policy 
and liquidity. Nance et al. (1993), and Berkman and Bradbury (1996) suggest that dividend 
payout will have an impact on derivative use due to hesitance to cut dividends and the 
implication of dividend payments for debt financing. They also point out that the degree of 
liquidity of a firm’s assets influence its extent of using derivatives, as there is an inverse 
relationship between liquidity and risk.  
Finally, diversification is considered as a substitute to hedging with derivatives, as through 
diversification firms can reduce both their business and financial risks. In the model of Stapleton 
(1982), firms diversified across lines of business may already have a low volatility in operating 
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income, with only a small benefit from hedging with derivatives, so they need lower extent 
derivatives to hedge. 
2.5. Theoretical association of derivatives use and exposures 
Géczy et al. (1997) demonstrates that market imperfections create incentives to hedge, but 
they are not sufficient conditions for derivatives use. A decision to use derivatives also depends 
on the extent of exposure and the costs of hedging. This is because a high degree of volatility of 
financial prices can be related to lower firm valuations as it reduces the expected value of future 
cash flows in a world with market imperfections (Rawls and Smithson, 1990). Froot et al. 
(1993), among others, show that as cash flow volatility not only magnifies the probability that a 
firm will need to access capital markets, but also increases the costs of doing so. Thus, it lowers 
the level of investment and result in decreasing the firm value. Consequently, firms with volatile 
cash flows or greater portions of their revenue exposed to the financial price risks might be more 
beneficial from hedging activities.  
Shapiro (1975) is the first scholar to officially model the relationship between firm value 
and exchange rate fluctuations. His two-country model predicts that the impacts of local currency 
devaluation on firm value can only be measured by examining the total effect of devaluation on 
future cash flows, because a depreciation in local currency leads to a reduction in a firm’s cash 
flows, thereby decreasing the value of that firm. Elaborating on Shapiro (1975)’s work, the 
model developed by Dumas (1978) highlights the importance of decisions to hedge against 
exchange rate risk by a firm in a multi-currency world. He argues that the decision to hedge 
exchange rate risks, by using forward contracts or other derivatives contracts, becomes a major 
financial decision to maximize firm value in the world with different currencies.  
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Using the two-country model as Dumas (1978), but Hodder (1982) emphasizes the domestic 
aspects of exposure. In the model, exchange rate exposure is divided into: domestic price related 
exposure, foreign real asset exposure, and inflation-related exposure. He shows that in order to 
eliminate these exposures, a firm can undertake hedging by using forward contracts or other 
derivatives contracts, besides foreign borrowing. And hedging activities can be applied to 
multinational corporations, importers, exporters and purely domestic firms as well. 
On the other hand, Alder and Dumas (1984) first attempt to measure exposure as a 
regression coefficient and point out how hedging can reduce exposures. They indicate that 
exposure to exchange rate risk is not intrinsically different from that of exposure to other market 
risks such as interest rates and commodity price risk. Thus, they suggest that identifying and 
hedging large exposures to exchange rate risks and other market risks can result in a reduction in 
perceptions of default risks, an improvement in bond ratings and lowering borrowing. In a 
subsequent paper, Bodnar et al. (2002) develop a duopoly model of exporting firms under 
imperfect competition to study the relationship between exposure and firm value. They show that 
exposure to exchange rate risk would be reduced if the exporter uses hedging activities. 
2.6. Institutional theory approach and hedging 
The institution-based view argues that a network of firms is a coordinated system of value-
added activities whose structure is determined by the institutions that control or affect firms’ 
objectives and behaviors (Dunning, 2003). North (1990, 1994) was among the first to emphasize 
the importance of institutions. He considers institutions much more than background conditions 
and defines institutions as “rules of the game,” including the formal rules (laws, regulations) and 
informal constraints (customs, norms, cultures) that organizations face. Institutions shape firm 
actions by determining transaction costs and transformation costs of production. As such, 
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institutions play a key role in determining the organizational outcomes and effectiveness of 
organizations (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001) as well as framing their organizational strategic 
choices (Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005).  
Therefore, to better understand the determinants of firms’ activities and their effects, it is 
necessary to consider institutional influences inside the firm and the external environment where 
firms operate simultaneously. Dunning and Lundan (2008) introduce a theoretical framework in 
the context of the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988) in order to accommodate both firm- and 
country-specific considerations. The ownership advantages (O) in the OLI paradigm now include 
institutional ownership advantages (Oi), which comprise the firm-specific characteristics and an 
indentation of the institutional environment (L attributes) (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 
2010). On the other hand, the institutionally related location advantages of countries (Li) allow 
for the interdependence between the firm and national institutions on both the micro and macro 
levels.  
Regarding the literature on hedging, although studies on traditional hedging theories are 
abundant, few empirical studies have investigated the link between differences in cross-country 
characteristics and firms’ use of derivatives. Furthermore, the findings of these studies provide 
mixed evidence. For example, Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) together with Lel (2012) 
obtained a significant association between GDP per capita and the use of derivatives in the 
predicted directions, although Lievenbruck and Schmid only found supporting evidence in the 
case of commodity price derivatives use. The effect of financial risk is always statistically 
significant but inconsistent with the hypothesized prediction (see Bartram et al., 2009). Likewise, 
regulatory quality and long-term interest rates are insignificant, while the effect of inflation rate 
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and long-term exchange rate are very weak (see Bartram et al., 2009; Livenbruck and Schmid, 
2014). 
Our study explores countries with great variances in terms of economic, political, and social 
environments. Hence, we expect to observe differences in derivatives use due to the differences 
in governance mechanisms.  
According to Globerman and Shapiro (2003), governance mechanisms consist of institutions 
and policies targeting economic, legal, and social relations. Good governance mechanisms value 
“independent judiciary and legislation, fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, 
reliable public financial information and high public trust” (Li, 2005, pp.298). As such, good 
governance mechanisms are able to reduce transaction, production, and R&D costs, leading to 
reductions in the variability of firms’ profitability and high-return, low-risk investments (Ngobo 
and Fouda, 2012). They implement policies that favor free and open markets and form effective 
and non-corrupt institutions (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). On the contrary, poor governance 
mechanisms increase costs and uncertainty (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), and they can lead to smaller, 
more volatile, and less liquid stock markets in emerging economies (Lin et al. 2008) as well as a 
lack of transparent financial data and other information on firms and a shortage of specialized 
financial intermediaries (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005).  
In this study, we focus on an important aspect of governance mechanisms, that is corruption. 
While the concept of corruption is widely studied in the economics and international business 
areas, to our knowledge, there is currently no research linking corruption with derivatives use in 
the literature. Bardhan (1997), Quazi (2014), and others view corruption as a “grabbing hand,” 
because it increases uncertainty and transaction costs, and one major cause of corruption is bad 
governance mechanisms (Lambsdorff, 2006). When it is costly to transact, institutions matter, 
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and when institutions matter, it is costly to transact (North, 1993). Thus, firms in highly corrupt 
countries may face higher transaction costs due to bribe payments and related expenses 
(Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol, 2008), which in turn leads to higher hedging costs. Along this 
line, abundant empirical evidence indicates that corruption directly deters economic growth and 
development, causing the business environment to become more uncertain and less favourable 
for profit making and firm performance (e.g., Lee and Hong, 2012; Petrou, 2015). 
Furthermore, although up to date the existing literature has been silent about the influence of 
corruption on value effects of derivatives use, some researchers (e.g. Venard and Hanfi, 2007; 
Foss, 2010; Petrou, 2014, among others) observe that firms’ exposure to corrupt countries in 
their business operations may translate to real financial losses for them. More clearly, firms that 
operate in countries with a high level of corruption are likely to engage in costly market 
transactions and less efficient transformation because that country is likely to have lower quality 
of infrastructure services, economic growth and financial stability (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999). 
The existing literature also shows that a higher level of corruption is associated with higher 
borrowing cost, worse corporate governance, and lower stock valuation. In their analyses, 
Donadelli, Fasan, and Magnanelli (2014) evidence that firms operating in highly corrupt 
countries tend to have relatively low returns. While those firms operating in countries with lower 
level of corruption can capitalize on the advantages generated by a more favorable institutional 
context for firms, which in turn has a positive influence on performance and profitability of firms 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994; Bergara, Henisz, Spiller, 1998). 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter begins with discussion about the use of derivatives. The discussion shows that 
firms can use derivatives for both hedging and speculation, but empirical studies on derivatives 
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usage present the evidence that most of firms using derivative to hedge rather than to speculate. 
In addition, although there is differences in the exact meanings of the terms “risk management”, 
“hedging” and “derivatives use”, arguments and explanations of extant literature indicate that 
these terms can be used interchangeably. 
The chapter then presented the MM theory. Starting with assumption that the capital markets 
are perfect, the theory argues that there is no risk, even there is risk, firms do not need to hedge, 
and if the firms hedge, hedging does not add value to the firms. Hedging theory relaxes the 
perfect market assumptions, and shows that if there are market imperfections, hedging can add 
value to the firms. Theory suggests that hedging can increase the firm value because (1) hedging 
reduces the probability that firms encounter bankruptcy and financial distress, thereby lowering 
the expected costs of bankruptcy and costs of financial distress; (2) hedging can reduce the tax 
burdens for a firm with a convex tax schedule and/or having tax preference items; (3) hedging 
reduces agency costs arising from conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, 
agency costs associated underinvestment, overinvestment and enhances the firm’s ability to 
finance future potential investment projects. In addition, this chapter demonstrates that firm’s 
motivations for hedging also depend on the economies of scales, and substitutes to hedging.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the theoretical association between derivatives use and 
exposures. The models of Shapiro (1975), Dumas (1978), Alder and Dumas (1984), among 
others, show that exposures to market risks make firm’s cash flows volatile, leading to lowering 
the value of the firm. However, hedging, especially hedging with derivative instruments, can 
eliminate the variability of cash flows and reduce costs of financial distress and bankruptcy costs 
associated with exposures, so hedging is a value-enhancing activities.  
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In general, these above mentioned theories and arguments provide explanations for a firm’s 
demand for using derivatives, identify relationship between the benefits of derivatives use with 
various firm-specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics as well. They also point 
out the testable ways and channels that the use of derivatives can reduce exposures to market 
risks and add value to a firm. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter two reviewed hedging theory and theoretical relationship between the use of 
derivatives and exposures, which all provided useful insights and determinants of a firm’s 
decision to use derivatives. In the past few decades, many empirical studies have been conducted 
to examine incentives of derivatives usage and to evaluate effects of hedging on firm value and 
exposure by operationalizing various theoretical predictions into empirical testable implications. 
However, the existing evidence on determinants of hedging is not quite consistent among these 
studies.  
This chapter examines the extant literature, which has focused on testing the various theories 
of value creation through hedging, and the extent to which it supports or refutes them. Following 
Aretz and Bartram (2010), we present and discuss the empirical evidence by reviewing the proxy 
variables used to test these hypotheses. The findings of this chapter will help to opt how these 
theories have been assessed in the empirical literature and whether the theories underpin what is 
observed in practice.  
In addition, this chapter surveys the extensive literature examining the relationship between 
derivatives uses and firm value. Allyannis, Lel, and Miller (2012) indicate that most of prior 
work has focused on the unconditional effect of derivatives use on firm value and has found 
mixed results; and they employ a conditional test. Based on their idea, we classify prior 
empirical studies into 2 categories, unconditional analyses and conditional analyses. 
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Furthermore, the chapter provides comprehensive review of studies on association between 
derivatives usage and exposure. Some studies analyze the relationship between derivatives use 
and exchange rate exposures, whereas some studies scrutinize derivatives usage in association 
with other different types of exposures. We will highlight and discuss the main findings emerged 
in those studies. 
We divide the empirical literature review into two main parts, in which the first part covers 
the studies outside East Asia, and the second part surveys studies on derivatives use in the East 
Asia countries. In each such sub-part, we review studies on determinants of derivatives uses, 
derivatives use and firm value, and the use of derivatives and exposures, separately. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical studies 
outside East Asia. Section 3 surveys the empirical studies in East Asia. Finally, the chapter 
concludes. 
3.2. Empirical studies outside East Asia 
3.2.1. Determinants of derivatives use 
This section surveys papers that tested empirically hedging theory, which were presented in 
the chapter 2, in countries outside East Asia over a few last decades from 1993 to present by 
analyzing their evidence through reviewing the most commonly used proxy variables. 
(INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE) 
3.2.1.1. Bankruptcy costs and costs of financial distress 
To test the hypothesis of bankruptcy and financial distress cost, empirical studies over the 
last few decades have been using many proxies to measure the likelihood of these costs. 
Leverage is the most popular proxy, as financial distress is more pronounced with more debt in a 
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firm’s capital structure, so a firm with higher leverage is more prone to hedge.  As shown in the 
table 3.2, twenty out of twenty four papers use this variable, but there is not clear-cut evidence. 
In spite of finding that leverage is statistically significant, Chen and King (2014), Lievenbruck 
and Schmid (2014), among others, present evidence of positive relationship between leverage 
and derivatives usage, while other researchers such as Afza and Alam (2011) find the negative 
association between them. On the other hand, Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), Lel (2012) show that 
leverage has no effect on firm’s decision to use derivatives, as the coefficient of this variable is 
positive but insignificant.  
Besides leverage, many studies employ interest coverage ratio and debt ratio to present the 
probability of financial distress and bankruptcy. Most of studies (e.g., Chen and King, 2014; 
Kumar and Rabinovitch, 2013; among others), find out a positive relationship between debt ratio 
and derivatives use and negative effect of interest coverage ratio on derivatives usage. These 
findings imply that firms with higher debt ratio and/or lower interest cover ratio are more likely 
to use derivatives to lower costs of financial distress. On the contrary, Spano (2007), Charumathi 
and Kota (2012) indicate that these factors do not influence the firms’ decisions on using 
derivatives. 
In similar fashion, some studies propose the profitability, which is estimated as gross margin 
and ratio of earnings to total assets (ROA), as a measure of financial distress. A firm with lower 
gross margin and/or ROA is likely to use more derivatives because it has more difficulties in 
meeting its payment obligations and higher risk of insolvency. However, the empirical evidence 
is unclear. Chen and King (2014), Afza and Alam (2011) find supporting evidence for this 
argument, while Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) find out the opposite association, and Aabo and 
Ploeen (2014) indicate that ROA has no impact on derivatives use. Especially, Clark and Judge 
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(2008) employ tax loss carry forwards as a proxy for profitability as it presents the existence of 
net losses, but they find weak evidence that it is positively related to derivatives usage. 
Firm size is also widely used in the extant literature. Nance et al. (1993) state that a firm’s 
probability of financial distress is directly connected to the size of firm’s fixed claims relative to 
value of its assets. Although the direction of relation between firm size and derivatives usage is 
ambiguous, the overall evidence of empirical studies gives strong support for the view that the 
larger a firm, the more derivatives the firm uses to reduce costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Aabo and Ploeen, 2014; Júnior, 2013; Gay et al., 2011). 
The judgement of other market participants about a firm’s survial chances may predict the 
likelihood of financial distress and bankuptcy. As such, a firm with lower credit rating may 
induce to use more derivatives. Chen and King (2014) employ Altman’s Z-score, while Judge 
and Clark (2008) use Qui-score as proxy for credit rating, and Sprcic and Sevic (2012) use 
dummy variable. Although all researchers find that credit rating is a determinant of firms’ 
decision on using derivatives, the effect for this variable is mixed. Chen and King (2014), Judge 
and Clark (2008) obtain the evidence that firms will use more derivatives to alleviate financial 
distress when they obtain lower credit rating, but Sprcic and Sevic (2012) indicate that the higher 
credit rating, the more derivatives use by non-financial firms in Croatia. 
In general speaking, the existing evidence provides mixed support for the hypothesis of 
bankruptcy costs and financial costs. Testing the case of non-financial firms in UK, Judge 
(2006a, 2006b) finds a strong relationship between financial distress costs and foreign currency 
hedging decision, which is much stronger than many previous studies in the U.S. Recently, Chen 
and King (2014) examine 1832 U.S non-financial firms and present evidence consistent with 
financial distress cost arguments. In contrast, Géczy et al. (1997), Charumathi and Kota (2012) 
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state that there is no evidence supporting this hypothesis. Especially, Guay and Kothari (2003) 
suggest a need to rethink the past empirical research on firms’ derivatives use. 
(INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE) 
3.2.1.2. Corporate taxes 
Empirical studies employ variables measuring for tax convexity, and tax preference items as 
proxies for testing tax argument. Nance et al. (1993), and Mian (1996) use progressivity dummy 
when investigating derivatives use of 169 non-financial firms of Fortune 500, and 3022 firms 
from Compustat and Narrs. However, they do not find any evidence supporting this hypothesis 
when progressivity dummy variables are insignificant at any confidence levels. 
Furthermore, to assess whether the taxable income of a firm is in convex region of the tax 
schedule, marginal tax rates and tax charges to market value are used as proxies and these 
proxies lead to mixed results. Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) present evidence of a positive 
association between marginal tax rates and the use of derivatives, while Spano (2007) shows that 
firms use more derivatives to alleviate tax burden when its ratio of tax charges to market value is 
lower. 
In addition to statutory progressivity, tax preference items such as tax loss carry forwards, 
foreign tax credits, and investment tax credits also make tax function more convex. The most 
commonly used variable is tax loss carry forwards, but the evidence is inclusive. Judge (2006a) 
finds strong evidence that the greater the tax loss- carry -forwards, the more derivatives firms use 
to reduce tax burden. Whereas Géczy et al. (1997) do not find any supporting evidence for this 
variable in both univariate and multivariate tests. Alternatively, Afza and Alam (2011), among 
others, employ dummy variable to denote the availability of tax loss carry forwards. However, 
only study by Supavanij and Strauss (2010) shows that this variable has significantly positive 
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effect on derivatives use. In contrast, Gay et al. (2011) indicate that firms with more tax loss 
carry forwards have less incentive to use derivatives. Additionally, Sprcic and Sevic (2012) 
employ total value of tax loss carry forwards and tax loss carry backs to total assets, but they also 
do not find any statistically significant evidence. 
Overall, most studies find some evidence supporting tax incentive argument, especially, the 
empirical evidence based on tax preference items and assessment of taxable income. Supanvanij 
and Strauss (2010) find that tax loss carry forwards is important factor in determining the use of 
foreign currency derivatives, while Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) indicate that foreign tax 
credits are in the direction hypothesized and firms use derivatives to increase the present value of 
tax losses. In contrast, Sprcic and Sevic (2012) finds that the evidence in favor of the tax 
hypothesis is very weak, while Gay et al (2011) do not find any evidence in support of the tax 
incentive to increase debt capacity.  
(INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE) 
3.2.1.3. Agency costs of debt 
Most often, proxy measures growth opportunities is market to book ratio (or book to market 
value). The theory hypothesizes that firms with higher market to book ratio have more incentives 
to use derivatives to reduce agency costs of debt, however, large body of empirical studies do not 
find evidence consistent with the theoretical prediction. While Supanvanij and Strauss (2010), 
among others, present a significantly negative association between this variable and the use of 
derivatives, Júnior (2013) finds out a significant relationship but at opposite direction. In 
contrast, from earlier studies such as Guay and Kothari (2003) to recent studies (e.g., Chen and 
King, 2014; Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; Aabo and Ploeen, 2014) show that market to book 
ratio is not a determinant of derivatives use. 
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However, empirical results intensely support the hypothesized relation between R&D 
expenditures, the second most popular measure for growth opportunities, and the use of 
derivatives (Aabo and Ploeen, 2014; Spano, 2007; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Géczy et al., 
1997). R&D expenditures provide a reasonable indicator of future project development (Triki, 
2005). Hence, higher R&D expenditures indicate higher availability of growth opportunities, 
implying a higher propensity of hedging. In the same fashion, Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013) 
use capital expenditure, while Sprcic and Sevic (2012) employ investment expenditures as 
proxies of a firm’s growth opportunities. Both studies exhibit results consistent with theory 
agrument, suggesting that firms with more capital expenditures or investment expenditures hedge 
more agency cost of debt by using derivatives.  
With respect to the more indirect measure of growth opportunities, the earnings to price ratio 
(E/P ratio) is served as a proxy in several studies. Firms with low earnings but high share price 
seem to obtain most of their value from profitable expansion opportunities, thus E/P ratio and the 
use of derivatives should be negatively associated (Aret and Bartram, 2010). This proxy provides 
strong support for the hypothesis of agency cost of debt in the study of Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996), Adedeji and Baker (2002). By contrast with these findings, recent study by Charumathi 
and Kota (2012) indicates that E/P ratio does not affect the firm’s decision to use derivatives. 
Furthermore, firm’s investment opportunities can be tested by employing liquidity variable. 
Firms are more prone to forgo positive present value projects or encountering underinvestment 
problem when their cash flow holdings are low, thus higher liquidity should lead to higher 
probability of using derivatives. Nguyen and Faff (2002) evidence a significantly postive relation 
between that variable and derivative use. Additionally, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) use dividend 
38 
 
as alternative proxy, but they do not find any significant relation between that variable and the 
use of derivatives. 
Agency cost of debt theory also argues that firms use derivatives to lower agency costs 
related to overinvestment problems. To evaluate that relationship Lel (2012), Fauver and Naranjo 
(2010) use free cash flow ratio as proxy on the ground that overinvestment problem is more 
observable in the case of firms with larger free cash flows and fewer investment opportunities. 
Empirical evidence strongly support that free cash flow ratio is a significant determinant of 
derivatives usage. However, if Fauver and Naranjo (2010) present a positive relationship 
between them consistent with theory prediction, Lel (2012) indicates that lower free cash flow 
result in higher likelihood of hedging by derivatives.  
In terms of financial constraints, the empirical studies support the hypothesis that financial 
constraints should lead to higher propensity for using derivatives to alleviate agency cost of debt. 
These tests are based on leverage and gearing variables (Chen and King, 2014; Judge, 2006), or 
profit margin (Bartram, Brown, and Fehle, 2009). Evidence from these studies highly support 
that they are determinants of firms’ derivatives use.  
To sum up, empirical studies on testing the agency cost of debt theory provide inconclusive 
evidence. The evidence to support the underinvestment cost theory can be found in Chen and 
King (2014), Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013), Fauver and Naranjo (2010), among others. 
However, investigating 121 large Indian non- financial companies, Charumathi and Kota (2012) 
indicates that the agency cost of debt hypothesis fails to provide convincing evidences in 
predicting a firm's derivative use. This finding is consistent with recent study by Lievenbruck 
and Schmid (2014), and earlier studies such as Nance et al. (1993), and Tufano (1996). 
(INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE) 
39 
 
3.2.1.4. Economies of scale 
As mentioned in the chapter 2, up to date there is no theoretical model investigating the 
relationship between hedging and economies of scale, but many prior studies use firm size as 
good proxy for economies of scale, although an association between firm size and hedging is still 
indeterminate. 
In spite of different measures of firm size, many empirical studies figure out that larger 
firms have more motivations to use derivatives (e.g., Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; Aabo and 
Ploeen, 2014; Júnior, 2013; Lel, 2012, among others). In contrast, Chen and King (2014) obtain 
the significant but negative association between firm size and derivatives use, suggesting that 
smaller firms use more derivatives than larger firms. While, Charumathi and Kota (2012), Kumar 
and Rabinovitch (2013) show that firm size is not a determinant of derivatives usage.  
In addition to firm size, Géczy et al. (1997) employ two proxies related to substitute to 
hedging with derivatives, namely foreign denominated debt and other types of derivatives to 
measure economies of scales. They hypothesize that benefits from hedging are greater for firms 
having more foreign denominated debt or using other types of derivatives, thus, these proxies are 
expected to be positive to hedging. They also use a variable associated to tax, that is pre tax 
foreign income, as a proxy of economies of scale and they find significantly positive relation 
between that variable and derivatives use.  
 (INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE) 
3.2.1.5. Substitutes to hedging with derivatives 
The prior studies indicate that a firm’s decision to use derivatives is also affected by other 
financial policies. Three substitutes to hedging with derivatives considered in extant literature are 
natural hedging, dividend policy and liquidity, and diversification. 
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With regards to natural hedging, convertible debt and foreign denominated debt are the most 
mainly used proxy in empirical studies. Nance et al. (1993) argue that firms with convertible 
debt have less incentive to hedge. Elliot, Huffman and Makar (2003) present strongly significant 
evidence that foreign denominated debt is negatively related to derivatives use, interpreting that 
it is used as a substitute for derivatives in reducing risks. On the contrary, recent studies show 
that they do not find evidence that firms prefer using foreign denominated debt than derivatives 
as hedging instruments (see Aabo and Ploeen, 20014; Júnior, 2013). Further, preference capital 
and long-term loans are included in some studies as proxy of natural hedging, but none of these 
studies obtain significant evidence supporting the notion that preference capital and long-term 
loans can replace derivatives in hedging risks (Clark and Judge, 2008; Guay and Kothari, 2003).  
In terms of dividend policy, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) indicate that the likelihood of the 
firm using derivatives is lower when the firm’s dividend payout is smaller. As such, dividend 
payout and dividend yield are used mainly in prior empirical studies, and expected to be positive 
to the use of derivatives. Nevertheless, empirical studies provide overall mixed evidence. Lel 
(2012), among others, strongly support the positive association between dividend yields and 
derivatives use, but Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) indicate that lower dividend yield increase the 
possibility of using derivatives by firms.  
By the same token, it is predicted that liquidity is negatively related to the use of derivatives. 
Current ratio and quick ratio are employed as proxies of liquidity in extant empirical literature, of 
which quick ratio is preferred. In deed, in most of empirical studies, variable of quick ratio 
exhibits significant association with derivatives use in predicted sign. Therefore, it confirms that 
liquid assets are alternative hedging instruments rather than derivatives (e.g., Gay et al., 2011; 
Afza and Alam, 2011, among others). On the contrary, some other studies such as Sprcic and 
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Sevic (2012), Clark and Judge (2008) do not find any evidence supporting the theoretical 
arguments. In terms of variable current ratio, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) confirm that 
liquidity acts as hedging substitute, whereas Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013) do not find any 
significant evidence. 
Diversification is the third hedging substitute method considered in the literature. It is 
expected that the higher degree of diversification lead to lower propensity of using derivatives. 
Empirical studies employ several proxies to measure firms’ extent of diversification, but they 
yield mixed results. Specifically, Júnior (2013), Chen and King (2014) obtain the significant 
association between industry and geographic diversification and derivatives use in predicted 
directions. By contrast, Aabo and Ploeen (2014) obtains significant evidence for variable foreign 
assets but it is not of hypothesized direction. 
To sum up, the prior empirical studies provide inconclusive evidence of the substitute to 
hedging with derivatives. There is relatively strong evidence that probability of using derivatives 
is lower when firms have more liquid assets or lower dividend payout or smaller dividend yields. 
It supports the view that firms can use liquidity and dividend policy to manage risks rather than 
derivatives. In contrast, supporting evidence of natural hedging and diversification is very weak. 
Their finding raises question about the complexity of the relationship between diversification and 
the use of derivatives.  
(INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE) 
3.2.1.6. Country-specific characteristics 
The above sections show that existing empirical studies provide overall mixed evidence, and 
some studies find no evidence supporting hedging theory. Bartram et al. (2009) indicate that 
traditional tests of hedging theory have little power to explain the determinants of derivatives 
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usage. The inconclusive evidence may arise from the fact that a large body of extant literature 
investigates the firm-specific determinants of the use of derivatives, but a firm’s decisions to use 
derivatives may not only depend on the firm’s characteristics, but also are affected by the 
characteristics of the country where it operates. Therefore, a few researchers include country-
specific characteristics in their analyses to investigate determinants of derivatives use. 
There are very limited empirical studies investigating whether differences in economic, 
financial and legal environments across countries affect firms’ decisions to use derivatives. 
Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014), Lel (2012) obtain significant association between GDP per 
capita and derivatives use in the predicted directions. The positive relationship between them 
implies that the higher the development of economies, the higher propensity of using derivatives 
by firms. In addition, Bartram et al. (2009) present that derivatives market rank is significantly 
important factor explaining why firms use derivatives. Their results imply that firms use more 
derivatives when they operate in countries with developed derivative markets.  
Other factors provide mixed evidence at best. In particular, the effect of financial risk is 
always statistically significant but it is not at hypothesized prediction, whereas an effective legal 
environment has significant and positive effect on foreign currency derivatives, but it is unrelated 
to interest rate derivatives and commodity price derivatives (Bartram et al., 2009). By the same 
fashion, closely held shares are statistically significant but just in the case of commodity price 
derivatives usage (Livenbruck and Schmid, 2014). Variables regulatory quality and long-term 
interest rates are insignificant, while the effect of inflation rate and long term exchange rate are 
very weak (Bartram et al., 2009). 
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3.2.2. Derivatives use and firm value 
The relationship between derivative use and firm value remains an open question, as 
empirical evidence is overall inconclusive. In this section, we will review the papers that 
investigated the association between firm value and the use of derivatives by firms in countries 
outside East Asia over a few last decades from 2001 to the present. We partition existing 
empirical studies into 2 categories, unconditional analyses and conditional analyses. 
(INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE) 
3.2.2.1. Unconditional analyses of relationship between derivatives use and firm value 
A large body of the existing literature has investigated unconditional value effects of 
derivatives use, and they provide mixed evidence. In the first stream, many studies show that 
derivatives use is a value-increasing activity. Allayannis and Weston (2001) is the first to use 
Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value, and observe that Tobin’s Q increases among the derivative 
users, indicating that the use of derivatives increases firm value. Following them, Belghitar, 
Clark and Mefteh (2013), Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011), among others, also employ 
Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. Although measures of Tobin’s Q vary across papers, most of 
them find a significant and positive relationship between firm value and any type of derivatives 
use. 
However, it is interesting to note that in spite of finding that derivatives use enhances firm 
value, the estimated magnitudes of the hedging premium vary across the studies. In terms of 
foreign currency derivatives, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the use of foreign currency 
derivatives increases the total firm value of U.S non-financial firms by average 4.8%. Taking 
U.S firms into account as well, Magee (2008) finds that the estimated long-run effect of foreign 
currency hedging on Tobin’s Q is 1.939, suggesting that foreign currency hedging is associated 
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with an increase in firm value of 6.33%. In the case of non-financial firms in the UK, Clark and 
Judge (2009) indicate that foreign currency derivatives use increases firm value and hedging 
premium for all foreign currency hedgers is 12%, while hedging premiums for interest rate and 
commodity price derivative users ranges between 11% and 34%, respectively. These hedging 
premiums are considerably larger than premiums found in studies on U.S firms. On the contrary, 
Gómez-González, Rincón, and Rodríguez (2012) find that for Columbian corporations, an 
increase in foreign currency derivative use leads to a hedging premium of 1.8% on average. 
Furthermore, Campello, Lin, Ma and Zou (2011) do not calculate hedging premium, but 
they present the evidence that average firm in their sample has an annual net gain from hedging 
of about 4.7% of its annual income. Meanwhile, Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) use a large 
sample of non financial firms from 47 countries in 2000-2001 and point out that the effect of 
derivative use on firm value is positive but more sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variable 
concerns. 
In the second stream, there is some empirical evidence that the use of derivatives decreases 
firm value at some degrees. Khediri and Folus (2010) examine 320 non- financial listed firms in 
France and indicate that the derivative users have lower firm value than the non -users. Nguyen 
and Faff (2010) present that a hedging discount is most severely imposed on users of swaps, and 
it represents a 24% reduction in firm value in a sample consisting of 428 Australian firms. 
Consistent with the prior studies, Supanvanij (2011) shows weak evidence that economic value 
added can be negatively affected by the interest rate derivatives at 10% significance level. 
In other strand, some previous studies do not provide any evidence of association between 
derivatives use and firm value, or provide mixed results. Representatively, Belghitar et al. (2013) 
conclude that there is no evidence of value creation of foreign currency derivative use, although 
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it is effective in reducing overall foreign currency exposure in case of French non financial firms. 
Likewise, Supanvaij (2011) finds no value effects for foreign currency derivative users, while the 
use of interest rate derivatives reduces firm value. Khediri and Folus (2010) also do not report 
significant results that are consistent with the argument that the use of derivatives increases the 
firm value. Especially, Magee (2008) finds that foreign currency hedging hinges on past amounts 
of firm value. Therefore, although foreign currency derivatives in long-term increases firm value 
by 6.33%, after controlling past effect of firm value the use of foreign currency derivatives does 
not affect firm value.   
More interestingly, some researchers raise doubt about the relationship between derivatives 
use and firm value, and findings of other earlier studies. Guay and Kothari (2003) find that 
derivatives use generates modest amount relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash 
flows, and other benchmarks. So, they suggest that the substantial increases in firm value 
documented in the previous studies are either driven by other risk-management activities (e.g., 
operational hedges) that are correlated with derivatives use, or that the results are spurious.  
3.2.2.2. Conditional analyses of relationship between derivatives use and firm value  
Fauver and Naranjo (2010) points out that there might be agency costs of debt and 
monitoring problems related to derivatives use, thereby increasing probability of reduction in 
firm value at the expense of shareholders. Therefore, on contrary to empirical studies testing a 
direct relation between the use of derivatives and firm value as mentioned in the previous part, a 
few studies, namely Fauver and Naranjo (2010), Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012), Marami and 
Dubois (2013), Chen and King (2014), investigate the conditional effects of derivatives use on 
firm value.  
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To our best knowledge, Fauver and Naranjo (2010) is the first to examine the relationship 
between derivatives usage and value effects associated with agency and monitoring problems. 
Following the prior researchers, they use Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value in an analysis of 
1746 non-financial firms located in U.S from 1991 to 2000. They find that firms with greater 
agency and monitoring problems exhibit a negative association between Tobin's Q and derivative 
usage. The negative effect is significant with an impact of -8.4% on Tobin's Q from a one 
standard deviation change in the firm monitoring index. 
By the same token, Allayannis et al. (2012) takes into account corporate governance 
problems at both internal firm-level and external country-level. Their study shows that the use of 
currency derivatives for firms with strong firm- level and country- level governance is associated 
with a significant value premium of 10.7%, whereas there is no hedging premium for firms with 
weak corporate governance. 
In addition, Chen and King (2014) investigates value effect of derivatives use interacted 
with cost of debt among 1832 U.S non-financial firms during the period of 1994-2009, and 
evidences that hedging is positively related to Tobin’s Q, supporting the view that that the use of 
derivatives creates value. They also indicate that derivatives use creates value by mitigating 
negative effect of increasing borrowing costs on capital expenditure, which is evidenced by 
positive estimated coefficient on interaction term between hedging and yield spread. 
On the other hand, some other studies find mixed evidence on value effect of derivatives 
use. Analyzing the link between mandatory and voluntary interest rate derivatives use and firm 
value, Marami and Dubois (2013) find that mandatory use increases firm value with average 
premium of 7.6%. But there is no significant impact from voluntary ones. Additionally, 
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Pramborg (2004) finds that there is a positive value effect from hedging transaction exposure for 
firms that are geographically diversified, while hedging translation exposure does not add value. 
3.2.3. Effects of derivatives usage on exposure 
A firm’s value is determined by two variables: expected net cash flow and discount rate 
(cost of capital). A reduction in cost of capital as a consequence of reduced exposure leads to an 
increase in firm value; and value relevance of derivatives use should be gauged quantitatively by 
the reduced exposure as a contributing factor to enhanced firm value in the value chain (Zhou 
and Wang, 2013). While determinants of derivatives use have been relatively thoroughly 
investigated, the impact of financial derivatives use on firms' exposure has only recently become 
a subject for empirical analysis and the research remains occasional. Moreover, most of previous 
studies focus on foreign currency exposure, but interest rate exposure and commodity price risk 
are not examined in-depth. And the empirical evidence is mixed at best. 
 (INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE) 
In the first strand, several studies assess the effect of derivatives use on exposure and report 
significant reduction in exposure. These studies report exposure effects ranging from as low as 
2.387% to as high as 54%. Following Jorison (1990), Allyannis and Ofek (2001) use a market 
model, and show that there is a negative relationship between a firm’s exchange rate exposure 
and its hedging intensity.  
Consistent with Allyannis and Ofek (2001), Nguyen and Faff (2003) apply the same 
methodology, and their results support the view that foreign currency derivatives reduce 
exchange rate exposure in the long run. Additionally, Zhou and Wang (2013) evidences that UK 
non-financial firms use derivatives to hedge against unfavorable exchange rate movements and 
hedging is effective in reducing firms' risk exposure to varied degrees. 
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On the other hand, Adam and Fernando (2006) applies Fama-French model to examine the 
case of 92 gold mining firms in North America from 1989-1999. They conclude that hedging is 
immensely profitable as derivative users alleviate their one-year exposure to gold prices by 54% 
on average, and earn substantial additional cash flows from their derivative transactions.  
Huffman, Makar and Beyer (2010) investigate a sample of 185 US MNCs with exposure to 
exchange rate risk by applying Fama-French model and market model. When the dependent 
variable is the highest foreign exchange exposure, both models find that hedging is negatively 
related to the exposures, suggesting that derivatives usage leads to lower probability of foreign 
exchange exposures being faced by firms.  
Notably, employing market model, Clark and Mefteh (2011), Belghitar et al. (2013) 
emphasize that foreign currency derivatives use by French non-financial firms has a significant 
negative effect on foreign currency exposure only when asymmetry is considered. Further, 
attempting to provide evidence of relationship between hedging and exposure in the international 
context, Bartram, Brown and Minton (2010) examine 1150 firms from 6 countries in 2003 by 
applying the market model. They find that foreign currency derivatives reduces exposure to 
exchange rate risk by about 11.5%, while financial hedging (foreign currency debt and 
derivatives) accounts for approximately 40% reduction in exposure. On the contrary, Hutson and 
Laing (2014) figure out that both derivatives use and operational hedging significantly alleviate 
exposure, supporting the notion that operational hedging and the use of derivatives are 
complementary, rather than substitutes. 
In the second strand, the arguments that derivatives usage efficiently reduces firm’s 
exposures are questioned by some empirical studies. On contrary to findings of Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001), Choi and Jiang (2009) find that financial hedging has no impact on exposures for 
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both MNC and non-MNC in both the market and Fama-French models. We argue that reasons 
may arise from the difference in explanatory variables. In deed, the former uses notional value of 
derivatives use in a single year of 1993, whereas the latter uses financial hedging dummy with a 
size and industry-matched MNC and non-MNC sample during the period of 2000-2006.  
Recently, Treanor et al. (2014) present evidence that hedging premium does not increase in 
U.S airlines facing exposure to fuel prices, implying that hedging may not reduce fuel price risk 
in US airline industry. Consistently, Berghofer and Lucey (2014) also reject the hypothesis that 
financial hedging decreases exposure to fuel prices. 
In other stream, Nguyen and Faff (2010) provide mixed results. They report that for 
derivative users with hedging intensity of less than 40%, the use of interest rate derivatives 
reduces risk by approximately 2.387%. In the case of extensive derivative users, on the other 
hand, derivative use seems to increase firm risk. However, when they compare derivative users 
and non-users, they find no evidence suggesting that those firms are more exposed to risks than 
non-users.  
By the same token, Yip and Nguyen (2012) scrutinizes the effect of derivatives use on 
exposure when the global financial crisis happened. They evidence that exchange rate exposure 
is time varying, and derivatives usage is related to a lower levels of exposure when exposure is 
solely regressed against it. However, there is not adequate evidence to show that an increased 
derivatives use leads to lower exposures during the global financial crisis. 
The reasons why derivatives use is not related to a reduction in exposures can come from the 
fact that firms implement other hedging methods such as operational hedging, or natural 
hedging. Second, it may be due to selective hedging from firms. Third, the amount of derivatives 
use is small relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks 
50 
 
especially when foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices change at the same 
time as Guay and Kothari (2003) point out. Four, problems may lie beneath the augmented 
market model, on which many studies primarily rely. In particular, a hinted assumption of 
augmented market model is that exposure is constant over time, but Yip and Nguyen (2012) 
figures out that foreign exchange exposure is time varying.  
3.3. Empirical studies in East Asia 
There is a fact that due to the lack of availability of data on hedging positions, studies on 
derivatives use of East Asian firms are relatively rare and limited in scope. In this section, we 
will review empirical studies on determinants of derivatives use, on the value effects of 
derivatives usage, and on the association between the use of derivatives and exposures in the 
context of East Asia from 1998 to the present. 
 (INSERT TABLE 3.9 HERE) 
3.3.1. Determinants of derivatives use 
To the best of our knowledge, only Allyannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) analyze exchange 
rate derivatives use of 372 non-financial firms across 8 East Asia countries in the period of 1996-
1998. They evidence that, in contrast to studies on US firms, there is limited support for 
hypotheses of costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, and agency cost of debt. Likewise, they 
do not find positive relationship between firm size and the use of derivatives, except the case of 
Hong Kong firms.  
More interestingly, they indicate that derivative use does not increase firm value and there is 
no evidence that East Asian firms eliminate their foreign exchange exposure by using 
derivatives, because the use of foreign exchange derivatives was selective, too narrow in scope, 
and interrupted when the Asian financial crisis began. Additionally, in comparison with firms not 
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using derivatives, they find that in pre-crisis period, derivative users perform as poorly as those 
firms. In the after-crisis period, derivative users perform better than non-users to some degree; 
however, this result is due to derivative market illiquidity during that period.  
Other studies examine derivatives use within one country and the focus of most studies is 
the understanding of determinants of currency derivatives usage. Hu and Wang (2006) fails to 
support hedging theory in the case of 419 non-financial firms in Hong Kong, but they find 
evidence supporting the notion that derivatives use reduces exposure that firms face. Notably, 
their results show that firm-specific characteristics do not affect firms’ decisions to hedge, but 
other specific factors of Hong Kong such as currency policy, knowledge of foreign currency 
hedging are determinants of derivative activities. 
On the contrary, Tungsong (2010) investigates the case of Thailand, and they exhibit strong 
evidence that firms use derivatives to alleviate costs of financial distress, and agency costs of 
debt. Likewise, Lantara (2012) examines firms in Indonesia and indicates that the larger the firm, 
the higher the growth opportunities of the firms, the greater exposures that firms face lead to 
higher extent of derivatives use. Additionally, negative association between liquidity and 
derivatives use suggest that liquid assets can act as hedging substitute.  
All other studies analyze the case of non-financial firms in Malaysia (e.g., Fazilah, Azizan, 
and Hui, 2008; Ahmad and Haris, 2012; Shaari et al., 2013; Chong, Chang, and Tan, 2014). The 
common feature of these studies is that almost all variables being examined are statistically 
significant but at opposite hypothesized prediction. Firstly, on contrary to arguments of 
substitutes to hedging with derivatives, Fazilah et al. (2008) figure out that the smaller the 
dividend yield, the higher the probability of using derivatives by firms, whereas Shaari et al. 
(2013) exhibit statistically positive relationship between liquidity and the use of derivatives. 
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Secondly, it is extremely astonishing that in the analysis of hypothesis of financial distress and 
bankruptcy costs, Shaari et al. (2013) show that firms with lower leverage or lower profitability 
use more derivatives to hedge those costs. Recently, Chong et al. (2014) surveys 219 non-
financial firms in Malaysia, but they concentrate on hedging practices rather than testing hedging 
theory. 
3.3.2. Derivatives use and firm value 
As shown in table 3.9, there are very limited empirical studies on the association between 
derivative use and firm value in the context of East Asia. Actually, no study directly investigates 
that relationship across countries in East Asia, but a few examine the value effects of derivatives 
usage across industries of one country. Remarkably, two out of these three studies take into 
account both financial firms and non-financial firms, and provide ambiguous evidence at best. 
Ameer (2009) uses firm share price as proxy for firm value to examine a sample of 40 listed non 
-financial firms and banks for the period of 2003-2007 in Malaysia. He finds that although 
disclosed notional amount of the derivatives have value relevance but its contribution to a firm's 
valuation is very minimal.  
On the other hand, Oktavia (2012) examines 160 financial and non-financial firms in 
Indonesia. In his study, price to book value ratio acts as proxy of market value, and his findings 
show that non-financial firms use derivatives for speculation, while banks use derivatives for 
hedging. More importantly, he evidences that derivatives use by non-financial firms can enhance 
shareholder value, but it does not affect earnings of banks.  
Among studies scrutinizing the value effects of derivatives usage, only Yin and Qui-qi 
(2010) use Tobin’s Q with a sample of 295 non-financial Chinese firms. Consistent with most of 
studies outside East Asia, they find that derivatives use rewards firms with higher value. 
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3.3.3. Effects of derivatives use on exposures 
Empirical studies on value effect of derivatives use are very limited, but empirical studies on 
association between the use of derivatives and exposures are more rare. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is only study by Ameer, Matisa and Abdullah (2011) directly investigates that 
association. However, they show that the use of derivatives is not statistically significant to 
firms’ cost of capital, indicating that derivatives use does not affect the extent of exposures to 
which firms face.  
In spite of not examining the relationship between derivatives use and exposures directly, 
He and Ng (1998) is the first paper and up to date is the most thorough analysis of exposures that 
Japanese multinational firms face. They find that 25% of firms in the sample experience 
economically significant positive exposure effects, and highly leveraged firms, or firms with low 
liquidity tend to have smaller exposures. More importantly, they evidence that consistent with 
hedging theory, the extent to which a firm is exposed to exchange rate volatility can be explained 
by variables that are proxied for a firm’s hedging motivations. These findings suggest that 
Japanese MNCs with high leverage or low liquidity use more derivatives to hedge, and 
eventually reduce exchange rate exposure.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that one caveat to the above generalization of prior empirical 
studies is that they only investigate exchange rate exposure, but ignore other types of exposures. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter evaluated the extant empirical studies on testing hedging theory, on value 
effects of derivatives use, and on relationship between derivatives use and exposures in the 
context of both outside and inside East Asia by carefully assembling, classifying and analyzing 
evidence through dependent variables, widely used explanatory variables and methodologies. 
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The first finding reveals that the vast body of extant literature focuses on developed countries 
outside of East Asia, while studies on this region are very limited. 
Secondly, the comprehensive review of prior studies on determinants of derivatives usage 
shows that prior studies provide overall mixed results. For example, most of variables used to 
test hypothesis of financial distress and bankruptcy costs provide ambiguous evidence, although 
a small number of variables, such as credit rating, are statistically significant and in the 
hypothesized directions. Additionally, several variables such as leverage, dividend, liquidity, and 
size are used as proxies in tests of more than one hypothesis. Thus, it leads to complexity in 
interpreting results and makes analyses less powerful. Besides variables investigating traditional 
hedging theory, in recent years, new explanations for firms’ incentives to use derivatives, which 
are based on country-specific characteristics, are considered in the literature. To measure 
difference in economic, financial and political environment across countries, these studies 
employ different variables, however, they also do not provide clear-cut evidence. Therefore, the 
review argues that it is necessary to improve hedging theory, as well as the variables to measure 
determinants of derivatives use. 
Thirdly, this chapter thoroughly surveys empirical studies on relationship between the use of 
derivatives and firm value and finds out that the extant literature can be broken down into 
unconditional analyses and conditional analyses. In spite of different measures across studies, 
Tobin’s Q is the most popularly used proxy of firm value in both unconditional and conditional 
studies. In the group of unconditional tests on value effects of derivatives usage, many studies 
find positive relationship, but hedging premium ranges from 4.87% to 34%. Other papers show 
no relation or mixed results. Recently, a few researchers propose investigation for the conditional 
effects of derivatives use on firm value. Nevertheless, they provide relatively different results 
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with different effects. The impact of derivatives usage on firm value is, therefore, an open 
empirical issue. 
Fourthly, the review of studies on association between derivatives use and exposures show 
that most of studies find negative relationship between them, suggesting that the use of 
derivatives reduces the extent of exposures to which firms face, while other papers find 
contracting evidence or no relation. We strongly find that the mixed results of prior studies may 
come from different models they use; even they use the same model but derivative dummy is 
explored rather than derivative notional value also leads to different results. More importantly, 
we find that different effects of derivatives use may derive from the fact that firms use other 
hedging methods besides derivatives, or firms selectively hedge; or the amount of derivatives is 
small or exposures are time-varying. 
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Table 3.1: Empirical studies examining hedging theory (in chronological order) 
No 
 
Authors 
 
Year 
Area of  
study 
Country &  
Sample size 
Methodology 
Dependent  
variables 
Financial 
distress costs 
Taxes 
Agency cost 
of debt 
Economies 
of scales 
Substitutes 
to derivatives 
Country-specific 
characteristics 
1 Nance, Smith, Smithson 1993 All Fortune 500 – 169 Logit Binary       
2 Berkman and Bradbury 1996 All New Zealand-116 Tobit Continuous       
3 Mian 1996 FC & IR Compstat &Narrs-3022 Logit Binary       
4 Tufano 1996 CP North America -48 Tobit Continuous       
5 Géczy, Minton, Schrand 1997 FC US -372 Logit Binary       
6 Allayannis and Ofek 2001 FC S&P500- 378 Cragg model  Binary/Continuous       
7 Nguyen and Faff 2002 All Australia- 239 Logit/Tobit Binary/Continuous       
8 Abimbola and Adedeji 2002 IR UK Survey/Logit Binary       
9 Elliott, Huffman, Makar 2003 FC US – 88 3SLS Continuous       
10 Hagelin 2003 FC Sweden -160 Logit /Cragg Binary       
11 Guay and Kothari 2003 All Compstat – 413 Probit Continuous       
12 Judge 2006 FC UK- 366 Logit Binary       
13 Judge 2006 All UK- 441 Logit Binary       
14 Spano 2007 FC UK- 443 Tobit/Probit Binary/Continuous       
15 Clark and Judge 2008 FC UK-366 Logit Binary       
16 Bartram, Brown, Fehle 2009 All 50 countries- 7319 Probit Binary       
17 Supanvanij and Strauss 2010 FC & IR S&P500-198 
Two stage 
IV approach 
Continuous  
 
      
18 Fauver and Naranjo 2010 All US- 1746 Logit Binary       
19 Afza and Alam 2011 FC Pakistan-86 Logit Binary       
20 Gay, Lin, Smith 2011 All US-1541 Probit/Tobit Binary/Continuous       
21 González, Sara, Onofre 2011 FC&IR Spain-28 Logit /Tobit Binary/Continuous       
22 Charumathi and Kota 2012 All India-121 OLS Continuous        
23 Lel 2012 FC 30 countries – 253 Logit /Tobit 
Binary/ 
Continuous 
      
24 Sprcic and Sevic 2012 All Croatia-157 Slovenia-189 Logit/ OLS Binary       
25 Gatopoulos, Louberge 2013 FC 
5 Latin American 
countries -103 
Logit/ Tobit/ 
Cragg model 
Binary/Continuous       
26 Kumar and Rabinovitch 2013 CP Hoovers-41 Tobit Continuous       
27 Júnior 2013 FC Brazil- 200 Logit Binary       
28 Aabo and Ploeen 2014 FC Germany-198 OLS/ Probit Binary/Continuous       
29 Lievenbruck, Schmid 2014 All 50 countries – 500 Probit/ tobit Binary/Continuous       
30 Chen and King 2014 All US-1832 
Cross-
sectional  
regression 
Continuous       
Note: “All” means foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price derivatives; FC means foreign currency derivatives; IR means interest rate derivatives; CP means commodity price 
derivatives 
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Table 3.2: Empirical evidence on the hypothesis of bankruptcy costs and financial distress costs 
Variables Leverage Cash 
costs 
Conv. 
Debt 
Credit 
rating 
Divid. 
 
Int.Cov. 
Ratio 
Gross 
margin 
Debt 
ratio 
Pref. 
Cap. 
Human 
Cap. 
ROA 
 
R. On 
Cap. 
Liq. Size Tang. 
Assets 
Tax 
Loss 
Net 
interest 
Theory prediction + + ? - ? - - + ? - - - - ? - + - 
Géczy, Minton, Schrand (1997)        no     yes     
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) no 
0.05 
         no       
Hagelin (2003) no 
0.1 
   neg.     no 
0.1 
  yes     
Guay and Kothari (2003) yes                 
Judge (2006) yes 
0.01 
  yes 
0.01 
 yes 
0.01 
       pos. 
0.01 
 yes 
0.1 
yes 
0.01 
Spano (2007)        no          
Clark and Judge (2008)    yes 
0.05 
         pos.  yes  
Bartram, Brown, Fehle (2009) yes 
0.01 
    yes 
0.1 
      yes 
0.01 
pos. 
0.01 
   
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010)        yes 
0.01 
         
Afza and Alam (2011) no 
0.05 
    yes 
0.05 
    yes 
0.1 
   yes 
0.01 
  
Gay, Lin, Smith (2011) no             pos. 
0.01 
   
González, Sara, Onofre (2011) yes 
0.05 
            pos. 
0.01 
   
Charumathi and Kota  (2012)      yes  yes          
Lel (2012) yes                 
Sprcic and Sevic (2012)    no 
0.05c 
             
Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013) yes 
0.1 
     yes           
Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013)        yes 
0.01 
    yes     
Júnior (2013)        no      pos. 
0.1 
   
Aabo and Ploeen (2014)       yes    yes  no 
0.1 
pos. 
0.01 
   
Lievenbruck, Schmid (2014) yes 
0.01a 
         no 
0.1 
      
Chen and King (2014) yes 
0.01 
  yes 
0.01 
 yes 
0.01 
    yes 
0.01 
      
Note: A “yes” in the table denotes that the evidence is in the line with theory prediction; a “no” denotes that evidence is opposite to the theoretical prediction. The “pos.” and “neg.” stand 
for positive and negative direction, respectively. Numbers below “yes”, “no”, “pos.”, “neg.” are p-value. Bold text indicates that the evidence is both statistically significant and in the 
line with theory prediction. Italic text indicates that the evidence is statistically significant but opposite to the theoretical sign. (a) Evidence is obtained from testing interest rate 
derivatives use only, (b) Evidence is from Logit test, (c) Evidence is related to Croatia case only 
 
58 
 
Table 3.3: Empirical evidence on the tax hypothesis 
Proxies Progressivity 
Dummy 
Marginal  
tax rates 
Investment 
Tax credits 
Foreign tax  
credits dummy 
Tax-loss carry 
forwards (TLCF) 
TLCF 
dummy 
Tax  
charges 
TLCF and tax loss  
carry backs 
Theory prediction + + + + + + - + 
Nance, Smith, Smithson (1993) yes 
 
 yes 
0.1 
 yes    
Berkman and Bradbury (1996)    yes 
0.05 
    
Mian (1996) yes 
 
  yes 
0.01a 
yes 
 
   
Tufano (1996)     yes    
Géczy, Minton, Schrand (1997)     yes    
Allayannis and Ofek (2001)      yes   
Judge (2006)     yes 
0.05 
   
Spano (2007)       yes 
0.05 
 
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010)      yes 
0.01 
  
Afza and Alam (2011)      no 
0.1 
  
Gay, Lin, Smith (2011)     no    
Sprcic and Sevic (2012)        yes 
Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013)  yes 
0.05 
      
 
Note: 
A “yes” in the table denotes that the evidence is in the line with theory prediction; a “no” denotes that evidence is opposite to the theoretical prediction. The “pos.” and “neg.” 
stand for positive and negative direction, respectively. Numbers below “yes”, “no”, “pos.”, “neg.” are p-value. Bold text indicates that the evidence is both statistically significant 
and in the line with theory prediction. Italic text indicates that the evidence is statistically significant but opposite to the theoretical sign.  
a. Evidence is obtained from testing foreign currency derivatives use only 
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Table 3.4: Empirical evidence on the agency cost of debt hypothesis 
Variables Acqui. 
Activity 
Asset 
Growth/
C.Flow 
B/M 
ratio 
E/P 
 ratio 
Explo.  
Activity 
Free  
C. Flow 
Leverage Invest. 
Expenses 
Earnings  
volatility 
R&D Capital 
Expense 
Div. Liq. Size Gearing Tobin
’s Q 
Profit 
Marg 
Theory prediction + + - - + + + + + + + ? - ? + + - 
Nance, Smith, Smithson (1993)   yes    no           
Berkman and Bradbury (1996)  no  yesa 
0.1 
             
Mian (1996)   no 
0.01b 
              
Tufano (1996) yes    no             
Géczy, Minton, Schrand (1997)     yes 
 
        yes 
0.05 
       
Allayannis and Ofek (2001)   yes       yes 
0.05 
 neg.      
Abimbola and Adedeji (2002)    yes 
0.1 
             
Judge (2006)              pos. 
0.01 
yes 
0.01 
  
Spano (2007)          yes 
0.01 
     no  
Clark and Judge (2008)              pos    
Bartram, Brown, Fehle (2009)   yes 
0.01 
             no 
0.01 
Fauver and Naranjo (2010)      yes 
0.05 
           
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010)   yes 
0.01 
              
Afza and Alam (2011)   yes               
Gay, Lin, Smith (2011)   yes               
Lel (2012)      no 
0.05 
           
Gatopoulos, Louberge (2013)           yes 
0.01 
    yes 
0.05 
 
Júnior (2013)   no 
0.1 
         yes     
Aabo and Ploeen (2014)   no       yes 
0.1 
       
Lievenbruck, Schmid (2014)   no               
Chen and King (2014)   no    yes 
0.01 
 yes 
0.01 
        
Note: A “yes” in the table denotes that the evidence is in the line with theory prediction; a “no” denotes that evidence is opposite to the theoretical prediction. The “pos.” and “neg.” stand 
for positive and negative direction, respectively. Numbers below “yes”, “no”, “pos.”, “neg.” are p-value. Bold text indicates that the evidence is both statistically significant and in the 
line with theory prediction. Italic text indicates that the evidence is statistically significant but opposite to the theoretical sign.  
a. Evidence is obtained when dependent variable is fair value of derivatives  
b. Evidence is obtained from testing interest rate derivatives use only 
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Table 3.5: Empirical evidence on the hypothesis of economies of scales 
Variables Firm size Pre tax 
Foreign income 
Revenue Book value 
of total sales 
Market value Firm value Foreign 
denominated debt 
Other types of 
derivatives 
Theory prediction ? + ? ? + ? + + 
Mian (1996) pos. 
0.01 
       
Géczy, Minton, Schrand (1997) pos. 
0.01 
yes 
0.1 
    yes 
0.05 
yes 
0.05 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) pos. 
0.01 
       
Abimbola and Adedeji (2002)      pos. 
0.01 
 yes 
Elliot, Huffman, Makar (2003)     yes 
0.01 
   
Guay and Kothari (2003) neg. 
0.05 
       
Judge (2006) pos. 
0.01 
       
Clark and Judge (2008) pos.        
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010)    neg. 
0.01 
    
Afza and Alam (2011) pos.        
Gay, Lin, Smith (2011) pos. 
0.01 
       
González, Sara, Onofre (2011) pos. 
0.01 
       
Charumathi and Kota  (2012) pos. 
0.01 
 pos.      
Lel (2012) pos. 
0.01 
       
Sprcic and Sevic (2012)    pos.     
Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013) pos.        
Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) neg.        
Júnior (2013) pos. 
0.1 
       
Aabo and Ploeen (2014) pos. 
0.01 
       
Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) pos. 
0.01 
       
Chen and King (2014) neg. 
0.01 
       
Note: 
A “yes” in the table denotes that the evidence is in the line with theory prediction; a “no” denotes that evidence is opposite to the theoretical prediction. The “pos.” and “neg.” 
stand for positive and negative direction, respectively. Numbers below “yes”, “no”, “pos.”, “neg.” are p-value. Bold text indicates that the evidence is both statistically significant 
and in the line with theory prediction. Italic text indicates that the evidence is statistically significant but opposite to the theoretical sign.  
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Table 3.6: Empirical evidence on substitutes to hedging with derivatives 
Variables Diver. Current 
ratio 
Quick 
ratio 
Pref. 
stock 
FD 
Debt  
Geograph. 
Diver. 
Quasi  
equity 
Div. 
Payout 
Div. 
yield 
Preference 
capital 
Long term 
 loans 
Industry 
Diver. 
Convertible 
debt  
Foreign 
assets 
Theory prediction - - - - - - - + + - + - - - 
Nance, Smith, Smithson (1993)  yes 
 
 yes     yes 
0.01 
   no  
Berkman and Bradbury (1996)    yes 
0.05a 
    no yes      yes 
Mian (1996)               
Tufano (1996) no 
 
   yes 
0.05 
           
Géczy, Minton, Schrand (1997)     yes          
Nguyen and Faff (2002)         yes 
0.01b 
     
Abimbola and Adedeji (2002)   no     yes  yes     
Elliot, Huffman, Makar (2003)     yes 
0.01 
yes 
 
        
Guay and Kothari (2003)      no      no   
Judge (2006)   yes 
0.01 
           
Spano (2007)   yes 
0.05 
     yes 
0.1 
 no    
Clark and Judge (2008)   yes            
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010)   yes 
0.01 
     no 
0.05 
     
Afza and Alam (2011)   yes 
0.01 
    no       
Gay, Lin, Smith (2011)   yes 
0.01 
        no 
0.05c 
  
Charumathi and Kota  (2012) yes              
Lel (2012)         yes 
0.05 
   yes  
Sprcic and Sevic (2012)   no            
Gatopoulos and Louberge (2013)  no             
Júnior (2013)     no 
0.1 
no 
0.05 
     no   
Aabo and Ploeen (2014)     yes       yes  no 
0.01 
Chen and King (2014)            yes 
0.01 
  
Note: 
A “yes” in the table denotes that the evidence is in the line with theory prediction; a “no” denotes that evidence is opposite to the theoretical prediction. The “pos.” and “neg.” stand for 
positive and negative direction, respectively. Numbers below “yes”, “no”, “pos.”, “neg.” are p-value. Bold text indicates that the evidence is both statistically significant and in the line 
with theory prediction. Italic text indicates that the evidence is statistically significant but opposite to the theoretical sign. Upper a refers to results obtained when dependent variable is 
fair value of derivatives. Upper b refers to evidence from Tobit test. Upper c refers to evidence from Probit test. 
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Table 3.7: Empirical studies on the relationship between derivatives use and firm value (in chronological order) 
 
No 
 
 
Authors 
 
Year 
Area of  
study 
Country &  
Sample size 
Methodology Dependent  
variables 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Effect of derivatives use on firm value 
Increase Decrease No effect 
Panel A: Unconditional analyses 
1 Allayannis and Weston 2001 FC US – 720 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q  Derivative dummy/ 
notional value 
4.87%   
2 Guay and Kothari 2003 All Compustat-413 OLS Cash flow/ market 
value sensitivity  
Derivative notional value 
?   
3 Pramborg 2004 FC Sweden-359 Questionaire/ 
Tobin's Q 
Tobin's Q  Derivatives dummy 
    
4 Carter, Rogers, Simkins 2006 CP US-28 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivatives dummy 5% - 10%   
5 Magee 2008 FC US- 408 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q  Derivative notional value 6.33%   g 
6 Clark and Judge 2009 FC UK-412 Tobin's Q 
 
Tobin's Q  Derivatives dummy 
11% – 34%   
7 Lin, Pantzalis, Park 2009 FC&IR US- 90 Cross sectional 
regression 
Cumulative 
abnormal return  
Derivative dummy/ 
notional value 
    
8 Khediri and Folus 2010 All France- 320 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivatives dummy   a  b 
9 Nguyen and Faff 2010 All Australia – 428 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivative dummy/ 
notional value 
 24%c   
10 Bartram,Brown, Conrad 2011 All 47 countries 
- 6,888  
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivatives dummy 
    
11 Supanvaij 2011 FC&IR S&P500 – 231 Fixed effect 
panel data 
ROA, ROE, EVA Derivative notional value 
  d   
12 González, Sara, Onofre 2011 FC&IR Spain-28  Cross-sectional 
regression  
ROA, ROE, EVA Derivative dummy/ 
notional value 
    
13 Campello, Lin, Ma, Zou 2011 FC&IR US-1185 OLS/IV 
estimation 
Return on 
investment 
Derivative dummy/ 
notional value 
    
14 Eduado, Carlos, Juliet 2012 FC Colombia-81 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q  Derivative notional value 1.8%   
15 Yang 2013 FC US-20 OLS ROA, average 
abnormal return  
Derivative notional value 
    
16 Belghitar, Clark, Mefteh 2013 FC France-211 3SLS Tobin's Q Derivative notional value     
Panel B: Conditional analyses 
17 Fauver and Naranjo 2010 All US- 1746 Tobin's Q  Tobin's Q  Derivative dummy  -8.4%  
18 Allayanmis, Lel, Miller 2012 FC 39 countries 
-372 
Tobin's Q 
 
Tobin's Q Derivative dummy 
10.7%   
19 Marami and Dubois 2013 IR US- 728 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivative notional value 7.6%e   f 
20 Chen and King 2014 All US-1832 Pooled OLS Tobin's Q Derivative dummy     
Note:  “All” means foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity price derivatives. “FC”, “IR”, and “CP” mean foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and 
commodity price derivatives, respectively. EVA stands for economic value added. Upper word a denotes results obtained from univariate analysis; Upper word b denotes results obtained from 
multivariate analysis; Upper word c denotes results for hedging by swaps only; Upper word d denotes results for interest rate derivatives only; Upper word e denotes results for mandatory interest 
rate hedging; Upper word f denotes results for voluntary interest rate hedging; Upper word g denotes results obtained after controlling past amounts of firm value. 
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Table 3.8: Empirical studies on the relationship between derivatives use and exposures (in chronological order) 
 
No 
 
 
Authors 
 
Year 
Area of  
study 
Country &  
Sample size 
Methodology* 
        
Dependent  
variables 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Effect of derivatives use on exposures 
Increase Decrease No effect 
1 Allayannis and Ofek 2001 FC S&P500- 378 Market model FC exposure Derivative notional value    
2 Nguyen and Faff 2003 FC Australia- 144 Market model FC exposure Derivative notional value    
3 Adam and Fernando 2006 All North America -92 FF model Firm’s stock market beta Hedge ratio  54%  
4 Choi and Jiang 2009 FC US-889 Market model/ FF model FC exposure Derivative dummy  
 
 
  
5 Huffman, Makar, Beyer 2010 FC US-185 Market model/ FF model FC exposure dummy Derivative dummy    
6 Nguyen and Faff 2010 FC&IR  Australia -469 Market model Total risk/ Systematic 
risk/ Unsystematic risk 
Derivative notional value 
b 2.387%a  
7 Bartram, Brown, Minton 2010 FC 16 countries 
-1150 
Market model FC exposure/ IR 
exposure 
Derivative dummy  
11.5%  
8 Clark and Mefteh 2011 FC France- 176 Market model FC exposure Derivative dummy    
9 Gay, Lin, Smith 2011 All US-1541 FF model Cost of equity Derivative dummy  24-78 bpt  
10 Aysun and Guldi 2012 FC 6 countries-3227 Market model FC exposure Firms’ derivative market 
participation 
 
  
11 Yip and Nguyen 2012 FC Australia – 97 Market model FC exposure Derivative dummy/ 
Derivative notional value 
 
c d 
12 Yun and Wang 2013 FC UK-249 Market model FC exposure Derivative fair value    
13 Chang, Hsin, Hou 2013 FC Compustat-2790 FF model FC exposure Derivative dummy    
14 Belghitar, Clark, Mefteh 2013 FC France-211 Market model FC exposure Interactive variable of 
derivatives 
 
  
15 Treanor, Rogers, Carter, 
Simkins 
2014 CP US-29 Market model Fuel hedging percentage Exposure to fuel prices  
  
16 Hutson, Laing 2014 FC US-953 Market model FC exposure Derivative dummy    
17 Berghofer and Lucey 2014 CP Asia, Europe, 
North America-64 
Market model CP exposure Fuel requirements 
hedged/ hedging maturity 
 
  
Note: “All” means foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity price derivatives. “FC”, “IR”, and “CP” mean foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and commodity 
price derivatives, respectively. Methodologies mentioned on the table are methodologies used for estimating exposures. FF model stands for Fama-French model.  
a- results for interest rate derivative users;  
b- results for extensive derivative users;  
c- results are obtained when exposures are solely regressed against derivatives usage;  
d- results for the global financial crisis. 
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Table 3.9: Summary of previous studies on derivatives use in East Asia countries (in chronological order) 
Panel A: Studies on determinants of derivatives use  
 
No 
 
 
Authors 
 
Year 
Area 
of  
study 
Country &  
Sample 
size 
Methodology Dependent  
variables 
Financial 
distress 
costs 
Taxes Agency 
cost of 
debt 
Managerial 
risk aversion, 
compensation 
Info. 
Asymmetry 
Econ.  
of 
scales 
Substitutes Corporate 
governance 
Country
-specific  
1 
Allaynnis, Brown, 
Klapper 
2001 FC 
8 countries 
– 372 
Logit/ Tobit 
Continuous  
 
         
2 
Allaynnis, Brown, 
Klapper 
2003 FC 
8 countries 
– 372 
Tobit 
Continuous  
 
         
3 Hu and Wang 2006 FC HK-419 Logit Binary          
4 Fazilah, Azian, Hui,  2008 All 
Malaysia- 
101 
OLS Continuous          
5 Tungsong 2010 All Thailand- Logit Binary          
6 Lantara 2012 All 
Indonesia- 
315 
Probit/Tobit 
Binary/ 
Continuous 
         
7 Ahmad and Haris 2012 All 
Malaysia- 
110 
Logit Binary          
8 
Shaari, Hasan, 
Palanimally, Mohamed,  
2013 All 
Malaysia- 
97 
Panel Least 
squares 
Continuous 
 
         
9 Chong, Change, Tan 2014 FC 
Malaysia 
– 219 
Survey           
Panel B: Studies investigating the relationship between derivatives use and firm value 
No Authors Year Are 
of 
study 
Country &  
Sample 
size 
Methodology Dependent  
variables 
Main explanatory variables Effects of derivatives use on firm value 
Increase Decrease No effect 
1 Ameer 2009 
FC&
IR 
Malaysia-
40 
OLS Share price Derivative notional value    
2 Yin and Qui-qi 2010 
FC&
CP 
China – 
295 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Derivative dummy    
3 Oktavia 2012 All 
Indonesia- 
160 
OLS Price to book value ratio Derivative notional amount a  b 
Panel C: Studies investigating the relationship between derivatives use and exposures 
No Authors Year Are 
of 
study 
Country &  
Sample 
size 
Methodology Dependent  
variables 
Main explanatory variables Effects of derivatives use on exposures 
Increase Decrease No effect 
1 He and Ng  1998 FC Japan-171 
Market 
model 
FC exposure Firm’s export ratio    
2 Ameer, Isa, Abdullah 2011 FC 
Malaysia-
60 
OLS Cost of equity capital Derivative notional value    
Note: “All” means foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity price derivatives. “FC”, “IR”, and “CP” mean foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and commodity 
price derivatives, respectively. Upper a refers to results for non-financial firms; Upper b refers to results for b
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF 
DERIVATIVES USE IN EAST ASIAN NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS  
4.1. Introduction 
Derivatives are an important risk management instrument used by 90 percent of Fortune 500 
companies (Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011). The Bank for International Settlements (2014) 
reports that the global over-the-counter derivatives notional amount outstanding was $691 
trillion at the end of June 2014. The rationale behind hedging, however, has not been well 
sustained. Hedging theories suggest that using derivatives increases the value of firms by 
addressing market imperfections, such as taxes, agency problems, bankruptcy, and financial 
distress. Nevertheless, empirical evidence (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Charumathi and Kota, 
2012) lends little support to these theories. Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009) indicate that 
traditional theories have little power to explain decisions regarding the use of derivatives. The 
inconclusive evidence may arise from the fact that most existing studies consider only firm-
specific factors as determinants of hedging behavior, while the characteristics of the country 
where a firm operates may influence its decision to use derivatives. While firm determinants 
alone cannot fully explain firms’ behaviors, little is known about the role of country-specific 
factors in shaping firms’ decisions to use derivatives. 
Using unique hand-collected data on derivatives use, we contribute to the literature by 
incorporating country-specific factors, particularly governance quality, to explore firms’ hedging 
behavior. We focus the analysis on a sample of 9,691 observations from eight East Asian 
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countries during the period of 2003–2013. This sample was chosen for the following reasons. 
Firstly, although the literature on derivatives use has been growing, most empirical studies focus 
on the derivatives usage of U.S. non-financial firms. There is also a growing body of literature 
on derivatives in developed and emerging economies, yet research on the hedging behavior of 
East Asian firms is still relatively scarce, even though they have become the world’s key 
derivatives users.4 Secondly, our sampled firms are located in countries with great variance in 
terms of economic, political, and social environments. Such variation gives us a unique 
opportunity to explore whether a country’s characteristics determine derivatives use 
independently from firm-specific factors. Country heterogeneity also allows us to focus on 
differences in governance mechanisms that are arguably exogenous to firms’ derivatives use. 
Lastly, given that many of our firms (nearly 45%) are domestic and 48.23 percent are domestic 
multinational corporation (MNC) headquarters, we would expect the role of country-specific 
characteristics to become more salient in determining derivatives use. 
The main findings of our study can be summarized as follows. Results from both univariate 
and multivariate analyses reveal that governance mechanisms have a strong positive effect on 
firms’ decisions to use derivatives. Firms are more likely to use derivatives, and use them more 
extensively, when they are located in countries with lower corruption levels. In countries with 
better governance mechanisms, firms use derivatives to hedge exposure, yet in weakly governed 
or highly corrupt countries, firms do not use derivatives for risk management but rather for 
                                                     
4According to the annual survey of the Future Industry Association in 2014, the trading volume in Asia-Pacific is 
$7.25 billion, accounting for about one-third of global trading volume. 
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speculative and/or selective hedging. We also find that countries with higher degrees of 
economic, financial, and political risks encourage firms to use derivatives.5 
We proceed with the remainder of this chapter as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
incentives for derivatives use, discusses the existing empirical literature on country-specific 
factors, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and identifies variables. 
Section 4 presents empirical specifications. Section 5 reports empirical analyses and robustness 
tests. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
4.2.1. Hedging theory and derivatives use 
Modigiliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal paper shows that in an efficient market, the 
financing policies of firms are irrelevant; that is, hedging or derivatives use does not affect firm 
value. Hence, the incentives of hedging depend on the degree to which the use of derivatives 
effectively addresses market imperfections, such as corporate taxes (see Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Mayers and Smith, 1990), financial distress or bankruptcy costs (see Nance, Smith, and 
Smithson, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993), or agency costs of debts (see Mayers and 
Smith, 1982; Bessembinder, 1991).  
                                                     
5 Further, we notice that the effects of country-specific characteristics on the use of derivatives somewhat depends 
on underlying assets of derivatives contracts. Our findings are also robust to specifications in which we estimate the 
relation between firms’ derivatives use and country-level factors by using lagged variables and random effect 
models to account for endogeneity concerns related to firms’ derivatives use, country-specific characteristics, and 
countries’ financial policies. We also conduct a set of alternative tests to gauge the robustness of the results, 
including country-random-effects specification with a Tobit model to analyze the impact of country-level factors on 
determinants of derivatives use and pooled models with measures of the strength of governance mechanisms to 
control for multicollinearity. 
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Existing evidence, however, provides mixed support for hedging theories. Judge (2006a) 
finds a strong relationship between financial distress costs and foreign currency hedging 
decisions, much stronger than that found in many previous studies in the U.K. Recently, Chen 
and King (2014) examined 1,832 U.S. non-financial firms and presented significant evidence 
consistent with financial distress cost arguments. In contrast, Charumathi and Kota (2012) state 
that there is no evidence supporting this hypothesis. Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) find that tax 
loss carried forward is an important factor in determining the use of foreign currency derivatives, 
while Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) indicate that foreign tax credits are in the direction 
hypothesized and firms use derivatives to increase the present value of tax losses. In contrast, 
Sprcic and Sevic (2012) find that the evidence in favor of the tax hypothesis is very weak, while 
Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011) do not find any evidence in support of the tax incentive to increase 
debt capacity.  
Empirical studies on testing the agency costs of debt theory also provide inconclusive 
evidence. Chen and King (2014), among others, find evidence to support the agency costs of debt 
theory. However, Charumathi and Kota (2012) do not find evidence in support of the agency 
costs of debt hypothesis. This finding is consistent with a recent study by Lievenbruck and 
Schmid (2014) and earlier studies such as Nance et al. (1993).6 
4.2.2. Institutional theory and country-specific characteristics 
The institution-based view argues that a network of firms is a coordinated system of value-
added activities whose structure is determined by the institutions that control or affect firms’ 
objectives and behaviors (Dunning, 2003). North (1990, 1994) was among the first to emphasize 
the importance of institutions. He considers institutions much more than background conditions 
                                                     
6 Overall, Guay and Kothari (2003) suggest the need to rethink the past empirical research on firms’ derivatives use. 
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and defines institutions as “rules of the game,” including the formal rules (laws, regulations) and 
informal constraints (customs, norms, cultures) that organizations face. Institutions shape firm 
actions by determining transaction costs and transformation costs of production. As such, 
institutions play a key role in determining the organizational outcomes and effectiveness of 
organizations (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001) as well as framing their organizational strategic 
choices (Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005).  
Therefore, to better understand the determinants of firms’ activities and their effects, it is 
necessary to consider institutional influences inside the firm and the external environment where 
firms operate simultaneously. Dunning and Lundan (2008) introduce a theoretical framework in 
the context of the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988) in order to accommodate both firm- and 
country-specific considerations. The ownership advantages (O) in the OLI paradigm now include 
institutional ownership advantages (Oi), which comprise the firm-specific characteristics and an 
indentation of the institutional environment (L attributes) (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 
2010). On the other hand, the institutionally related location advantages of countries (Li) allow 
for the interdependence between the firm and national institutions on both the micro and macro 
levels.  
Regarding the literature on hedging, although studies on traditional hedging theories are 
abundant, few empirical studies have investigated the link between differences in cross-country 
characteristics and firms’ use of derivatives. Furthermore, the findings of these studies provide 
mixed evidence. For example, Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) together with Lel (2012) 
obtained a significant association between GDP per capita and the use of derivatives in the 
predicted directions, although Lievenbruck and Schmid only found supporting evidence in the 
case of commodity price derivatives use. The effect of financial risk is always statistically 
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significant but inconsistent with the hypothesized prediction (see Bartram et al., 2009). Likewise, 
regulatory quality and long-term interest rates are insignificant, while the effect of inflation rate 
and long-term exchange rate are very weak (see Bartram et al., 2009; Livenbruck and Schmid, 
2014). 
Our study explores countries with great variances in terms of economic, political, and social 
environments. Hence, we expect to observe differences in derivatives use due to the differences 
in country risks and governance mechanisms.  
Governance mechanisms 
According to Globerman and Shapiro (2003), governance mechanisms consist of institutions 
and policies targeting economic, legal, and social relations. Good governance mechanisms value 
“independent judiciary and legislation, fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, 
reliable public financial information and high public trust” (Li, 2005, pp.298). As such, good 
governance mechanisms are able to reduce transaction, production, and R&D costs, leading to 
reductions in the variability of firms’ profitability and high-return, low-risk investments (Ngobo 
and Fouda, 2012). They implement policies that favor free and open markets and form effective 
and non-corrupt institutions (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). On the contrary, poor governance 
mechanisms increase costs and uncertainty (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008), and they can lead to smaller, 
more volatile, and less liquid stock markets in emerging economies (Lin et al. 2008) as well as a 
lack of transparent financial data and other information on firms and a shortage of specialized 
financial intermediaries (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005).  
In this study, we investigate two aspects of governance mechanisms: corruption and quality 
of governance system. While the concept of corruption is widely studied in the economics and 
international business areas, to our knowledge, there is currently no research linking corruption 
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with derivatives use in the literature. Bardhan (1997), Quazi (2014), and others view corruption 
as a “grabbing hand,” because it increases uncertainty and transaction costs, and one major cause 
of corruption is bad governance mechanisms (Lambsdorff, 2006). When it is costly to transact, 
institutions matter, and when institutions matter, it is costly to transact (North, 1993). Thus, firms 
in highly corrupt countries may face higher transaction costs due to bribe payments and related 
expenses (Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol, 2008), which in turn leads to higher hedging costs.7 
Building upon this insight, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms located in countries with higher corruption levels are less likely to use 
derivatives. 
Considering a globalized macroeconomic environment, we wonder whether corruption 
influences firms’ decisions on derivatives use through firm-specific and country-specific 
characteristics. Conditional on the levels of corruption, various factors might play a role in 
explaining a firm’s hedging behavior. Petrou (2015) along with Petrou and Thanos (2014) show 
that corruption often generates additional difficulties rather than opportunities for firms to benefit 
from non-market environments. In addition, a high level of corruption is associated with a 
sophisticated bribery system, discouraging firms from using derivatives as a risk management 
tool. We thus propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: High levels of corruption discourage firms from using derivatives to reduce 
exposure as stated by hedging theory. 
                                                     
7 Along this line, abundant empirical evidence indicates that corruption directly deters economic growth and 
development, causing the business environment to become more uncertain and less favourable for profit making and 
firm performance (e.g., Lee and Hong, 2012; Petrou, 2015). 
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Likewise, we expect a positive relationship between firms’ use of derivatives and quality of 
governance mechanisms. Several studies motivated by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) emphasize 
that legal institutions (either laws or enforcement) play a significant role in explaining cross-
country differences in financial development, decision-making, and valuation, because laws and 
the quality of their enforcement determine the rights and operation of firms participating in 
financial systems. Beck and Levine (2008) note that finance can be considered a set of contracts. 
Because derivatives are financial contracts, we expect that legal institutions are likely to 
influence derivatives use. Finally, Bevan et al. (2004) note that an efficient legal infrastructure 
reduces institutional uncertainty as well as facilitates contract establishment and lowers 
transaction costs. We therefore propose that better governance mechanisms encourage firms to 
enter into derivatives contracts given the lower cost of hedging. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms located in countries with higher governance quality are more prone to 
use derivatives. 
Country risks 
Shapiro (1999) defines country risk as the general level of political and economic 
uncertainty in a country influencing the value of investments in that country. Allien and Carletti 
(2013) further indicate that the interactions of institutions and markets determine the country 
risks that drive firms’ activities (Cantwell et al., 2010). Relatedly, uncertainties in government 
policies and the economic environment may lead to a higher cost of capital faced by firms due to 
the increased probability of financial distress, so firms tend to have greater exposure (Huang et 
al., 2015; Glover and Levine, 2015). Under the influence of a host country’s uncertainty, an 
increase in the production of an MNC subsidiary there decreases the production of other 
subsidiaries within the same MNC network (Lee and Song, 2012). 
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Although the topic of political and economic uncertainty has been investigated extensively, 
there has been little discussion of the link between derivatives use and country risks. Batram et 
al. (2009) state that firms located in countries with greater economic, financial, and political 
risks are more likely to use derivatives. On the other hand, firms based in less risky countries 
may have lower expected financial distress costs and less need for risk management. Recently, 
Azad, Fang, and Hung (2012) found evidence consistent with the argument that greater 
macroeconomic risk induces firms to use derivatives more.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms in countries with higher country risk have more incentive to use 
derivatives.  
To sum up, using derivatives to manage risk is a complex decision that may involve various 
factors. Hedging theories focus on the role of firm-specific factors. Institutional theory, on the 
other hand, stresses the importance of incorporating country factors to explore firms’ behavior in 
derivatives use. In this paper, by combining hedging and institutional theories into a single 
framework of analysis, we complement and shed new light on the current literature on 
derivatives use. We also provide new insights into the nature of firms’ hedging behaviors. In 
doing so, we address some open questions on the determinants of derivatives use. 
4.3. Sample and data 
4.3.1. Sample 
We focus the analysis on 881 non-financial firms across industries for the period of 2003–
2013. These firms we relocate in eight East Asian countries: Singapore, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and Japan. Our sample spans beyond the 
global financial crisis in 2007–2008, which generated real exogenous shocks to firms. Under 
such volatile environments, it is instructive to study why and how firms decide to use financial 
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derivatives. We present the construction of the sample and the data-collection procedure in detail 
below. 
Following most prior studies, we selected the top-listed companies ranked by market 
capitalization on the stock exchanges of the eight countries in the sample. Large firms were 
chosen for two important reasons. Firstly, large firms were more likely to be involved in 
international business activities and thereby have exposure to financial risks. As many firms are 
expected to have exposure to financial risks, our sample potentially provides a rich cross-section 
of derivatives users and non-users. Secondly, there was a high likelihood that large firms were 
actively encouraged to report their derivatives usage in their annual reports during the sample 
period. We excluded firms that did not have annual reports in English or did not have all annual 
reports from 2003–2013.  
It is worth noting that many firms in our sample were cross-listed. A disadvantage of using 
cross-listed firms is that they may be subject to governance regulations by both home countries 
and foreign countries, making the measurement of the strength of governance mechanisms 
challenging. However, in our sample, domestic firms account for 44.51 percent, domestic MNCs 
account for 48.23 percent, and the proportion of foreign MNC affiliates is 7.26 percent 
(untabulated), so the home country governance mechanisms of our sample firms had primary 
effects on firms’ derivatives use. On the other hand, foreign affiliates’ performance and strategic 
actions are always affected by the institutional context of the host country in which they are 
embedded (see Chan, Isobe, and Makino, 2008; Spencer and Gomez, 2015; Makino, Isobe, and 
Chan, 2004). To address this issue, we run the regressions for the whole sample as well as for a 
subsample that included only domestic firms and found consistent results between these two 
samples. In addition, both Allayannis, Brown, and Flapper (2003), using a sample of East Asian 
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firms, and Lel (2012) found no difference in the derivatives usage of cross-listed firms and those 
that are not cross-listed. These insights enable us to use this sample of firms to investigate the 
effect of the quality of a firm’s home country governance on its hedging activity. 
We collected the information on derivatives use and some explanatory variables from firms’ 
annual reports. Currently, information on the notional principal amount of derivatives 
instruments is grouped with off-balance sheet items; therefore, there is no database containing 
data on the derivatives usage of non-financial firms in East Asian countries. Hence, we hand 
collected these data directly from annual reports. We strived to verify the data accuracy by 
searching through a subset of firms’ annual reports, in which the electronic annual reports in 
PDF format were obtained via the websites of each firm, Morningstar 8 (an independent 
investment research firm that provides a direct link to each company’s annual recent reports), or 
the stock exchanges of each country. As the eight countries in our sample had different local 
currencies with different values, it could have resulted in a sampling bias. Hence, we decided to 
use a common currency to represent the amount of derivatives use and all other financial data, 
and we chose United States dollars (USD). For annual reports in which the reporting currency 
was not USD, all hand-collected data were converted into USD using the exchange rates on the 
Datastream database.  
We augmented this database on derivatives usage from annual reports with financial data on 
explanatory variables from the Datastream database. For data not available on Datastream, we 
searched the annual reports of firms to fill in as much missing data as possible. Some country-
specific data such as corruption indices were obtained from the Transparency International (TI) 
                                                     
8http://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/ 
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and reports of central banks of sample countries, while proxies for governance mechanisms were 
obtained from the World Bank. All financial data were yearly and in thousands of USD. 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Panel A in Table 4.1 below shows that across the entire sample, more than half (53.5%) use 
at least one type of derivatives, and 100 percent of firms in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines 
used some kind of derivative during the sample period. The most commonly used instruments 
are foreign currency derivatives (42.55%), followed by interest rate derivatives (25.81%) and 
commodity price derivatives (8.99%). When we examine derivatives use by major industry 
(untabulated), we find that usage rates are highest in the chemicals and construction and mining 
machinery industries and lowest in the materials and aerospace and defense industries.  
(INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE) 
Panel B presents how derivatives use changed over time. We divide the sample into three 
periods based on the global financial crisis. Derivatives are used more frequently over time, 
increasing from 49.72 percent in the 2003–2006 period to 54.14 percent in the 2007–2008 period 
and 55.89 percent in the 2009–2013 period. The boost in derivatives usage in 2009 onward 
corresponds to the global financial crisis; specifically, the number of firms using foreign 
currency derivatives increases from 36.71 percent in the pre-crisis period to 46.08 percent in the 
post-crisis period. 
4.3.2. Dependent variables 
To examine both the decision to use derivatives and the intensity of derivatives use, we 
considered two kinds of dependent variables. To measure a firm’s likelihood of using 
derivatives, we constructed a binary variable with the value of one or zero depending on whether 
a firm used derivatives. To measure a firm’s intensity of using derivatives, we constructed a 
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continuous variable defined as the total notional amount of derivatives contracts scaled by the 
firm size for a user and zero for a firm that does not use derivatives. We searched annual reports 
for information on derivatives use and classified firms as derivatives users if their annual reports 
specifically mentioned the use of any type of derivatives contracts (i.e., forwards, swaps, futures, 
or options). Almost every firm stated that they did not enter into derivatives contracts for trading 
or speculation purposes; we therefore assumed that all firms in our sample used derivatives 
mainly for hedging. 
We do not use accounting definitions, because accounting standards differ across countries 
and accounting classifications do not always reveal a firm’s intention inholding a derivative 
position. We focused on textual descriptions; as such, a firm was classified as a derivatives user 
if it had any numerical or narrative disclosures of derivatives use in the fiscal year. The binary 
variable is an effective measure of derivatives usage given the nature of our sample. Applying 
this measure, we are able to investigate the use of derivatives for a large sample of firms over a 
long period of time. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Guay and 
Kothari, 2003; Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014), we then constructed derivatives use to total 
assets as the dependent variable. This derivatives usage ratio is censored at zero by construction. 
4.3.3. Independent variables 
4.3.3.1. Country-specific variables 
To measure country risk, we use the overall risk rating scores (i.e. average of the scores for 
sovereign risk, currency risk, and banking sector risk of each country on a scale from 0 
(minimum risk) to 100 (maximum risk)) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
We use two sets of proxies for governance mechanisms: corruption and quality of 
governance. To measure the corruption level, we collected the Corruption Perception Index 
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(CPI) from the TI, ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Quality of governance 
mechanisms is constructed using three measures. The first is the rule of law, which is a proxy for 
the quality of law enforcement. The second is regulatory quality, which measures the 
governmental ability to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. The last is 
government effectiveness, which measures the quality of public and civil services and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. All these variables are on a scale from -
2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance), and they were obtained from the World Bank. 
We implemented Pearson correlations for country-specific variables (untabulated). The pair-
wise correlations showed that rule of law, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness was 
highly correlated, suggesting that some of these variables should be dropped in the multivariate 
analysis. Therefore, we only use government effectiveness, which represents the overall legal 
system, in the following analyses.9 
4.3.3.2. Firm-specific variables 
To test traditional hedging theories, we employ the most standard variables identified in the 
extant literature. Firstly, we use two measures of borrowing capacity as proxies for a firm’s pre-
hedging probability of financial distress: financial leverage and interest coverage. Secondly, we 
measure three aspects of the firm’s effective tax function: deferred taxes. Following Kumar and 
Rabinovitch (2013), we also use the range of a firm’s tax rate as a proxy for the progressive 
region of the tax schedule and expected positive coefficients on these variables. Thirdly, three 
sets of variables are developed to capture the essence of the conditions underlying the agency 
costs of debt hypothesis: leverage ratio, ratio of market to book value, and current ratio.  
                                                     
9The results are almost the same if we use the other two variables instead of government effectiveness. 
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We also control for the existence of other means of financial hedging—convertible debts, 
preferred stocks, current ratio, and dividend payout—as firms issue these debt instruments and 
liquid assets instead of hedging with derivatives (Nance et al., 1993). In addition, we control for 
firm size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. We expect this variable to 
have a positive effect on derivatives use. 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE) 
4.3.4. Control variables 
Other country-level factors could have been confounded with governance quality proxies to 
affect firms’ hedging behavior. Thus, we control for such country effects and country’s time-
invariant characteristics by using GDP per capita ratio to proxy for the relative performance of 
the countries and financial system deposits to GDP (defined as demand, time, and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP) to proxy for 
financial market development. These variables were obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Further, we control for the exposure that a firm may face by employing 
the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. Positive 
coefficients on these variables are expected. 
4.4. Models for investigating determinants of derivatives use 
In this thesis, we will analyze all aspects of determinants of derivatives use by firms. As 
such, we first investigate factors affecting firms’ decision to use derivatives, and then we 
scrutinize determinants of the extent of derivatives usage, alternatively, examine how much firms 
use derivatives. 
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4.4.1. Models for testing decision to use derivatives 
In the previous studies, analyses of firms’ decision to use derivatives are widely carried out 
by logit or probit model. In these models, dependent variable is binary, which is coded as a 1 for 
those firms using derivatives, and 0 for those firms not using derivatives. As such, the basic logic 
is that firm faces a decision with two options, to use derivatives or not to use derivatives, and its 
decision hinges on its facets. The primary goal of the model is to predict the probability that a 
firm with certain set of attributes will use derivatives, and so find out what factors determine the 
likelihood of derivatives usage.  
The logit model is based on logistic distribution function, while the probit model is based on 
normal cumulative distribution function. Logit or probit model can be expressed as below: 
                                        yi
*= β0 + βx + e,    yi ={
𝟏 𝒊𝒇 𝒚𝒊
∗ > 𝟎
𝟎 𝒊𝒇 𝒚𝒊
∗ ≤ 𝟎
                        (4.1) 
Where: 
yi: A binary dependent variable, taking a value of 1 if a firm uses derivatives, and 0 
otherwise 
yi
*: An unobserved or latent variable. In this case yi
* is defined as propensity of using   
derivatives. The subscript i indexes observation 
x: The full set of explanatory variables 
β: Set of parameters  
e: Error term with either standard logistic distribution or the standard normal distribution. 
From the equation (4.1), the response probability for y, referring to the likelihood that a firm 
with the given values of explanatory variables will use derivatives, can be derived as follows: 
P(𝒚𝒊|𝒙) = P(𝒚𝒊
∗ > 𝟎|𝒙) = P [𝒆 >  − (𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒙)|𝒙)] = 1- F[−(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒙)] = F(β0 +βx)         (4.2) 
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Where: 
F: Distribution function, which is logistic function in logit model, and normal distribution 
function in probit model 
The coefficients β represent the marginal effects of x on the latent variable yi* 
The marginal effect of an explanatory variable xi measures changes in the probability of 
using derivatives by firms when xi changes by one unit, keeping other explanatory variables 
unchanged. It is the slope of the logistic function or normal distribution function with regard to 
each of the explanatory variables. Because this slope is not constant, the marginal effect of a 
given explanatory variable also varies. 
The marginal effect of an independent variable xi, which is not related to other explanatory 
variables, can be derived as below: 
 a) If xi  is continuous variable, then marginal effect will be: 
𝝏𝑷𝒊(𝒚|𝒙)
𝝏𝒙𝒊
=
𝒆𝒁𝒊
(𝟏 + 𝒆𝒁𝒊)
𝜷𝒊 
Where: Zi = β0 + βixi 
b) If xi  is dummy variable, then marginal effect will be: 
𝝏𝑷𝒊(𝒚|𝒙)
𝝏𝒙𝒊
= 𝑷(𝒚 = 𝟏|?̅?𝒊, 𝒙𝒊 = 𝟏) −  𝑷(𝒚 = 𝟏|?̅?𝒊, 𝒙𝒊 = 𝟎) 
Where: 
 ?̅?𝒊 represents the mean of all variables in x, other than xi 
The marginal effect of a continuous variable is the effect of one unit change in the 
explanatory variable on the response likelihood. We can see that for any pair of continuous 
variables, the relative effects do not depend on x as the ratio of the marginal effect is constant 
and equal to the ratio of the corresponding coefficients. Whereas the margin effects of a dummy 
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is the difference between the estimated probabilities estimated at the two values of the binary 
variables of interest, other things remain unchanged. 
Interestingly, although logit and probit model are based on different distribution function, 
the marginal effects and predicted probabilities from logit and probit models tend to be quite 
similar. Therefore, the choice between the two models is not an important issue. However, the 
probit model is more popularly used than logit model, because economists tend to favor normal 
distribution, and several specification problems are most easily analyzed using probit model due 
to properties of normal distribution (see Wooldridge, 2013, pp.562). In view of this, this thesis 
will employ probit specification to analyze the factors affecting firms’ decisions to use 
derivatives.  
4.4.2. Models for testing the extent of derivatives use 
On contrary to treating derivative usage as a binary variable, prior empirical studies explore 
it as a continuous variable to investigate determinants of derivatives usage. That measure is 
constructed by using data on amount of derivatives used by firms, that is notional value or fair 
value, scaled by total assets or total sales, while those firms not using derivative has zero value 
for that measure. In such that way, existing studies apply censored regression models as 
dependent variable is continuous, but observed only on a limited range and there are no firms 
with negative derivatives use. In the following section, we will review the most widely used 
model, that is, Tobit model.  
Preceding studies usually use Tobit model to examine both firms’ decision to use derivatives 
and decision on how much firms use derivatives. This is because Tobit model is quite 
appropriate for purposes of having a model that implies nonnegative predicted value for the use 
of derivatives, and that has sensible partial effects on a wide range of the independent variables. 
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Especially, in the case they want to estimate characteristics of the distribution of derivatives 
usage with given explanatory variables rather than the conditional expectation (see Wooldridge, 
2013, pp.573)  
Let y be observed extent of derivatives use that is essentially continuous for the firms using 
derivatives, and takes on a value of zero for those firms not using derivatives. Basically, the 
Tobit model, which is originally proposed by Tobin (1958), exhibits the observed response, yi, as 
an underlying latent variable as below: 
              yi
*= β0 + βx + u,    𝒖|x ~𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈𝟐),       yi ={
𝒚𝒊
∗ 𝒊𝒇 𝒚𝒊
∗ ≥ 𝟎
𝟎 𝒊𝒇 𝒚𝒊
∗ < 𝟎
                                    (4.3) 
Where: 
yi
*: A latent continuous variable.  The subscript i indexes observation 
x: The full set of explanatory variable  
β: Set of parameters  
u: Error term is independently and  normally distributed, with mean zero and a variance 
𝝈𝟐 
As Tobin (1958) shows, given that z = βx/ σ, the expected value of yi and yi* in the model is 
expressed as follows: 
 E(yi) = 𝜷𝒙𝑭(𝒛) + 𝝈𝒇(𝒛)                                              (4.4) 
                  E(yi
*) = E(𝒚|𝒚 > 𝟎) = 𝑬((𝒚|𝒖 > −𝜷𝒙) = 𝜷𝒙 + 𝝈𝒇(𝒛)/𝑭(𝒛)                    (4.5) 
So, 
                 E(yi) = F(z) E(yi
*)                                                                                           (4.6) 
Where: 
 f(z): Standard normal distribution 
 F(z): Cumulative normal distribution function 
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From these above equations, the effect of a change in the xi on y (the marginal effect) is 
estimated. In this thesis, there are two kinds of marginal effects. The first one is the marginal 
effect on the probability, which is not censored, that is firms’ decision of whether to use 
derivatives. The second one is the marginal effect on the expected on being not censored that is 
the extent of derivatives use or decision to how much to use derivatives. The two marginal 
effects are expressed as follows: 
a)      
𝝏𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃 (𝒚𝒊>𝟎)
𝝏𝒙𝒊
=
𝜷𝒊
𝝈
𝒇(𝒛) 
b)      
𝝏𝑬(𝒚𝒊|𝒚𝒊 > 𝟎, 𝒙𝒊)
𝝏𝒙𝒊
= 𝜷𝒊 [𝟏 − 𝒛
𝒇(𝒛)
𝑭(𝒛)
−
𝒇(𝒛)𝟐
𝑭(𝒛)𝟐
] 
A key limitation of the tobit model is that the probability of a positive value and the actual 
value, given that it is positive, are determined by the same underlying process, i.e the same 
parameters. Particularly, in the case of being applied here, Tobit model implies the decision on 
whether to use derivatives or not to use derivatives, and decision on extent of derivatives use are 
both determined by the same latent dependent variable y*. In other words, Tobit model 
constraints the coefficients on the factors determining the use of derivative to be the same as 
those determining the amount of derivative usage. The implication of Tobit model is that a firm’s 
decision on derivatives usage may include two steps together: determining whether to use or not 
to use derivatives, and then determining the extent of using derivatives, if it uses. However, in 
some situations, decisions on to use derivatives and on the amount of using derivatives may not 
be so intimately related. For example, the probability that a firm use derivatives and the amount 
of derivatives use when it uses might both hinge on firm size, but in opposite directions. 
Alternatively, the effect of a specific factor on a firm’s decision to use derivatives can be 
different from the effect of the same factor on the extent of derivatives use by those firms have 
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determined to use derivatives. Therefore, it is impossible to model the differential response 
between the decision equation and the extent of participation equation in a simple Tobit model, 
as there is only one equation with a unique coefficient on each variable.  
4.4.3. Modeling procedures 
Following our discussion above, we estimate a series of probit models and tobit models in 
general forms as Equation (4.7) and Equation (4.8) below: 
Probability (Derivative use)it = f (Firm-specific variables, country-specific variables)           (4.7)                  
           Derivative useit = f (Firm-specific variables, country-specific variables)              (4.8)                          
Where: 
Probability (Derivatives use) is a binary variable that indicates whether firm i uses 
derivatives at year t. 
Derivatives use is a continuous variable that is measured by the notional amount of 
derivatives contracts scaled by total assets. 
Country-specific variables include proxies for country risk and governance 
mechanisms. 
Firm-specific variables are the aforementioned variables that are used in testing 
value-creation theories through hedging and control variables for exposure to 
financial risks. 
It is worth noting that in our analysis, we use country random effects to focus on the effects 
of country-level factors and the variance component structure, as the main explanatory variables 
were at the country level and time invariant.10Our approach is in line with Bryan and Jenkins’ 
                                                     
10We also performed the Hausman tests on the random-effects versus the fixed-effects model. The result showed that 
the random-effects model gave better fit. 
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(2013) insight that the country-random-effects approach is more efficient than the fixed-effects 
approach, as it “borrows strength” from between-group variation, while the fixed-effects 
approach uses only within-group variation. We also use industry and year fixed effects to 
measure the within-industry differences in the effect of country-level factors on firms’ 
derivatives usage and control for unobserved time-varying effects. In addition, following Rogers 
(1993), we employ a clustering method to adjust for the heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
of standard errors.  
4.5. Results and discussion 
4.5.1. Univariate results 
Panel A of table 4.3 presents determinants of derivatives use by country-specific variables. 
First, corruption levels and other proxies for quality of governance mechanisms could be very 
important factors. Derivatives users are more often located in better-governed countries with 
lower corruption levels, higher government effectiveness, and higher quality of law enforcement. 
Second, other results related to country risks, in spite of being statistically different from zero, 
reveal only very small economic differences between derivatives users and non-users. 
(INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE) 
The univariate tests suggest that users of foreign currency derivatives and interest rate 
derivatives are not statistically different from non-users with respect to bankruptcy costs and 
costs of financial distress. For commodity price derivatives, the result is mixed. Although the 
leverage is statistically significant and lower for derivatives users, differences in interest 
coverage ratios between users and non-users are insignificant. Overall, other results with respect 
to proxies for corporate tax and agency costs of debt are weak and in some instances inconsistent 
 87 
with the theories. In addition, the insignificance of foreign assets to total assets, and foreign sales 
to total sales is in line with the notion that firms may not use derivatives for hedging exposure. 
4.5.2. Multivariate analysis: Determinants of the decision to use derivatives 
4.5.2.1. Pooled Probit results 
* Analysis by country-specific factors 
In line with Hypothesis 1, we find that corruption is positively and significantly associated 
with a firm’s likelihood of using derivatives. This result may be attributed to a lower transaction 
cost associated with lower corruption. Put differently, lower corruption enables firms to enter 
financial derivatives contracts at a lower cost. Likewise, consistent with Hypothesis 2, there 
exists a significant and positive effect of government effectiveness on a firm’s tendency to use 
derivatives. This result is due to the fact that a well-functioning legal system and high legal 
enforceability lower the costs of contracting and administrating, thereby facilitating firms ‘use of 
derivatives.  
(INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE) 
Taken together, these findings suggest that good governance increases a firm’s inclination to 
use derivatives. Relatedly, firms in weakly governed countries are likely to use derivatives for 
purposes other than reducing exposure to financial risks. In particular, when examining the 
proxies for exposure, we find the coefficient estimates of all other proxies are insignificant; 
implying that exposure to financial risks does not play an important role in the determinants of a 
firm’s derivatives usage. This finding is similar to that of Allayannis et al. (2003), who found 
that there is no evidence that East Asian firms eliminate their foreign exchange exposure by 
using derivatives. 
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The estimated coefficient on overall risk rating, the proxy for country risk, is positive and 
statistically different from zero. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 and implies that firms in 
more risky countries are more likely to use derivatives to manage a higher level of exposure to 
market risks.  
* Analysis by type of derivatives 
We find that the results somewhat depend on the underlying assets of derivatives contracts. 
In the case of foreign currency derivatives, broadly similar to the results obtained for the use of 
any derivatives, we find a positive and statistically significant association between government 
effectiveness, overall risk rating, and firms’ decisions to use derivatives. Conversely, for the use 
of interest rate derivatives, government effectiveness does not affect firms’ likelihood of using 
derivatives, although there exists strongly significant link between the use of interest rate 
derivatives and corruption and overall risk rating. For the use of commodity price derivatives, 
notably, the results lie in stark contrast to the results of any derivatives, foreign currency 
derivatives, and interest rate derivatives use when we are unable to find any evidence that there 
is a link between governance mechanisms and country risk and firms’ decisions on using 
derivatives. However, opposite to the finding of Lel (2012) that the use of commodity price 
derivatives is mostly industry-specific, we observe that the coefficient on corruption is always 
significant and positive, suggesting that a country’s governance quality has a strong impact on a 
firm’s decision on using that type of derivatives. 
4.5.2.2. Pooled Probit results based on corruption levels  
In this section, we replicate pooled probit regressions with respect to the corruption level. 
We group countries into low and high corruption levels based on the scales of the CPI as defined 
by the TI. The low corruption level group consists of all countries having scores equal to or 
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greater than 75, whereas any country with a CPI score less than 75 is placed in the high 
corruption level group. In that way, we can identify the factors that might or might not be 
determinants of derivatives usage by firms located in countries with low corruption and the 
factors most likely to affect firms’ decisions when they are influenced by high corruption. 
(INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE) 
When the corruption level is low, the results show that governance mechanism quality is a 
significant determinant explaining why firms use derivatives, but traditional hedging theories 
have very little power to explain why firms use derivatives. In particular, we find mixed 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis of bankruptcy and financial distress costs: Leverage is 
positively related with firms’ likelihood of using derivatives, while the interest coverage ratio is 
never different from zero at any significance level. Consistent with Gay et al. (2011) and Sprcic 
and Sevic (2012), we do not find any significant evidence of a link between proxies for corporate 
tax and firms’ probability of using derivatives, as they are statistically significant but counter to 
the hypothesized sign. In line with Géczy, Minton, and Schrand(1997) and Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001), we do not find any link between agency costs of debt and decisions on derivatives use by 
firms in countries with low corruption.  
The significant and positive coefficient estimates of foreign sales to total sales and leverage, 
however, suggest firms with greater exposure to exchange rate and interest rate risks are more 
likely to use derivatives. This result indicates that firms in countries with low corruption appear 
to use derivatives to mitigate exposure to financial risks rather than to speculate, in line with 
arguments about speculation of prior studies such as Géczy et al. (1997) and Júnior (2013). 
When we analyze the results by type of derivatives, we find that the driving factors of firms’ 
decisions on using derivatives vary somewhat among the types of derivatives, and there is still a 
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lack of supporting evidence for traditional hedging theories. Specifically, when a firm makes a 
decision on derivatives usage in the situation of low corruption, leverage is a significant 
determinant. However, if coefficients on leverage are significant and with the predicted sign in 
the case of foreign currency and interest rate derivatives use, the negative effects for leverage in 
the case of commodity price derivatives use are counter to the hypothesis of bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs. These results indicate that firms use foreign currency and interest rate 
derivatives more aggressively when the costs of financial distress are higher. Similarly, firm size 
is an important factor influencing firms’ likelihood of using foreign currency derivatives, while it 
does not affect firms’ decisions in the case of interest rate and commodity price derivatives.  
When the level of corruption is high, the factors influencing firms’ decisions on using 
derivatives are different. First, contrary to Nance et al. (1993), the observed negative coefficient 
estimate on deferred taxes implies that in highly corrupt countries, the more progressive marginal 
tax rates are, the less the firms are induced to use derivatives. Second, the market to book ratio 
has a highly significant and negative effect on firms’ likelihood of using derivatives in highly 
corrupt countries but an insignificant effect in countries with low corruption. This result suggests 
that firms in highly corrupt countries do not use derivatives to reduce agency costs of debt. 
Meanwhile, firms with growth opportunities in countries with low corruption may have greater 
sufficient funds and/or higher external financing availability and thus have less incentive to use 
derivatives to deal with the mismatch between domestic costs and foreign revenues, as shown in 
Géczy et al. (1997). Third, the observed insignificant coefficient estimates on all proxies for 
exposure indicate that firms in highly corrupt countries do not use derivatives to eliminate 
exposure to financial risks. They use derivatives for other purposes, such as speculation or self-
management purposes. 
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4.5.3. Multivariate analysis: Determinants of the intensity of derivatives use 
4.5.3.1. Pooled Tobit estimations 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the corruption index has a significant and positive impact on 
the intensity of derivatives use. We also observe a positive effect for government effectiveness. 
Taken together, these results suggest that good institutions with strong legal enforceability and 
governance capabilities lower hedging costs, hence facilitating firms’ use of derivatives. 
Meanwhile, firms in countries with high corruption have less motivation to use derivatives, 
because entering into contracts is more costly due to bribes and other administrative payments. 
Next, given that formal institutions are shaped by national cultural values (Li et al., 2013), 
we can also explore the interaction effect of formal institutions and culture on derivatives use. 
The results suggest that firms’ decisions on the extent of derivatives use may rely on the national 
cultural values of firms’ country of origin. In particular, based on Licht et al.’s (2005) argument, 
the countries with high corruption levels in our sample are harmonious societies, as they 
emphasize accepting the status quo, avoiding conflicts, and self-assertion; hence, they are less 
comfortable with market-based financial systems. By contrast, the countries with low corruption 
levels are disharmonious societies that emphasize self-interested competition, requiring formal 
institutions to protect the rights of competing parties, so they are supportive of market-based 
financial systems that facilitate the use of derivatives contracts. 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE) 
Regarding types of derivatives, we find that besides the similar results to those in the case of 
any derivatives, the effects of some factors vary across types of derivatives. For interest rate 
derivatives, we observe that corruption is a significant determinant influencing firms’ extent of 
using derivatives, while we do not find any significant effect of government effectiveness or 
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country risk on firms’ level of derivatives use. For commodity price derivatives, we find that 
there is a strong relation between a country’s corruption level and risks and a firms’ decision on 
the extent of derivatives use. This result is different from the findings of previous studies that 
firms use commodity price derivatives for other reasons arising from industry-specific factors. 
4.5.3.2. Moderating effect of corruption levels 
When the corruption level is low, consistent with the findings from probit estimations, Table 
4.7 shows that although some firm-specific factors are statistically significant determinants of 
firms’ level of derivatives use, they do not support any traditional hedging theories, as most of 
the significant results are counter to predictions. In particular, the results do not support the 
hypothesis of economies of scale, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient estimate on firm 
size. We are also unable to find any supporting evidence in favor of the corporate tax hypothesis 
or the argument of agency costs of debt. On the other hand, even though leverage and interest 
coverage are statistically significant, they are both opposite to the predicted sign. 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.7 HERE) 
We observe that governance mechanism quality is a consistently important factor 
influencing non-financial firms’ level of derivatives use, as government effectiveness is 
statistically different from zero and positively associated with firms’ level of derivatives use in 
all models. On the other hand, we find the interesting result that non-financial firms in countries 
with low corruption consider countries’ risk levels when they make decisions on the extent of 
derivatives use. This finding is consistent with our prior finding from the probit model in the 
previous section.    
We note that the factors affecting firms’ derivatives use in countries with low corruption and 
countries with high corruption differ somewhat. First, firm size is a significant determinant of 
 93 
derivatives use by firms located in highly corrupt countries, as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficient estimates. In line with Clark and Judge (2008), we propose a possible 
explanation that in highly corrupt countries, small firms face greater information asymmetries 
and higher financing transaction costs, which is likely to make external financing more 
expensive for smaller firms and thus motivate them to use higher levels of derivatives.  
Second, the coefficient estimates on current ratio and convertible debts are statistically 
different from zero and negatively related to firms’ derivatives use decisions, while these 
variables are insignificant factors for firms located in countries with low corruption. According 
to Nance et al.’s (1993) argument on substitutes for hedging with derivatives, these results 
suggest that firms in highly corrupt countries possess liquid assets or issue debt instruments to 
mitigate the probability of financial distress and agency costs of debt with respect to long-term 
financing, which acts as a substitute to hedging with derivatives. This finding also supports 
Hypothesis 1 that firms have less incentive to enter into derivatives contracts if they are located 
in highly corrupt countries. Meanwhile, the countries with low corruption facilitate the use of 
derivatives, so firms based in these countries are not induced to use liquid assets and debt 
instruments as substitutes for derivatives. 
Third, overall risk rating has a highly significant and positive effect on firms’ likelihood of 
using derivatives, while it is an insignificant determinant of derivatives use by firms located in 
countries with low corruption. This result supports Hypothesis 3 and suggests that firms in 
highly corrupt countries use derivatives more aggressively, simply because their countries have 
higher degree of economic, financial, and political risks. 
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4.5.3.3. Extended multivariate regressions 
To address the endogeneity problem, in this section, we implement lagged variables in a 
panel data framework with respect to corruption levels. This method not only offers a solution to 
the endogeneity issue but also enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is 
unchanged over time and correlates to the independent variables (see Chen and King, 2014). 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.8 HERE) 
We find that firms in countries with low corruption levels use derivatives to hedge exposure, 
while firms located in highly corrupt countries use derivatives for selective hedging and not for 
the reasons stated by traditional hedging theories. In particular, we observe that the amount of 
derivatives use in the previous year is positively related to decisions on levels of derivatives use 
in the current year by firms in countries with low corruption, while it does not affect decisions of 
firms in countries with high corruption levels. This result suggests that firms located in countries 
with low corruption use derivatives as their norm. In contrast, in highly corrupt countries, firms 
“take their view” on decisions on the extent of derivatives use or, in Júnior’s (2013) words, they 
selectively hedge. This result is similar to Allayannis et al.’s (2003) finding that non-financial 
firms in East Asian countries engage in selective hedging. 
On the other hand, we find no relation between the extent of derivatives usage and the 
likelihood of firms in highly corrupt countries to use derivatives to reduce costs of bankruptcy 
and financial distress, agency costs of debt, economies of scale, or corporate tax burden. 
However, we observe that firms located in countries with low corruption levels use derivatives to 
reduce expected tax liability, thus reducing the volatility of pre-tax firm value, as evidenced by 
the significant and positive estimated coefficients on both tax rate and deferred taxes, which is 
consistent with Nance et al. (1993) and Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013). We also find that foreign 
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assets to total assets has a strongly significant and positive effect on decisions on the extent of 
derivatives use by firms in countries with low corruption, indicating that firms use derivatives to 
hedge, while all proxies for exposure are insignificant in the case of high corruption levels. 
4.5.4. Robustness tests 
4.5.4.1. Country random effects  
The first robustness test we undertake is the country-random-effects specification with the 
Tobit model. With this approach, any remaining unobserved country effects are considered 
generated by some common mechanism and thereby able to transfer between countries (see 
Bryan and Jenkins, 2013). 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.9 HERE) 
We find that firms are more likely to use higher levels of derivatives when they are located 
in countries with higher governance quality, more effective legal systems, and lower corruption, 
as shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on corruption and government 
effectiveness. Consistent with our previous findings, Table 4.9 also shows that non-financial East 
Asian firms do not use derivatives to eliminate exposure or for reasons established by hedging 
theories to overcome market imperfections, because with the exception of firm size, all observed 
estimated coefficients on firm-specific factors and exposure are insignificant.  
4.5.4.2.  Strength of governance mechanisms 
Finally, we replicate the pooled probit and pooled Tobit with corruption and government 
effectiveness as a proxy for the strength of governance mechanisms to investigate the impact of 
cross-country governance mechanisms on the use of derivatives. Higher values of these indices 
correspond to stronger governance mechanisms. We also generate interaction terms between 
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proxies for exposure and those indices. Lel (2012) indicates that the main advantage of using 
country-specific indices is that regression estimates will be less subject to the endogeneity 
problem, because they are beyond firms’ control and hence they cannot be jointly determined 
with firms’ derivatives usage and other financial policies. 
 (INSERT TABLE 4.10 HERE) 
We observe that the estimated coefficient on the interest coverage ratio is positive and 
statistically different from zero, and the coefficient on the interaction term between this variable 
and governance is also positive and significant (0.0212 and 0.0125, respectively). These results 
indicate that firms located in well-governed countries use derivatives more aggressively when 
they have higher exposure to interest rate risks. These findings also show that firms in countries 
with higher governance quality use derivatives more to reduce their costs of bankruptcy and 
financial distress, in line with the prediction of Smith and Stulz (1985) and existing literature 
such as Chen and King (2014) and Bartram et al. (2009). Therefore, firms in countries with 
strong governance mechanisms use derivatives to a greater extent to eliminate exposure and to 
overcome market imperfections as hedging theories argue. These results are consistent with our 
previous findings. 
We obtain similar results regarding the impact of government effectiveness on derivatives 
use. We find that firms located in countries with better governance are more likely to use 
derivatives. These firms use derivatives to mitigate their bankruptcy costs and costs of financial 
distress, as evidenced by the significant and positive effect for leverage and for the interaction 
term between this variable and governance (0.0143 and 0.0894, respectively). 
Taken together, the results in this section indicate that our main inferences are mostly robust 
to various estimation techniques and measures of the strength of governance mechanisms. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
We explored the link between countries’ governance quality and derivatives use by non-
financial firms in eight countries in East Asia during the period of 2003–2013. Our findings 
strongly suggest that countries’ governance mechanisms have significant and positive effect on 
firms’ decisions on derivatives usage. Corruption level plays a significant role in explaining the 
use of derivatives. Firms in highly corrupt countries have less incentive to use derivatives, while 
firms located in countries with lower corruption levels are more motivated to use derivatives and 
use derivatives with a greater intensity. We conjecture that firms in well-governed countries use 
derivatives to hedge exposure and overcome their costs arising from market imperfections, 
whereas firms located in weakly governed countries use derivatives for speculation and/or 
selective hedging. Characteristics of governance mechanism in our sample East Asian countries 
could be found in other developed and developing countries, so these findings of this study may 
act as a baseline from which to generalize. 
The theoretical contribution of this study is its specific operationalization and utilization of 
the institutional theory (e.g., North, 1990, 1994; Dunning, 2003; Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005) 
and Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1988; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) in non-financial 
firms’ derivative activities. This approach contrasts sharply to the hedging theory, which focuses 
mainly on how firm-specific characteristics determine firms’ hedging decision. Bartram et al. 
(2009) critically question the power of firm-specific factors, as they do not match the theoretical 
arguments that it has advanced. On the contrary, this study considers country-level factor 
deployment, utilization and exploitation with a focus on substantive elements underlying 
governance quality, which are the driver to rule a firm’s performance and behavior.  As such, our 
study contributes to the literature on the determinants of firms’ derivatives use by underlining the 
 98 
importance of incorporating country-level factors to explore incentives for derivatives use by 
non-financial firms. It suggests that country-specific characteristics may explain some of the 
ambiguity in the existing empirical literature. The strong link between institutional factors and 
the use of derivatives also stimulates further theoretical and empirical research aimed at 
elucidating firms’ decisions on using derivatives.  
Finally, our findings provide important policy implications emphasizing the role of 
policymakers in institutional development—such as enhancing legal systems, cracking down on 
corruption, and improving government efficiency—to enable firms to explore the benefits of 
using derivatives in managing risks.  
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of derivatives use of the sample firms 
This table shows the number of firms and the percentage of firms that use derivatives by country, and by year for all firms. We present the percentage of firms using 
derivatives separately for foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives and commodity price derivatives. Panel A presents the uses of three types of derivatives 
based on firm-year observations by country. Panel B shows the trend of derivatives use over time.  
 
Panel A: Derivatives use by country 
Countries Total Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives  
 N N % N % N % N % 
Indonesia 429 158 36.83 122 28.44 111 25.87 31 7.23 
Philippines 352 352 100.00 139 39.49 99 28.12 57 16.24 
Singapore 1639 651 39.72 735 44.98 434 26.58 168 10.29 
Japan 1661 1661 100.00 1293 78.22 1020 61.71 233 14.10 
Hong Kong 1606 382 23.79 350 21.88 265 16.56 95 5.94 
Malaysia 1760 669 38.01 661 37.58 219 12.46 112 6.38 
China 1111 179 16.11 202 18.20 100 9.01 88 7.93 
Thailand 1133 1133 100.00 613 54.10 247 21.84 84 7.43 
Total 9691 5185 53.50 4115 42.55 2495 25.81 868 8.99 
Panel B: Derivatives use by year 
Years Total Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives  
 N N % N % N % N % 
2003-2006 3524 1752 49.72 1293 36.71 782 22.20 217 6.16 
2007-2008 881 477 54.14 387 43.98 225 25.57 79 9.00 
2009-2013 4405 2462 55.89 2021 46.06 1261 28.77 488 11.14 
Total 9691 5185 53.50 4115 42.55 2495 25.81 868 8.99 
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Table 4.2: Definitions of independent variables 
This table defines the firm-secific and country-specific independent variables, and control variables that we examine 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Panel A: Firm-specific variables  
Leverage Total debt to total assets Datastream 
Interest coverage ratio Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total interest expenses Datastream 
Deferred taxes Deferred taxes represent the accumulation of taxes which are deferred as a 
result of timing differences between reporting sales and expenses for tax 
and financial reporting purposes 
Datastream 
Tax rate Income taxes to pre-tax income Datastream 
Market to book value Market value of a firm’s common equity divided by book value of 
common equity  
Datastream 
Current ratio Short term assets to short term liabilities Datastream 
Firm size Natural logarithm of market value of total assets scaled by Producer price 
index (PPI) 
Datastream 
Convertible debt Book value of convertible debt divided by firm size Datastream 
Preferred stock Book value of preferred stock divided by firm size Datastream 
Dividend payout Dividends per share to earnings per share Datastream 
Panel B: Country-specific variables  
Overall risk rating Average scores for sovereign risk, currency risk, banking sector risk, and 
economic structure risk of each country on a from 0 (minimum risk) to 
100 (maximum risk)  
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
Corruption Perception Index  
(CPI) 
Inverse ranking of country corruption levels on a scale from 100 (very 
clean) to 0 (highly corrupt)  
Transparency 
International 
Regulatory quality  Index measuring the governmental ability to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations with values from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)  
World Bank 
Government effectiveness  
 
 
 
Index measuring the quality of public services, civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies with values from -2.5 (weak) 
to 2.5 (strong)  
World Bank 
Panel C: Control variables  
FORSALES Foreign sales to total sales Datastream 
FORASSETS Foreign assets to total assets Datastream 
GDP per capita  
 
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita of respective countries, measured in 
thousands of USD  
World Bank 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 
 
Financial system deposits to GDP: The demand, time, saving deposits in 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP 
World Bank 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics 
This table provides summary statistics for both firm-specific and country-specific characteristics of the sample firms, partitioned on the basis of derivatives use. It reports summary 
statistics for proxies associated to incentives for using derivatives for firms that use either foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives or commodity price derivatives 
(derivative users) and firms that do not (derivatives non-users). P-values for testing the difference in mean are also reported. Data is measured in thousands of USD, and as of fiscal year-
ends. 
Variables  
Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives 
Users Non-users 
p-value 
Users Non-users 
p-value 
Users Non-users 
p-value 
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Firm-specific variables 
Leverage 23.76 33.63 25.54 95.88 0.203 23.95 29.57 25.07 86.39 0.341 22.53 27.35 25.01 79.13 0.049 
Interest coverage 2931.9 103942 116.6 31358.6 0.281 3219 128080 1429 35604 0.494 1822 37022 1898 74477 0.959 
Deferred taxes -44679 858534 4259 425653 0.000 -56623 104288 -2625 429692 0.013 -38137 818757 -14462 62759 0.412 
Tax rate 38.83 419.24 28.01 141.04 0.148 35.29 107.02 31.91 344.25 0.513 32.29 128.29 32.91 311.01 0.921 
Market to book value 2.699 46.09 2.84 56.72 0.892 1.528 21.74 3.22 59.55 0.043 5.24 99.87 2.539 45.17 0.435 
Current ratio 4.076 65.35 3.549 32.83 0.638 3.83 48.93 3.756 49.59 0.950 5.385 53.42 3.615 49.02 0.353 
Firm size 6.434 2.47 5.476 2.19 0.000 6.81 2.46 5.56 2.24 0.000 6.198 2.42 5.855 2.36 0.000 
Convertible debt 0.0014 0.0127 0.002 0.019 0.027 0.0014 0.0137 0.002 0.017 0.076 0.001 0.011 0.0019 0.0172 0.092 
Preferred stock 0.0018 0.0192 0.007 0.271 0.112 0.0018 0.0198 0.006 0.2389 0.113 0.0018 0.02 0.0055 0.216 0.128 
Dividend payout 27.58 24.36 24.61 25.78 0.000 27.078 23.74 25.45 25.72 0.007 26.358 24.51 25.813 25.29 0.557 
Country-specific variables  
Overall risk rating 29.63 7.774 31.37 8.379 0.000 28.68 7.93 31.30 8.15 0.000 30.11 8.216 30.68 8.167 0.049 
Corruption index  62.36 19.21 58.42 19.54 0.000 65.49 18.39 58.23 19.52 0.000 62.11 19.64 59.90 19.47 0.001 
Regulatory quality 0.94 0.71 0.87 0.89 0.000 1.02 0.71 0.86 0.85 0.000 0.91 0.79 0.89 0.82 0.618 
Government effectiveness 1.21 0.72 1.08 0.83 0.000 1.27 0.73 1.08 0.81 0.000 1.17 0.8 1.13 0.79 0.161 
Control variables  
FORSALES 37.08 33.86 35.99 38.15 0.220 39.40 33.61 35.40 37.09 0.000 39.65 40.23 36.18 35.76 0.042 
FORASSETS 21.32 24.99 24.37 28.93 0.000 22.33 23.98 23.28 28.43 0.215 22.82 25.63 23.04 27.46 0.848 
GDP per capita 36015 22265 34965 24087 0.026 37863 21545 34563 23866 0.000 36256 23672 36330 23299 0.2711 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 146.30 67.98 136.03 86.014 0.000 158.16 72.069 134.2 80.39 0.000 142.42 76.09 140.2 79.31 0.4179 
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Table 4.4: Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of using derivatives 
This table reports the regression for the probability of using any type of derivatives, foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives. The dependent variable is binary variable, which take 
on a value of 1 if firm use derivative, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2.The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors 
are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Model 1 investigates the country-specific characteristics only; both firm-specific and country-specific variables are included 
in the Model 2. Asterisks ***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
Explanatory variables 
      Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives  Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Country- specific factors         
Corruption 0.105*** 0.0939*** 0.0979*** 0.0855*** 0.109*** 0.0972*** 0.0416*** 0.0366*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Government effectiveness 0.651 0.503* 0.644* 0.496* 0.0838 -0.0402 -0.296 -0.246 
 (0.308) (0.084) (0.076) (0.083) (0.814) (0.919) (0.252) (0.420) 
Overall risk rating 0.132* 0.111* 0.126* 0.105* 0.105** 0.0923** 0.0367 0.0337 
 (0.077) (0.100) (0.071) (0.085) (0.015) (0.017) (0.265) (0.326) 
Firm- specific factors          
Firm size 
 
0.0436***  0.0449***  0.0409*  0.0142 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.057)  (0.403) 
Leverage  
 
0.0197**  0.0252***  0.0347***  -0.0333 
 (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.829) 
Interest coverage 
 
0.0521  0.0295**  -0.0700  0.0132 
 (0.133)  (0.021)  (0.339)  (0.164) 
Tax rate 
 
-0.0247***  -0.0268**  -0.0537  -0.0213 
 (0.007)  (0.021)  (0.645)  (0.378) 
Deferred taxes 
 
-0.0283*  -0.0577***  0.0512***  0.0493*** 
 (0.079)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.000) 
Market to book value 
 
-0.0106***  -0.0117***  -0.0127*  -0.0961** 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.075)  (0.027) 
Current ratio 
 
-0.0737  -0.0762  -0.0667  -0.0129 
 (0.347)  (0.352)  (0.441)  (0.338) 
Dividend payout 
 
-0.0694  -0.0953  -0.0222  0.0485 
 (0.204)  (0.467)  (0.011)  (0.799) 
Control variables          
FORSALES 0.0757 0.0125 0.0108 0.0174 0.0203* 0.0256** 0.0139 0.0939 
 (0.640) (0.399) (0.559) (0.335) (0.082) (0.040) (0.336) (0.593) 
FORASSETS -0.0326 -0.0302 -0.0280 -0.0248 -0.0210 -0.0212 -0.0192 -0.0256 
 (0.163) (0.265) (0.262) (0.364) (0.308) (0.330) (0.204) (0.273) 
GDP per capita 0.0616*** 0.0530*** 0.0591** 0.0496*** 0.0530*** 0.0430*** 0.0107 -0.0889 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.115) (0.344) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.253 0.436* 0.931 0.066 0.328 0.755 0.587 0.606 
 (0.117) (0.093) (0.227) (0.228) (0.734) (0.406) (0.422) (0.412) 
Intercept -8.927** -7.627** -8.561** -7.271** -8.984*** -7.962*** -4.520*** -4.225** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.021) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 3672 2686 3671 2679 3663 2680 3644 2661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1356 0.1776 0.1301 0.1675 0.1361 0.1775 0.0551 0.0797 
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Table 4.5: Probit estimations for determinants of derivative use based on corruption levels 
This table presents regressions from pooled probit models of the likelihood of using derivatives on the basis of corruption levels: low corruption, and high corruption. We define corruption levels based on 
corruption index, in which those countries having scores greater than 75 are grouped into low corruption level, and those countries having scores less than 75 are considered to be highly corrupt. The 
dependent variable is binary variable, which take on a value of 1 if firm uses derivative, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients and significance 
levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
            Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives  Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives 
Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption 
Country-specific factors         
Government effectiveness 0.598*** 0.819*** 1.368*** 0.525* 0.773*** 1.570*** 1.329** 0.970** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.039) (0.001) (0.000) (0.028) (0.028) 
Overall risk rating -0.0638 0.0435 -0.281 0.0557 0.0656 0.00616 0.0556 -0.0173 
 (0.838) (0.389) (0.421) (0.294) (0.810) (0.841) (0.674) (0.709) 
Firm-specific factors         
Firm size 0.0327*** 0.0297** 0.0414*** 0.0283* 0.0500 0.0396 -0.0353 0.0262 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.002) (0.060) (0.239) (0.113) (0.389) (0.183) 
Leverage  0.0194*** 0.0114 0.0274*** 0.0167 0.0363*** 0.0204 -0.0417*** 0.0109 
 (0.005) (0.538) (0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.235) (0.005) (0.433) 
Interest coverage 0.0192 0.0438 0.0674* 0.0287 -0.0751*** -0.0116 0.0326*** -0.0225 
 (0.124) (0.208) (0.094) (0.290) (0.001) (0.462) (0.000) (0.388) 
Tax rate -0.0303* 0.0350 -0.0313** -0.0759 -0.0249 0.0474*** -0.0439*** 0.0142 
 (0.085) (0.813) (0.003) (0.513) (0.363) (0.000) (0.006) (0.307) 
Deferred taxes 0.0063 -0.0358*** 0.0216 -0.0594*** 0.0209 0.0592*** 0.0534*** 0.0384*** 
 (0.919) (0.000) (0.698) (0.000) (0.287) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market to book value -0.00863 -0.0084** -0.0169** -0.0056 0.0113 -0.0411*** -0.0039 -0.0179 
 (0.279) (0.023) (0.041) (0.203) (0.721) (0.007) (0.110) (0.453) 
Control variables          
FORSALES 0.0117** 0.0474*** 0.0103 0.0610*** 0.0828*** 0.0527*** -0.0214* 0.0344 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.087) (0.201) 
FORASSETS -0.0348 0.0310 -0.0015 0.0240 -0.0297 0.0106 -0.0614*** 0.0152 
 (0.209) (0.160) (0.540) (0.431) (0.370) (0.102) (0.000) (0.711) 
GDP per capita 0.0400*** 0.0127*** 0.0547*** 0.0114*** 0.0330*** 0.0132*** 0.0356*** 0.0485** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.011) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.349 0.932*** 0.898 0.826*** 0.159** 0.994*** 0.257 -0.296 
 (0.295) (0.001) (0.457) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.177) (0.608) 
Intercept 0.170 -3.502 5.295 -3.869 -2.843 -2.809** -2.169 -1.389 
 (0.981) (0.131) (0.512) (0.123) (0.676) (0.047) (0.467) (0.500) 
Other firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 927 1757    927 1750    927 1748    822 1733    
Adjusted R-squared 0.0873 0.1880 0.0933 0.1654 0.0933 0.2001 0.0942 0.0854 
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Table 4.6: Tobit estimates for the extent of the use of derivatives 
This table reports the pooled tobit regressions with censoring at zero and one for the extent of firms’ using any type of derivatives, foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives. 
The dependent variable is continuous variable, which is measured as notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Non-derivative users are set to zero. All independent variables 
definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Model 1 investigates the country-specific characteristics only; both firm-specific and country-specific variables are included in the Model 2. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
      Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives  Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Country-specific factors         
Corruption 0.0267 0.0585* 0.0304* 0.0467* 0.0143** 0.0136** 0.0102** 0.0675** 
 (0.245) (0.054) (0.062) (0.086) (0.030) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) 
Government effectiveness 0.204*** 0.0329* 0.0447* -0.0350 -0.234 -0.223 -0.0598 -0.0699 
 (0.000) (0.071) (0.073) (0.728) (0.146) (0.245) (0.467) (0.903) 
Overall risk rating 0.0204*** 0.0108 0.0864 0.0457 0.0678 0.0195 0.0120* 0.0972 
 (0.010) (0.128) (0.198) (0.508) (0.935) (0.842) (0.090) (0.122) 
Control variables          
FORSALES 0.0673 0.0459 0.0545 0.0394 0.0722 0.0465 0.0955 0.0559 
 (0.280) (0.260) (0.377) (0.305) (0.228) (0.196) (0.217) (0.472) 
FORASSETS -0.0117* -0.0775 -0.0758 -0.0404 -0.0154* -0.0915 -0.0155 -0.0182 
 (0.061) (0.212) (0.168) (0.442) (0.082) (0.199) (0.140) (0.184) 
GDP per capita 0.0363 0.0301 0.0223 0.0191 0.0196 0.0198 0.0170 0.0191 
 (0.331) (0.375) (0.588) (0.588) (0.643) (0.555) (0.360) (0.233) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.281* 0.269* 0.276† 0.279* 0.121 0.237 0.282 0.254 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.073) (0.091) (0.639) (0.423) (0.537) (0.473) 
Intercept -0.729 -0.419 -0.428 -0.281 -0.924 -0.738 -2.054** -1.657** 
 (0.221) (0.369) (0.477) (0.549) (0.224) (0.185) (0.014) (0.022) 
Firm-specific factors No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 3471 2540 3676 2691 3422 2486    3595 2627    
Adjusted R-squared 0.071 0.112 0.091 0.1406 0.073 0.1066 0.0664 0.1291 
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Table 4.7: Tobit estimates for the extent of derivative use based on corruption levels 
This table reports the pooled tobit regressions with censoring at zero and one for the extent of firms’ using derivatives on the basis of corruption levels: low corruption, and high corruption level. We 
define corruption levels based on corruption index, in which those countries having scores greater than 75 are grouped into low corruption level, and those countries having scores less than 75 are 
considered to be highly corrupt. The dependent variable is continuous variable, which is measured as notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Non-derivative users are set to zero. All 
independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
Explanatory variables 
            Any derivatives    Foreign currency derivatives       Interest rate derivatives     Commodity price derivatives 
Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption 
Country-specific factors         
Government effectiveness 18.97*** 0.389** 17.34*** 0.335 26.29*** 0.542*** 4.450*** 0.0903 
 (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.608) 
Overall risk rating 0.924 -0.0437** -0.582 -0.0409** 0.712 -0.0491*** 0.321 -0.00842 
 (0.491) (0.006) (0.181) (0.013) (0.463) (0.000) (0.324) (0.554) 
Firm-specific factors         
Firm size -0.871 -0.0268*** -0.482 -0.0598*** -0.0780 -0.0963 -0.0583 -0.0226 
 (0.134) (0.000) (0.136) (0.000) (0.935) (0.911) (0.808) (0.555) 
Leverage  -0.0491* -0.0454 -0.0464 0.0850 -0.0127 -0.0432 -0.0238 -0.0195 
 (0.030) (0.735) (0.622) (0.923) (0.869) (0.602) (0.239) (0.415) 
Interest coverage 0.0174*** -0.0129 0.0138*** 0.0991 -0.0597*** -0.0127* 0.0455*** -0.0374 
 (0.000) (0.974) (0.000) (0.725) (0.000) (0.083) (0.005) (0.444) 
Tax rate -0.0101 0.0126** -0.0600*** 0.0851* -0.0531 0.0226*** -0.0101 0.0582 
 (0.564) (0.011) (0.000) (0.054) (0.492) (0.000) (0.231) (0.318) 
Deferred taxes 0.0640* -0.0235 0.0531* -0.0503 0.0821 0.0353 0.0103 0.0149 
 (0.085) (0.969) (0.089) (0.311) (0.183) (0.556) (0.286) (0.313) 
Market to book value -0.121 -0.0917 -0.138*** 0.0109 -0.0319 -0.0817** -0.0622 -0.0198 
 (0.165) (0.786) (0.000) (0.968) (0.743) (0.026) (0.324) (0.371) 
Current ratio -0.145 -0.0260* -0.197 -0.0514*** -0.0247 0.0160 -0.299*** 0.0303 
 (0.779) (0.087) (0.264) (0.000) (0.958) (0.888) (0.000) (0.973) 
Dividend payout 0.0458 -0.0201** 0.0351*** -0.0266*** -0.0656 -0.0707* -0.0460 0.0201 
 (0.861) (0.041) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.097) (0.651) (0.655) 
Convertible debt 2.176 -6.063*** -7.059 -5.734*** -23.11*** -3.470 -25.27*** -4.444* 
 (0.902) (0.002) (0.548) (0.001) (0.000) (0.213) (0.000) (0.062) 
Control variables         
FORSALES 0.0183 0.0317*** 0.0754 0.0278*** 0.0105 0.0143*** -0.0125*** 0.0126* 
 (0.239) (0.000) (0.572) (0.000) (0.154) (0.001) (0.005) (0.070) 
FORASSETS -0.0257 0.0181 -0.0171 0.0133 -0.0131 0.0551 -0.0360*** 0.0306 
 (0.539) (0.434) (0.387) (0.491) (0.717) (0.518) (0.000) (0.690) 
GDP per capita 0.342*** 0.131*** 0.811*** 0.159*** 0.416*** 0.0496* 0.890*** 0.0326 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.159) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.338 0.951*** 0.525 0.965*** 0.607 0.972* 0.370 -0.0209 
 (0.620) (0.000) (0.808) (0.000) (0.899) (0.092) (0.229) (0.909) 
Intercept 133.9*** -0.369 128.8*** -0.905 142.6*** 1.011* -32.77*** -0.446 
 (0.000) (0.569) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (0.104) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 804 1669    907 1716    848 1578    887 1675    
Adjusted R-squared 0.0220 0.0411 0.0303 0.0484 0.0132 0.152 0.0953 0.1842 
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Table 4.8: Results of Panel data regression with lagged variables based on corruption levels 
This table presents Panel data regressions with one-year lagged measure of all explanatory variables and one-year lagged derivatives use lagged variables based on corruption levels. We define corruption 
levels based on corruption index, in which those countries having scores greater than 75 are grouped into low corruption level, and those countries having scores less than 75 are considered to be highly 
corrupt. The dependent variable is continuous variable, which is measured as notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets. Non-derivative users are set to zero. All independent variables 
definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses. 
Explanatory variables 
                Any derivatives     Foreign currency derivatives       Interest rate derivatives     Commodity price derivatives 
Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption Low corruption High corruption 
Lagged derivative use 0.292*** -0.0272 0.0576*** 0.264 0.0597 0.0786*** 0.527*** 0.292*** 
 (0.000) (0.881) (0.000) (0.201) (0.908) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Country-specific factors         
Government effectiveness 1.112*** -0.225 7.439* -0.116 0.0114*** 0.166 -0.0712*** 1.112*** 
 (0.008) (0.453) (0.051) (0.336) (0.005) (0.504) (0.000) (0.008) 
Overall risk rating 5.221*** 0.0137** 2.440*** 0.0779 0.0867 0.119*** 0.0744 5.221*** 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.000) (0.136) (0.312) (0.000) (0.616) (0.001) 
Control variables          
FORSALES 0.0205*** 0.0363 0.0606** 0.0318* -0.017 0.0303** 0.0233 0.0205*** 
 (0.000) (0.737) (0.031) (0.062) (0.605) (0.037) (0.843) (0.000) 
FORASSETS 0.0164*** 0.0145 0.0124* 0.0524 0.0621** 0.0697*** 0.0363 0.0164*** 
 (0.000) (0.178) (0.061) (0.198) (0.039) (0.000) (0.278) (0.000) 
GDP per capita 0.286 0.1837*** 0.2513** 0.951* 0.0542 0.3271** 0.095 128.6 
 (0.201) (0.001) (0.023) (0.067) (0.956) (0.026) (0.666) (0.201) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.1069 0.588 0.5815*** 0.343*** 0.257 0.671*** 0.096*** 10.69 
 (0.516) (0.213) (0.000) (0.008) (0.381) (0.001) (0.008) (0.516) 
Intercept -26.503 1.275 -1.053 0.2440*** -0.826 1.002*** -2.973** -0.0602 
 (0.32) (0.378) (0.66) (0.010) (0.90) (0.000) (0.032) (0.319) 
Firm-level factors Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Current country-level factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
No of observations 268 602    270 695    298 724    324 788    
Adjusted R-squared N/A   N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 4.9: Random-effects Tobit model 
This tables presents resutls from random-effects tobit. The dependent variable is continuous variable. All independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The 
coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Asterisks 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
Explanatory variables Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives Commodity price derivatives 
Country-specific factors     
Corruption  0.156*** 0.0614 0.305*** 0.00250    
 (0.005) (0.118) (0.000) (0.792)    
Government effectiveness 1.734* 0.635 8.856*** 0.0667    
 (0.076) (0.553) (0.000) (0.805)   
Overall risk rating 0.0782 0.0242* -0.278* 0.00597    
 (0.536) (0.086) (0.060) (0.831)    
Control variables      
FORSALES -0.0285 -0.0335 0.0277 -0.0267    
 (0.708) (0.534) (0.754) (0.622)    
FORASSETS -0.0288 -0.0111 0.0972 -0.0584    
 (0.723) (0.058) (0.273) (0.374)    
GDP per capita 0.359 0.125 0.103 0.0437    
 (0.296) (0.597) (0.792) (0.238)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.606 0.910 0.451 0.0632    
 (0.323) (0.311) (0.329) (0.174)    
Intercept  -10.19 -6.545 -8.848 -0.429    
 (0.201) (0.241) (0.344) (0.953)    
Firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 2473 2623 2426 2562    
Log likelihood -5066.77 -4126.84 -7227.57 -2019.42 
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Table 4.10: Derivatives use and the strength of governance mechanism 
This table reports pooled probit and pooled tobit estimates of the effects of the strength of governance mechanism on the use of any 
derivative. Higher values of these three country-specific indices refer to higher strength of governance mechanism. In probit models, the 
dependent variable is binary variable, which takes on a value of 1 if a firm uses derivative, and 0 otherwise. In Tobit models, the dependent 
variable is continuous variable, which is measured as notional amount of derivatives use divided by total assets; non-derivative users are set to 
zero. All independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. 
Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Explanatory variables 
            Corruption    Government effectiveness 
Probit 
   (1) 
Tobit 
  (2) 
Probit 
  (3) 
Tobit 
  (4) 
Firm size 0.0393*** -0.0144** 0.123*** -0.0864 
 (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.367) 
Leverage  0.00650 0.00162 0.00352** 0.00143* 
 (0.208) (0.477) (0.037) (0.089) 
Leverage*Governance -0.0736 -0.0212 -0.0174 0.0894** 
 (0.261) (0.446) (0.113) (0.014) 
Interest coverage 0.0106 0.0205* 0.0880 0.0312 
 (0.117) (0.064) (0.130) (0.115) 
Interest coverage* Governance -0.0112 0.0125* -0.0402 -0.0114 
 (0.216) (0.076) (0.171) (0.135) 
Overall risk rating 0.0802*** 0.0131 -0.0440 0.0616 
 (0.009) (0.159) (0.422) (0.587) 
FORSALES 0.0739* 0.0205 0.0351 0.0591 
 (0.099) (0.145) (0.133) (0.518) 
FORSALES*Governance -0.0942* -0.0287 -0.0178 -0.0190 
 (0.090) (0.132) (0.118) (0.719) 
FORASSETS 0.0615 0.0169 -0.0157 -0.0292 
 (0.464) (0.366) (0.767) (0.722) 
FORASSETS*Governance -0.0133 -0.0393 -0.0177 -0.0406 
 (0.280) (0.105) (0.573) (0.356) 
Intercept  -6.581*** -0.922 1.401 -0.109 
 (0.000) (0.268) (0.541) (0.887) 
Other firm-specific factors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 2686 2200 2686 2200    
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Appendix 4.1: Probit and Tobit regressions for domestic firms 
This table reports the Probit and Tobit regression estimates for domestic firms with regard to for the use of any type of derivatives, foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives. All 
independent variables definitions are reported in Table 4.2.The coefficients and significance levels are reported on each model. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; p-values are in parentheses  
 
Explanatory variables 
Probit models  Tobit models  
Any derivatives FC derivatives IR derivatives CD derivatives Any derivatives FC derivatives IR derivatives CD derivatives 
Country- specific factors         
Corruption 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.0947*** 0.0956*** 0.0525 0.0390 0.0117** 0.0103** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.196) (0.333) (0.044) (0.049) 
Government effectiveness 1.294 1.745* 0.215 0.585 0.144 0.0699 -0.230 0.175 
 (0.186) (0.072) (0.733) (0.284) (0.412) (0.684) (0.307) (0.306) 
Overall risk rating 0.217** 0.257* 0.100 0.178*** 0.0253* 0.0163 -0.0419 0.0376*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.183) (0.001) (0.076) (0.204) (0.836) (0.002) 
Firm- specific factors          
Firm size 0.0574*** 0.0716*** 0.0563* -0.0120 -0.0111 -0.0140 0.0147 -0.0322 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.090) (0.968) (0.487) (0.898) (0.318) (0.781) 
Leverage  0.0147 0.0597 0.0393 -0.0284 0.0474 0.0187 0.0769 -0.0881 
 (0.921) (0.724) (0.141) (0.867) (0.555) (0.718) (0.450) (0.925) 
Interest coverage 0.0201*** 0.0207* -0.0115 -0.0482 0.0256** 0.0296*** -0.0664 -0.0164 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.371) (0.390) (0.042) (0.006) (0.334) (0.257) 
Tax rate -0.0426** -0.0608 -0.0279** -0.0159 -0.0131* -0.0108** -0.0159 -0.0360 
 (0.022) (0.380) (0.042) (0.376) (0.086) (0.050) (0.209) (0.351) 
Deferred taxes -0.0123*** -0.0135*** 0.057 0.0299 -0.0214* -0.0258* 0.0354 -0.0557*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.251) (0.086) (0.051) (0.854) (0.005) 
Market to book value -0.0105 -0.0164 -0.0162 -0.0313 -0.0253 -0.0476 -0.0974** -0.0106 
 (0.342) (0.210) (0.217) (0.219) (0.488) (0.235) (0.013) (0.191) 
Current ratio -0.0049 0.0168 -0.0139 -0.0120 0.0508 0.0294 -0.0277 -0.0424 
 (0.821) (0.939) (0.554) (0.540) (0.578) (0.605) (0.737) (0.683) 
Dividend payout -0.0213 -0.0347* -0.0732 0.0166 -0.0393 -0.0646* -0.0717 0.0998 
 (0.150) (0.055) (0.685) (0.623) (0.419) (0.063) (0.956) (0.396) 
Control variables          
FORSALES 0.0133 0.0411 -0.0281** -0.0278 0.0146 -0.0578 -0.0998 -0.0708 
 (0.940) (0.841) (0.027) (0.425) (0.811) (0.930) (0.364) (0.630) 
FORASSETS -0.0309 -0.0228 -0.0956 -0.0290 -0.0662 -0.0408 0.0336 -0.0167 
 (0.155) (0.358) (0.718) (0.254) (0.368) (0.577) (0.811) (0.351) 
GDP per capita 0.0612 0.0718*** 0.0442*** 0.0409** 0.0552 0.0468 0.0464 0.0295 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.317) (0.397) (0.478) (0.631) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.644 0.229 0.165 0.394*** 0.212 0.187 0.733 9.448*** 
 (0.393) (0.795) (0.800) (0.000) (0.370) (0.376) (0.122) (0.001) 
Intercept -11.81 -14.00** -7.950** -11.36*** -0.598 -0.332 -0.280 -3.135** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.026) (0.000) (0.370) (0.587) (0.745) (0.025) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1122 1120 1104 1033    1037 1126 1059 1095    
Adjusted R-squared 0.1837 0.1963 0.2312 0.1906 0.1916 0.1842 0.1969 0.2638 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
DERIVATIVES USE AND FIRM VALUE 
5.1. Introduction 
The Modigiliani and Miller (1958) theorem with perfect capital markets shows that risk 
management is irrelevant to firm value, thereby hedging with derivatives does not add value to a 
firm. However, numerous studies (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayer and Smith, 1990; Mayer and Smith, 1982; 
Bessembinder, 1991) suggest that the use of derivatives is a value-increasing strategy for a firm 
by reducing costs brought about market imperfections.  A large part of empirical studies on this 
area have focused on the relation between derivatives use and firm characteristics to investigate 
hedging theory and explain why firms use derivatives. Only recently, there has been another 
strand of research explored the impacts of derivatives use on firm value.  
Most of these studies have concentrated on unconditional effects of derivatives use on firm 
value (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad, 2011). A few recent researchers have developed tests to investigate value implications 
of derivatives use conditional on corporate governance or agency problems (e.g., Fauver and 
Naranjo, 2010; Allayannis, Lel, and Miller, 2012). However, the existing literature provides 
inconsistent views about the effect of derivatives use on firm value. Therefore, the value effects 
of derivatives use remain an open question.  
Filling this gap in the literature, we explore the unique value effect of derivatives use for a 
 111 
sample of 881 non-financial firms in 8 East Asian countries over the period of 2003-2013 with 
new hand-collected dataset of derivatives use.  We make the following contributions: 
First, we focus on value implication of derivatives use under influence of corruption 
environment. Extant studies address the drivers of value implication focusing on the structural 
characteristics of firm-specific resources and capabilities. However, all firms are embedded in 
institutional environments, i.e., “rule of game” (North, 1990, 1994).  A key factor in such 
environment is corruption.  Despite the efforts of government, non-government and multilateral 
institutions to reduce corruption levels, corruption becomes a widespread phenomenon 
worldwide today and firms regularly engage in corrupt practices such as bribery (Beets, 2005). In 
East Asian countries, corruption is a serious problem. In 2013, 64% of these countries scored 
below 50 in perceived level of public corruption11. Also, while there are a great number of 
studies examining the correlation between corruption and economic growth, the effects of 
corruption on value effect of derivatives use is little known. 
Theoretically, corruption on the one hand can act as a “grabbing hand” by increasing 
uncertainty and transaction costs (e.g., Bardhan, 1997; Quazi, 2014), which impedes firms’ 
operations. On the other hand, corruption acts as a “helping hand” by greasing the wheels of 
commerce and raising economic growth in the presence of weak legal and regulatory 
frameworks (Bardhan, 1997; Houston, 2007), which should improve firms’ performance. These 
contradicting effects may derive from the varying degree of ambiguity associated with corrupt 
transactions in different countries (Petrou, 2014). Thus, without directly taking into account 
corruption environment, it would be difficult to determine whether the use of derivatives is 
value-enhancing activity. Undertaking this research need, we raise important questions that have 
                                                     
11 Transparency International. 2013, Corruption Perception Index 
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received little or no attention is: How does corruption influence value effect of derivatives use? 
In light of a corruption environment, whether the use of derivatives increases firm value?  
Second, over the past two decades, scholars have examined and provided important insights 
into the effects of derivatives use on the value of non-financial firms. Yet important questions 
remain: In what type of firm is the effect greater (or less), and what factors determine this 
difference? In this study, we shed new light on this gap by examining how the value effects of 
derivatives use may vary across foreign-owned firms (i.e., foreign MNC affiliates) and domestic-
owned firms in light of an environment of corruption. We break down the subset of domestic-
owned firms into domestic firms and multinational corporations (henceforth MNCs). Although 
research in international business (IB) has long recognized that by virtue of multinationality, 
MNCs have distinctive advantages in business operations vis-à-vis domestic firms (e.g., Hymer, 
1976; Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Allayannis and Weston, 2001), neither IB nor finance 
researchers provide a comprehensive analysis of whether the use of financial derivatives rewards 
MNCs with higher value than domestic firms.  
On the other hand, according to Castellani and Zanfei (2006), foreign affiliates of a MNC 
are firms having their parent companies abroad, while domestic MNCs are either headquarters or 
national affiliates. As such, it implies that advantages and costs incurred by domestic MNCs and 
foreign affiliates derive primarily from their different origins. Particularly, in a given country, 
foreign affiliates might be at higher position than local counterparts due to ownership advantages 
such as their parent companies’ advanced financial resources, access to equity and capital 
markets, or knowledge-based capabilities (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Nguyen and 
Rugman, 2015). However, there also exists well-supported empirical evidence that foreign 
affiliates tend to be at a disadvantages compared with local counterparts as they often suffer from 
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various costs of doing business abroad owing to liabilities of foreignness12 (e.g., Hymer, 1976; 
Zaheer, 2002; Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Higón and Antolín, 2012). As foreign affiliates’ 
advantages may or may not offset those costs, it remains unknown that under influence of 
corruption, whether foreign affiliates with derivatives activities are more valuable than domestic 
counterparts.  
Third, we investigate how value implication of derivatives usage under corruption differs 
across domestic firms, domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates when they faced exogenous shocks 
brought about by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The crisis caused severe harms to the 
world economy and increased volatility, but the magnitude of crisis effects was different across 
countries and firms. Although there are numerous studies on its effects, little has been done to 
analyze its impacts on derivatives use. Therefore, we choose the period of 2003-2013, which 
provides a natural experiment of financial risks and risk management, to examine the dynamic of 
relationship between derivatives use and firm value before, during and after the crisis. Our study 
does not merely investigate consequences of the global financial crisis on value implication of 
derivatives usage, but concentrate on the role of corruption levels in mitigating adverse 
consequences. 
The main findings of our study are as follows:  
Results from OLS estimation and after controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias 
consistently reveal that low corruption levels of home country (host country) induce the use of 
                                                     
12 Liabilities of foreignness in a host country are defined as “all additional costs of a firm operating in a market 
overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: pp.343). These costs are directly related to 
institutional distance and foreign affiliates’ weak link to local institutional setting (Zaheer, 2002; Bell, Filatotchev 
and Rasheed, 2012; Higón and Antolín, 2012) 
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financial derivatives and reward domestic firms and domestic MNCs (foreign affiliates) with 
higher value. In particular, derivative usage is value-enhancing activity for domestic firms and 
domestic MNCs, and it increases firm value of those firms from 9.87% to 11.77%, and 10.78% 
to 12.72% respectively, when they are in home country with low corruption environment13. 
Relatedly, although derivative usage does not add value to foreign affiliates, we find that they are 
more valuable in host countries where corruption is less severe 14 . We notice that hedging 
activities of domestic MNCs outperform domestic firms and foreign affiliates in terms of firm 
value under influence of corruption. Our empirical analysis also shows that during the crisis 
period, benefit of derivatives use on firm value does not gain for all firm types, and effect of low 
corruption levels on alleviating negative impacts of the crisis on derivatives usage is very 
moderate. Yet, low corruption level of home country is positively associated with hedging 
premiums of domestic firms and domestic MNCs in the post-crisis period. 
We will develop this chapter as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature and develop 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses sample for this study, identifies dependent variables and 
explanatory variables and provides summary statistics. Section 4 describes model specifications. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results and analysis of the relationship between derivatives use 
and firm value. Section 6 summaries the study and draws conclusion. 
                                                     
13 We define corruption levels based on corruption index (CPI index), in which those countries having scores greater 
than 75 are considered as low corrupt countries, and those countries having scores less than 75 are considered to be 
highly corrupt 
14 Our findings suggest that corruption environment may have stronger effect on the link between derivatives usage 
and firm value than other country-specific factors such as GDP per capita or the development of financial markets 
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5.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
In this study we carry out a conditional test on value effects derivatives usage in light of 
corruption environment because chapter 4 evidences that heterogeneity in the economic, political 
and social environments of a country plays a key role in the firms’ hedging behaviours. Our 
study is built on the following strands of literatures and hypotheses. 
Derivatives use and firm value 
Hedging theory argues that there is potential positive relationship between derivatives use 
and firm value. That link depends on the degree to which the use of derivatives effectively 
addresses market imperfections such as corporate taxes (see Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayer and 
Smith, 1990), financial distress or bankruptcy costs (Nance et al., 1993; Froot et al., 1993), or 
agency costs of debts (Mayer and Smith, 1982; Bessembinder, 1991). On the other hand, Stulz 
(1996) postulates that the primary objective of risk management is to mitigate the likelihood of 
costly lower-tail outcomes that may cause financing constraints or impede a firm to carry out its 
investment projects. Financial derivatives are risk management instruments, so if the use of 
derivatives generates positive cash flows or value, then those derivatives are deemed to hedge 
against firm’s risks, leading to increase in firm value.  
Although 90% firms of Fortune 500 have been using derivatives, derivative trading in Asia-
Pacific accounts for approximately one-third of trading volume all around the world15 and their 
use continues to increase, the influence of derivatives use on firm value has not received enough 
attention until recently. So far, the literature regarding value effect of derivatives usage provides 
                                                     
15 Bartram, M.S., Brown, W.G. & Conrad, J. 2011, "The effects of derivatives on firm risk and value", Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 967-999. 
FIA. 2015. FIA annual volume survey. Future Industry Association 
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overall mixed results. A large body of previous studies invariably focused on unconditional value 
effects of derivatives use, and have reported broadly consistent with the notion that derivatives 
use is value-increasing activity (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Clark and Judge, 2009; 
Campello, Lin, and Zou, 2011; Chen and King, 2014) but the estimated magnitudes of the 
hedging premium vary across the studies, which ranges from as low as 1.8% to as high as 34%. 
Some others have found a negative relationship between the use of derivatives and firm value 
(e.g., Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Supanvaij, 2011) or no effect (e.g., Belghitar, Clark, and Mefteh, 
2013). Thus, some researchers raise doubt about the relationship between derivatives use and 
firm value, and findings of other earlier studies (Guay and Kothari, 2003). 
Recently, a few researches have implemented conditional test to scrutinize value 
implications of derivatives usage in light of some corporate issues such as corporate governance 
or agency problems (e.g., Fauver and Naranjo, 2010; Allayannis et al., 2012); as Fauver and 
Naranjo (2010) argues that firms have internal problems which may lead to a potential loss in 
firm value, so net value impacts of derivatives use is an empirical issue.  
In the context of East Asia, there is only limited empirical evidence on the association 
between derivative use and firm value. To our best knowledge, no study directly investigates that 
relationship across countries in East Asia, but a few examine the value effects of derivatives 
usage across industries of one country. Ameer (2009) finds that although the use of derivatives 
has value relevance, its contribution to a firm's valuation is very minimal for a sample of 40 
Malaysian firms. In investigation of both financial and non-financial firms in Indonesia, Oktavia 
(2012) evidences that the use of derivatives by non-financial firms can enhance shareholder 
value, but it does not affect earnings of banks.  
Institutional theory, corruption, the use of derivatives and firm value 
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While acknowledging the contributions of firm determinants, scholars in the field of 
international business have stressed the importance of institutional variation across countries and 
claimed that country- specific factors contribute to explain the differences in performance and 
behaviors of firms. North (1990, 1994) is among the first to emphasize the importance of 
national institutions, considers institutions much more than background conditions, and defines 
institutions as “rules of the game” including formal rules (laws, regulations) and informal 
constraints (customs, norms, cultures), which organizations must follow. As such, institutions 
shape firm actions, determine transaction costs and transformation costs of production, 
eventually the outcomes and effectiveness of organizations (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; He, Tian, 
and Chen, 2007), and frame the strategic choices facing organizations (Peng, Li, and Wang, 
2005). 
However, all governments and institutions never work only for public benefits but pursuing 
legitimate objectives by the presence of corruption (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005). 
Corruption reflects political institutions, thus, corruption environments are at different degrees in 
different countries, and countries differ remarkably in the extent to which corruption affect 
firms’ performance16. The theory here is that corruption may have a strong effect on hedging 
costs and other transaction costs, thereby reducing expected cash flows, and ultimately value of 
firms using derivatives. This is consistent with the extant studies (e.g., Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) demonstrating that corruption is considered to be a more costly 
tax on business operation than legal taxes because they are constrained to waste their resources 
on unproductive actions (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). As such, corruption may dramatically 
                                                     
16  According to Transparency International, “corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. 
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/ 
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increase risk perception of capital market participants and affect expected return because the 
risk-return tradeoff states that expected excess market return should vary positively to market 
volatility. Consistently, Lee and Ng (2006) find that a country’s corruption is negatively related 
to expected cash flows, and may have substantially adverse impact on shareholder value.  
Furthermore, although up to date the existing literature has been silent about the influence of 
corruption on value effects of derivatives use, some researchers (e.g. Venard and Hanfi, 2007; 
Foss, 2010; Petrou, 2014, among others) observe that firms’ exposure to corrupt countries in 
their business operations may translate to real financial losses for them. More clearly, firms that 
operate in countries with a high level of corruption are likely to engage in costly market 
transactions and less efficient transformation because that country is likely to have lower quality 
of infrastructure services, economic growth and financial stability (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, 1999). 
The existing literature also shows that a higher level of corruption is associated with higher 
borrowing cost, worse corporate governance, and lower stock valuation. In their analyses, 
Donadelli, Fasan, and Magnanelli (2014) evidence that firms operating in highly corrupt 
countries tend to have relatively low returns. While those firms operating in countries with lower 
level of corruption can capitalize on the advantages generated by a more favorable institutional 
context for firms, which in turn has a positive influence on performance and profitability of firms 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994; Bergara, Henisz, Spiller, 1998). Chapter 4 also find that a lower 
corruption level correlates with higher hedging intensity in the case of East Asian firms. 
Building upon both literature on derivatives use and corruption, we therefore hypothesize 
the following: 
Hypothesis 4: The lower is the corruption level; the higher is the likelihood that the use 
of financial derivatives increases firm value 
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The use of derivatives and firm value for domestic firms, MNCs, and foreign affiliates 
We conjecture in the foregoing section that the value effect of derivatives use is likely to be 
higher for those firms operating in countries with lower level of corruption. However, derivatives 
use under influence of corruption environment does not have the same value effect on all types 
of firms. In this study, we investigate that dynamic relationship on comparison of foreign owned 
firms (i.e., foreign affiliates) and domestic owned firms, which are broken down into in domestic 
firms and MNCs.  
A particularly important distinction between domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates is the 
assertion that the former’s organizational routines and management process are rooted in local 
institutional conditions (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Obloj, 2008), and they have well developed 
access to the relevant information and knowledge about the local institutional setting for 
effectively running their operations, including economy, social needs and preferences, norms, 
cultures and law (Nachum, 2003; Bell et al., 2012); while the latter is embedded in institutional 
settings of both home and host countries, so they often experience liabilities of foreignness. On 
the other hand, in spite of being actively embedded in local institutional settings, the fundamental 
distinction between domestic MNCs and domestic firms is based on multinationality. Thus, we 
follow Higón and Antolín (2012) in arguing that comparison of domestic MNCs and domestic 
firms is symptomatic of multinatinality effect, while comparisons of MNCs and foreign affiliates 
reveal the effect of foreignness.  
Firstly, in comparison with domestic firms, IB literature often argues that MNCs possess 
some firm-specific advantages (FSA) 17 , which compensate for high cost of international 
                                                     
17 FSAs are benefits and strengths specific to a firm as compared to rivals, such as management and administrative 
knowledge, know-hows, marketing, innovation (Rugman, 1981) 
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operation and enable them to compete successfully. Indeed, following OLI theory (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977), IB scholars have found that MNCs should be able to exploit cost 
differentials on a global scale due to multinationality (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Chung et al., 
2010). 
Multinationality gives MNCs an ability to diversify portfolio of firms, making MNC’s cash 
flows less dependent on domestic market-level cash flows (Krapl, 2015), ultimately decreases 
the volatility of a company’s cash flows and earnings, hence improves firm value (Rugman, 
1976; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005). By virtue of multinationality, MNCs themselves are likely to 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Michel and Shaked, 1986), overcome inefficiencies arising 
from high agency and information costs (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005), as well as to provide 
shareholders with lower systematic and idiosyncratic risk, and superior return opportunities 
relative to domestic firms (Fatemi, 1984).  
Furthermore, MNCs also develop expertise in hedging risks and are more likely to possess 
superior capability of reducing exposures to market risks such as exchange rate risks by using 
financial derivatives (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Choi and Jiang, 2009), which leads to 
lower cost of capital. Also, MNCs transfer material and knowledge resources among affiliates, 
thereby reducing not only the cost of acquisition of those resources for affiliates but also 
contribute to hedge against market risks. These advantages may attribute to an increasing firm 
value of MNCs. 
Secondly, in terms of foreign affiliates, Kostova, Roth, and Dacin (2008) recognize that 
liability of foreignness is the key driver behind their missteps and inefficiencies. Foreign 
affiliates often bear higher costs arising from liability of foreignness such as costs and risks of 
exchange rate fluctuation, high agency and information costs, which arises from their lack of 
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knowledge about local cultures and networks connecting them with important actors in host 
country’s economy, in general, from their weak link to institutional setting of host country 
(Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002; Nachum, 2003; Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Higón and Antolín, 
2012).    
We follow Higón and Antolín (2012) among others in assuming that the key driver behind 
foreignness is the institutional distance between home and host country. Specifically, it has long 
learned that the physical distance between the headquarter in a different country and foreign 
affiliates increases the governance, communication, and travel costs associated with managing an 
overseas operation (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 2002). In terms of hedging activities, that physical 
distance may increase hedging costs, thereby reducing value effect of financial derivatives use. 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) also note that foreign affiliates face challenges arising from 
inconsistencies in the decision- and law-making by the regulatory institutions and governments 
of host country. Such inconsistencies adding difficulties in operations of foreign affiliates, thus 
exposing them to significant financial losses, and undermining derivative activities18 Similarly, 
the distance in cultural and social orientations of the home and host countries creates an obstacle 
limiting foreign affiliates’ abilities to gain legitimacy and other favorable economic transactions 
with local firms and government authorities (Peng and Luo, 2000; Luo, 2001; Makino et al., 
2004).  
Moreover, Kostova et al. (2008), Petrou (2014) among others argue that idiosyncrasies of 
corrupt host country’s institutions and regulations create additional issues, raise transaction costs 
and information asymmetries, which brings more challenges for foreign affiliates compared to 
                                                     
18 Beck and Levine (2008) note that finance can be considered a set of contracts. Because derivatives are financial 
contracts, it is likely that legal institution influences derivatives use 
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domestic owned firms. Particularly, in a corrupt country, government officials in their search of 
bribes can constrain performance of foreign affiliates by changing structure of taxations, laws 
and regulations to impede foreign affiliates’ participation in local competition and local 
resources (Lecraw, 1984; Contractor, 1990; Javorcik and Wei, 2009). Hymer (1976) also argues 
that governments also sometimes create costs arising from taxation differentials or bureaucratic 
delays in government approvals and paper-works for foreign affiliates and often put them at a 
disadvantage relative to local firms. Such unstable institutional environment threatens foreign 
affiliates, thereby increasing the costs of doing business (Makino et al. 2004) and costs of 
implementing derivatives activities in a host country. In all, it is likely that high costs of 
foreignness could worsen value effect of derivatives use of foreign affiliates.  
Based on the above logic, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5a: In light of corruption environment, the use of financial derivatives is more 
valuable in domestic MNCs than in domestic firms  
Hypothesis 5b: Under influence of corruption environment, the use of financial 
derivatives rewards domestic MNCs with higher value than foreign affiliates 
Financial crisis, derivatives use, and firm value 
We take into account the global financial crisis in the analysis of value effect of derivatives 
use under corruption environment. Researchers have found two separate and sequential effects of 
a crisis on firms. First, a crisis leads to sudden and big disruptions in demand, markets, which 
results in a decline in firms’ investment opportunities, and higher cost of external borrowing due 
to a loss of access to outside financing (Chakrabarti, Singh, and Mahmood, 2007; Enikolopov, 
Petrova, and Stepanov, 2014), both of which imply a potential reduction in firm value. Second, 
when causes and consequences of a crisis become more obvious, firms restructure to adjust to a 
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new environment and to reduce exposures. Therefore, we argue that impact of derivatives usage 
on firm value is likely to be worse during the crisis period, but it is better in the aftermath of the 
crisis. 
This argument, in addition, derives from the view that firms have difficulty in dealing with 
sudden and major external shocks (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 
1997) and benefits of derivatives use from reducing exposures may not gain during a crisis 
period as the crisis brings about significant exchange rate volatility, and shape rise in financial 
costs and prices (Singh and Yip, 2000). Besides, firms with more complicated organizational 
structures will get into greater difficulties when big shock occurs (Hanna, Polos, and Carroll, 
2003; Chakrabarti et al. 2007). Thus, those difficulties increase hedging costs, which offsets 
benefits from using financial derivatives.  
Furthermore, we also expect that value effect of derivatives use for firms in low corrupt 
countries is less severely affected by negative impacts of the global financial crisis than those 
firms located in highly corrupt countries. This is because low corruption reduces agency costs, 
resulting in lower costs of capital, increased operational efficiency, and eventually better firm 
performance and valuation as growing empirical studies on corruption have shown (e.g., Lee and 
Hong, 2012; Petrou, 2015). Taken the above arguments together, our 3a and 3b hypotheses are 
yielded as below: 
Hypothesis 6a: The global financial crisis worsens the value effect of derivatives usage 
under corruption environment, and there is a positive relationship between derivatives 
use and firm value in post-crisis period 
Hypothesis 6b: Low level of corruption mitigates negative impacts caused by the global 
financial crisis on the value effect of derivatives use 
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5.3. Sample selection and variable construction 
5.3.1. Data collection and descriptive statistics 
Our sample consists of non-financial firms across various industries in 8 countries in East 
Asia, namely China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and 
Indonesia. It comprises of all firms that have accounting data over the period of 2003-2013 on 
the Datastream database, that have annual reports in English for the same years on the 
Moningstar and firms’ website database. We exclude financial firms that are likely to have 
different incentives for using derivatives than non-financial firms. Our final sample contains 
9691 firm-year observations; it is balanced panel data set of 881 firms.  
All data set on derivatives contracts is hand-collected from 881 firms’ annual reports, we 
classify firms as derivative users or non-users based on information about the use of derivatives. 
A firm is classified as a derivative user if a firm discloses that it uses at least one type of 
financial derivatives for hedging purpose. For those firms that do not disclose any use of 
financial derivative contracts, we classify them as non-derivative users. We also manually-
collected notional amount of derivative contracts, and convert all these value into one common 
currency, that is USD. In addition, most of accounting data on explanatory variables are from 
Datastream; the missing variables are filled up by Bloomberg database or information in annual 
reports. These data are provided at a yearly frequency and in thousand USD. 
From this total sample, 389 domestic firms, 427 domestic MNCs and 65 foreign affiliates 
are identified. We use Corporate Affiliations database to classify firm types. Following Pantzalis 
et al. (2001), we consider a firm as MNC if that firm has at least one majority owned foreign 
subsidiary, otherwise it is domestic firm. A domestic MNC is a MNC with parent company being 
located in any sample country. We define foreign affiliate as an independent organizational unit, 
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which is wholly or partially managed and controlled by a foreign parent MNC, and operating in a 
given host country.  
Summary statistics on the use of derivatives by the sample firms is reported in the table 5.1. 
Across all countries, approximately 53.5% of our sample observations use at least one type of 
financial derivatives, indicating that the use of derivatives is common among non-financial firms 
in East Asian countries.  
(INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE) 
In Panel B, mean value of any derivatives (foreign currency derivatives and/or interest rate 
derivatives and/or commodity derivatives) is about $339 million. When we calculate the mean of 
notional value of derivative contracts to total assets, they are about 64.7% for any derivatives 
These numbers speak themselves that non-financial firms in East Asian countries use financial 
derivatives very intensively.  
Panel C exhibits the trend of derivatives use across the entire sample firm over time. There 
is obvious change in the use of derivatives before and after the global financial crisis. In 
particular, derivative usage increases remarkably in 2009 onwards in response to the crisis, 
which is shown by the number of derivatives users in post-crisis period of 55.89% compared to 
49.72% in the pre-crisis period. 
5.3.2. Dependent variable  
Detailed information about the definitions of dependent variable and independent variablesx 
that we use in this study can be found in table 5.2. 
(INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE) 
In this study, we use the most commonly used dependent variable in previous studies (e.g., 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram et al., 2011; Chen and King, 2014) – Tobin’s Q as a 
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proxy for firm value. While there are many variants of Tobin’s Q in the existing empirical 
studies, Tobin’s Q is generally defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement costs of assets. The measures of Tobin’s Q broadly differ from whether elaborate 
algorithms are used to derive the market value of preferred stock and long-term debt as well as 
the replacement value of capital stock and inventories. 
Yet, more elaborate algorithms for Tobin’s Q do not improve quality of measurement, but 
they may lead to a sample-selection bias as a result of data unavailability as Erickson and Whited 
(2006) argued. Therefore, we construct Tobin’s Q by calculating the ratio of a firm’s market 
value of total assets (the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity) to the book value of total assets of that firm, evaluated at the end of fiscal 
year. Fauver and Naranjo (2010), Allayannis et al. (2012), and others use this same firm value 
measure for Tobin’s Q. We compute Tobin’s Q for a total of 9691 firm-year observations (881 
firms per year). Similar to Allayannis and Weston (2001), among others, we use the natural 
logarithms of Tobin’s Q in our multivariate tests to control for skewness. 
5.3.3. Independent variables 
1- The use of derivatives 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) state that the ideal measure of derivative usage is hedging 
ratio of the contracts being used for managing risk. According to this argument, we measure 
hedging activity by derivative use intensity, rather than derivative dummy variable. This method 
provides a direct view about the effect of derivatives usage on firm value, or in other words, the 
effect from the real hedging premium. We construct derivative use intensity, denoted as USE, for 
firms that make any reference in their annual reports to use derivatives for hedging purposes and 
disclose the notional amount of derivative contracts. Derivative use intensity is measured by the 
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fiscal year end total notional value of derivative contracts of a firm scaled by that firm’s total 
assets, and it takes value of zero for non-derivative users. We anticipate a positive association 
between the use of derivatives (USE) and firm value (Tobin’s Q). 
In the analysis, we do not examine the effect of specific derivative types based on specific 
risks, namely foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price derivatives. We use the 
hedging intensity of using any derivative types, which present the overall derivatives use of a 
firm, as many firms in our sample use derivatives to hedge more than one type of risks. Judge 
(2003) shows that there will be confounding effects when firms, which do not hedge the specific 
risk under consideration, but hedge other type of risk exposures, are included in the sample as 
non-hedgers. 
2- Corruption  
To measure corruption levels, we collected Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from the 
Transparency International over the period of 2003-2013. This variable aggregates information 
from 13 sources originated from 11 independent institutions, consisting of surveys of business 
people and performance assessment from a group of country analysts. The CPI is calculated as 
the average standardized value from different sources to provide the overall extent of corruption. 
That index is on inverse ranking from 0 to 100, where higher index indicates lower level of 
corruption. A negative association between corruption and firm value, that is positive estimated 
coefficient on that index, is expected. We further explore value effects of derivatives use under 
influence of corruption environment by constructing interaction term of corruption and hedging 
intensity 
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5.3.4. Control variables 
Following prior studies (e.g., Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Fauver and Naranjo, 2010; 
Bartram et al., 2011; Allayannis et al., 2012), we use several firm- and country- specific 
variables to control for factors that have been shown to influence firm value. 
1. Firm size: Previous empirical evidence on effect of firm size on firm value is ambiguous. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Belghitar, Clark, and Mefteh (2013), Chen and King (2014) and 
some others find negative relationship between firm size and firm value. Yet, Magee (2008), 
Supanvanij (2011) report a positive coefficient on firm size, indicating that there may be a non-
linear effect of firm size on value of firm. Therefore, we use natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets as a proxy for firm size, and do not provide an ex ante prediction regarding effect 
of firm size on firm value. 
2. Leverage: The literature on capital structure suggests that a firm’s choice of capital 
structure may affect its market value when there are market imperfections (see Harris and Raviv 
(1991) for literature review). Specifically, Zou (2010) argues that leverage also can provide tax 
benefits of debts, thereby improving firm value. Some other studies find that leverage can act as 
negative signal of investment opportunities owing to agency costs of debt, suggesting a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm value (e.g., Magee, 2008, Belghitar et al., 2013). We 
therefore use the ratio of total debts to total assets as our definition of leverage and have no 
expectation on the sign of the relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q. 
3. Profitability: Profitability is supposed to have positive effect on valuation of a firm 
because it is likely that the marketplace rewards a more profitable firm with higher value 
compared to a less profitable firm as Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Belghitar et al. (2013) 
argue. As a result, if a derivative user is more profitable, it more likely to have higher firm value. 
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We use return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of net income to book value of total assets, 
to control for profitability, and expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
4. Investment growth: Myer (1977), Froot et al. (1993), among others suggest that firm 
value is dependent on future investment opportunities. In empirical studies, Allayannis et al. 
(2012), Marami and Dubois (2013) and some others find that investment growth is an important 
determinant of Tobin’s Q. In line with prior studies, we use ratio of capital expenditures to net 
sales to control for a firm’s investment opportunities and expect a positive association with firm 
value. 
5. Liquidity: The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) states that firms with excess free 
cash flow are likely to invest in negative NPV projects, resulting in lower firm value. Pramborg 
(2004), Bartram et al. (2011) and some others find evidence consistent with that argument. Yet, 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Allayannis et al. (2012) find contrary results. Thus, we have no 
conjecture on the sign of an association between liquidity and Tobin’s Q. We use quick ratio, 
defined as cash plus short-term investments divided by total current liabilities, as a proxy for 
liquidity. 
6. Access to financial markets: If derivative users have limited access to financial markets, 
their firm value may be high because they are financial constraints, so their managers add 
incentives to undertake only the highest NPV projects as Allayannis and Weston (2001), and Jin 
and Jorion (2006) noted. As in Clark and Judge (2009), Belghitar et al. (2013) we use dividend 
yield, which is measured by common dividend per share divided by the fiscal year end share 
price, to proxy for ability to access financial market, and we expect a negative relationship with 
firm value. 
 130 
7. Geographic diversification: The evidence on influence of geographic diversification 
(multinationality) on firm value in the existing literature is ambiguous. Makar and Huffman 
(2001), Fauver and Naranjo (2010), among others, evidence that geographic diversification is 
positively related to firm value, while Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002), Marami and Dubois (2013) 
find a negative relationship. Nevertheless, following Allayannis and Weston (2001), we use the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, denoted as FORSALES, to measure multinationality in this 
study. We expect that it is positively associated to firm value. We also use dummy variable 
GEOMARKT, which has a value of one for firms that have sale markets in foreign countries, and 
zero otherwise, as an alternative measure for geographic diversification.  
8. Industrial diversification: There are competing arguments concerning about whether 
diversification increases firm value. Some studies indicates that diversified firms are valued 
relatively lower than non-diversified firms (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Allayannis and Weston 
2001), while some others (e.g, Zou, 2010, Allayannis et al., 2012) find evidence that diversified 
firms receive a premium in valuation. We control for effect of industrial diversification on firm 
value by using diversification dummy, which equals one for firms operating in more than one 
business segment in the SIC industry classification, and zero otherwise. 
9. Country-level control variables: We control for country effects and country’s time 
invariant characteristics by using GDP per capita ratio to proxy for relative performance of the 
countries, and financial system deposits to GDP, which is defined as demand, time, saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP, to proxy for 
financial market development. These variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. An increase in GDP per capita and financial system deposits to GDP 
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gestures growth in the economy and tends to signal an improvement in productivity and firm 
value. Thus, a positive relationship between firm value and these variables is expected.  
5.4. Methodology for investigating value effects of derivatives use 
To scrutinize the value effects of derivatives use by non-financial firms, this thesis will 
employ the most commonly used approach in previous studies, Tobin’s Q. Since its introduction 
to the literature of financial economics approximately a half of century ago, Tobin’s Q has 
become an increasingly popular measure of firm performance. As defined by Brainard and Tobin 
(1968) and Tobin (1969), Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the firm’s market value and the 
replacement cost of its capital stock, this ratio has become known as Tobin’s average Q or 
Tobin’s Q in short. As such, they argue that investment is stimulated when capital is valued more 
highly in the market than it costs to manufacture it, and deterred when its valuation is less than 
its replacement cost. Another way to indicate the same point is that firms which display Tobin’s 
Q greater than unity are judged as using scare resources effectively, and those firms with Tobin’s 
Q less than unity are considered as using resources poorly. Because of that, Brainard and Tobin 
(1968) and Tobin (1969) propose that this ratio be used to measure the firm’s incentive to invest 
in capital.  
To the best of our knowledge, Allayannis and Weston (2001) is the first to apply this 
methodology to examine the effect of derivatives use on firm value. Following Allayannis and 
Weston (2001), among others, we define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of firm’s market value to 
replacement costs of assets, evaluated at the end of the fiscal year for each firm. We then need to 
estimate Tobin’s Q for each firm in the sample. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) developed 
methodology for measuring Tobin’s Q, which has become the roadmap for subsequent studies, in 
which it is expressed as below: 
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Our methodology for constructing market value of the firm closely follows Perfect and 
Wiles (1994), Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), and Allayannis and Weston (2001). According to 
Perfect and Wiles (1994), market value of a firm in year t is the sum of year-end market values 
of equity, debt and preferred stock. The year-end market value of a firm’s equity is estimated by 
year-end per share stock price multiplied by number of outstanding shares. Market value of a 
firm’s preferred stock is the total preferred dividends capitalized by preferred stock yield index.  
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) propose somewhat 
different estimation of the firm’s market value. In their estimation, market value of a firm 
consists of short-term debt, long-term debt, preferred stock and common stock. They suppose 
that short-term debt has a market value equal to book value, while long-term debt is estimated by 
using a recursive methodology that measures maturity structure of a firm’s long-term debt and 
accounts for changes in the yield on A-rated industrial bonds. Additionally, the market value of 
common stock is estimated by year-end share price multiplied by number of outstanding shares. 
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) estimates preferred stock as annual dividend obligations divided 
by the prevailing yield on medium-grade preferred, while Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
measures market value of preferred stock using the year-end redemption value, which is 
suggested by Lang and Stulz (1994).  
Market value of the firm 
Total replacement cost of assets  
Tobin’s Q = 
Market value (equity + debt + preferred stock) 
Replacement cost (plant + equipment + inventories) 
 = 
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By the same token, to calculate the replacement cost of assets, we follow the procedure 
outlined in studies by Perfect and Wiles (1994), Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), and Allayannis 
and Weston (2001). Perfect and Wiles (1994) notes that a firm’s assets can be decomposed into 
three constituents: a) plant and equipment; b) inventories, and c) others. The replacement cost of 
plant, equipment and inventories are estimated by using three methodologies that employ a 
firm’s replacement cost estimates, or time series estimates based on historical data or both. The 
first methodology uses replacement cost figures provided by the firm. The second method is 
derived from model of Lindenberg and Ross (1981), and the third technique calculates the end-
of-year book value of a firm’s total assets. 
In this study, we follow Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
approach of constructing replacement cost of assets, which is both simpler and more accurate. In 
their procedure, the replacement cost of assets is estimated as the sum of replacement cost of 
fixed assets plus inventories. As such, they calculate replacement cost of fixed assets by 
deducing the vintages19 and depreciation pattern of in-place gross fixed assets. In addition, the 
replacement cost of inventories is measured as the sum of book value of inventories plus LIFO20 
reserves. Allayannis and Weston (2001) demonstrates that the advantage of this methodology for 
estimating replacement cost is that it does not hinge on any initial conditions or “recursive build-
up” period, which can lead to a serious impact on both the magnitude and ranking of Tobin’s Q 
across firms as indicated by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997). 
                                                     
19 Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) explain that asset vintages are assets in place for a firm on the date when a 
replacement cost measure is desired.  
20 LIFO stands for “Last in, First out”, an inventory accounting. Under this method of accounting, the last items 
placed into the firm’s inventory are supposed to be the first ones sold (see Perfect and Wiles, 1994).  
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The review in chapter 3 showed that in previous studies on relationship between derivatives 
use and firm value, explanatory variables for the use of derivatives are dummy variable denoting 
the availability of derivatives use by firms, or notional value of derivatives, or both. In this 
thesis, we will perform our analysis based on notional value of derivatives.  
In testing the above-stated hypotheses, our baseline models can be written in condensed 
forms in Equation (5.1) as below 
             Ln (Tobin’s Q)ijt = useUSEijt + cCjt + use_cUSEijt * Cjt + xXijt + uijt              (5.1) 
   i= 1..n; j= 1-8; t= 2003-2013 
Where: 
Ln (Tobin’s Q)ijt: Firm value of firm i located in country j in year t, measured by 
natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity to book value of total assets  
USEijt: Derivatives use intensity of firm i located in country j in year t, measured by 
notional amount of derivative contracts scaled by total assets. 
Cjt: Corruption index of country j in year t, which is inverse ranking of country 
corruption levels on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) (from the 
Transparency International) 
Xijt is a vector of firm-and country-specific variables in year t, including firm size, 
leverage, ROA, capital expenditures, quick ratio, dividend yield, foreign sales to total 
sales, financial system deposits to GDP, and GDP per capita. 
uijt: Error terms clustered by country  
In our initial tests, we use OLS estimation of equation (5.1) for the subsamples of domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. To control for unobserved time-varying effects and 
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measure within-country and within-industry differences in the effect of derivatives use and 
corruption on firm value, we adopt country, industry and year fixed effects. Furthermore, it is 
likely that standard errors are inflated due to dependence at the firm level at a pooled cross-
section regression, so we employ clustering method, which is developed by Rogers (1993) to 
adjust for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of standard errors.  
We then assess robustness of our results by carrying out additional investigations. First, we 
acknowledge that it is possible that the observed relationship is subject to endogeneity. To 
address this concern, we implement instrumental variable (IV) model. Second, our sample 
confirms previous results in the existing literature that the characteristics of firms using 
derivatives on average are quite different from those firms do not. These differences are likely to 
lead to a selection-bias when investigating value effects of derivatives use under corruption. To 
control for the self-selection bias, following Bartram et al. (2011), Chen and King (2014), we 
employ the Heckman treatment effect model. Third, we carry out an additional robustness test to 
check the stability of value effects of derivatives use on by using alternative proxy for firm 
value, that is firm market value in thousand USD, calculated by a firm’s share price multiplied 
by the number of ordinary shares in issue. 
5.5. Empirical results and analysis 
5.5.1. Univariate results 
In this section, the main hypothesis we examine is whether the use of derivatives is 
rewarded by investors with higher valuation by comparing the value of Tobin’s Q of derivative 
users versus non-users. For domestic firms, the mean of Tobin’s Q for users is 0.509, compared 
with a mean of Tobin’s Q for non-users of 0.418, leading to a hedging premium of 0.091 (p < 
0.1). This result conforms to our hypothesis that derivatives users have a higher firm value than 
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non-users. In the case of domestic MNCs, we also obtain a positive hedging premium of 0.355 (p 
< 0.01). In contrast with our hypothesis, in terms of foreign affiliates, non-users are characterized 
by higher Tobin’s Q than users (the means of Tobin’s Q are 0.715 and 0.702 for non-users and 
users, respectively). This result leads to a statistically significant hedging discount of 0.013, and 
implies that the use of derivatives may not be a value-enhancing activity for foreign affiliates. 
(INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE) 
The second hypothesis we want to test is that whether corruption environment affects 
derivatives use and firms are likely to use derivatives when they are operating in country with 
low corruption level. In line with our hypothesis, for domestic MNCs, we find that countries 
where derivative users are located and operating have lower level of corruption (the mean of 
corruption is 64.338) than countries where non-users are (the mean of corruption is 54.881). The 
difference between users and non-users are strongly significant. In the case of domestic firms, 
although we find that firms using derivatives are located in country with lower corruption than 
those firms do not, the mean difference between them is not different from zero at any 
conventional significance level. Specially, we obtain a surprising result for foreign affiliates that 
derivatives users are located in countries with slightly higher corruption level than non-users. 
These results altogether suggest that corruption environment affects firms’ hedging behavior, but 
magnitude of its effect varies across different firm types.  
Furthermore, we investigate how firm-specific resources and capabilities between derivative 
users and non-users may affect firm value. On average, we find that firms using derivatives are 
larger, more profitable and have higher level of exposures than those firms do not as shown by 
means of firm size, ROA and foreign sales to total sales. These results are consistent with the 
previous studies such as Allayannis and Weston (2001), Allayannis et al. (2012).  
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5.5.2. Multivariate analysis 
5.5.2.1. Value effects of derivatives use under influence of corruption environment  
Table 5.4 presents results of a pooled OLS estimation for the sample of domestic firms, 
domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates, where we classify firms in accordance with Pantzalis et 
al. (2001). Paying our attention to the derivative use intensity variable, corruption, and the 
interaction of derivatives use and corruption, we find several interesting results. For domestic 
firms, we observe that there are positive and significant estimated coefficients on derivatives use 
and corruption (0.0418, 0.154, and 0.0759, respectively, p < 0.01). Due to inverse ranking of 
corruption level, these results suggest that effects of derivatives usage on value of domestic firms 
vary with the corruption levels of home countries. Specifically, in low corrupt countries21, the 
use of derivatives increases value of domestic firms from 9.87% to 11.77%, conforming to the 
finding of chapter 4 that the lower the corruption, the higher likelihood that firms use derivatives. 
The hedging premium is lightly higher than the premium of 4.87% - 6.33% reported by 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Nain (2004), Kim, Mathur, and Nam (2006), Magee (2008) for 
samples of U.S firms, but broadly similar to 12% found by Clark and Judge (2009) who use a 
sample of 412 UK firms.  
(INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE) 
For domestic MNCs, we find results generally consistent with our hypotheses. In particular, 
a lower corruption level (higher CPI index) is associated with a higher firm value as evidenced 
by significant and positive coefficient estimate for corruption (p < 0.01). We also find both 
statistically and economically significant coefficients on derivatives use and derivatives use 
                                                     
21 We define corruption levels based on corruption index (CPI index), in which those countries having scores greater than 75 are 
considered as low corrupt countries, and those countries having scores less than 75 are considered to be highly corrupt countries 
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interacted with corruption (0.0494 and 0.0778, respectively). These results indicate that domestic 
MNCs are likely to use financial derivatives in countries with low corruption, and such 
corruption environment facilitates the use of derivatives and rewards those firms with higher 
firm value. Despite conforming to our Hypothesis 5, however, we can notice that the difference 
in hedging premium of domestic MNCs compared to domestic firms is not striking (4.94% - 
12.72% versus 4.18% - 11.77%).  
In contrast with the above findings, when we analyze results for the case of foreign 
affiliates, we find strong evidence that the use of derivatives decreases firm value with hedging 
discount of 7% ( = -0.07, p <0.01). It can be partly attributed to the fact that their business 
operations are more complicated than those of domestic firms (Kim and Pantzalis, 2003), and 
they have institutional duality pressure to which they have to comply with both practices of their 
parent companies and host countries (Nell, Puck, and Heidenreich, 2015). Another possible 
explanation is finding of Chan, Isobe, and Makino (2008) is that performance of foreign affiliates 
in some emerging countries, such as China, Indonesia and Thailand, is “high risk, low return”. 
However, we also observe that coefficient on interaction term between derivative use and 
corruption is highly significant and positive ( = 0.0570, p <0.01). It supports the Hypothesis 5b 
and suggests that foreign affiliates, which reside in a country with a low corruption environment, 
engage in financial derivatives usage, are significantly more valuable than those affiliates, which 
reside in a country with a high corruption level.  
When we look at results of other independent and control variables, although effects for 
firm- specific and country-specific factors are broadly similar across subsamples, some different 
characteristics seems to be important to explain different effects of derivatives use on firm types. 
First, we observe that diversification indicator negatively affect firm value of foreign affiliates, 
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while it does not influence value of domestic firms and domestic MNCs. This result complies 
with the notion of Denis et al. (2002), Fauver and Naranjo (2010), Marami and Dubois (2013), 
among others, that on average, industrial diversification is harmful to firm value. 
Second, we find that the exchange risk exposure, measured by foreign sales to total sales 
(FORSALES) is actually significant for domestic firms ( = - 0.0466, p <0.1) but not for 
domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. This result supports finding of Choi and Jiang (2009) and 
may explain why value implication of derivatives use does not differ significantly between 
domestic firms and domestic MNCs as Géczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) state 
that a firm with higher ratio of foreign sales to total sales is more likely to use derivatives to 
hedge exposures, thereby increasing firm value.  
5.5.2.2. The link between derivatives use and firm value under corruption in the pre-, 
during-, and post- crisis periods 
We find interesting evidence that the incidence of financial derivatives use prior to the crisis 
is related to a reduction of 3.37% in domestic firms’ value (p < 0.01), while it does not affect 
value of MNCs and foreign affiliates. Similarly, the interaction term of derivatives use and 
corruption does not have significant effect on firm value of both domestic MNCs and foreign 
affiliates. Although the coefficient on such variable is highly significant and positive in the case 
of domestic firms, however, the effect is modest ( = 0.0154, p <0.01). On the other hand, we 
observe that the estimated coefficients on FORSALES are not different from zero at any 
conventional significance level for the case of MNCs and foreign affiliates, but it is positively 
associated with domestic firms’ value. This result indicates that exposures are less significant for 
domestic MNCs and foreign subsidiaries than domestic firms; while the use of derivatives may 
be unable to mitigate exposures that domestic firms face, consequently, reduces firm value. This 
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can be partly attributed to the finding of Guay and Kothari (2003) that the use of derivatives 
seems to be a small part in non-financial firms’ risk profile.  
(INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE) 
During the crisis period, in response to the increased exposure, derivatives users are found to 
intensify the extent of derivatives use and there is substantial increase in the proportion of firms 
that make use of derivatives as shown in the table 5.1. However, we can notice that the use of 
derivatives decreases firm value of both domestic firms and domestic MNCs, but domestic 
MNCs experience more significant drop in their value relative to domestic firms ( = -0.1379 
versus  = -0.0749), while it has no impact on foreign affiliates’ firm value. This result suggests 
that value impact of derivatives use on domestic MNCs is more sensitive to the crisis than other 
firms.  
More remarkably, in line with our Hypothesis 6b, we find that low level of corruption 
alleviates negative impacts of the crisis on value implication of derivatives use for domestic 
firms and domestic MNCs, however, that effect is very moderate ( = 0.0014 and 0.0038). This 
finding supports the premise that the financial crisis causes a sudden and big exogenous shock, 
firms are unable to adjust to new system (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, Enikolopov et al., 2014), the 
use of derivatives cannot reduce exposures to market risks while hedging costs is higher due to 
fluctuation in exchange rates and escalation in financial costs and prices, which all leads to a 
hedging discount. Under such disruptions caused by the crisis, in addition, the extent of 
corruption in the home or host country would be of less concern from the perspective of a firm’s 
hedging behaviors. 
In the post-crisis period, we obtain results broadly similar to findings in the previous section. 
The use of derivatives adds value to both domestic firms and domestic MNCs (domestic firms = 
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0.124, p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = 0.0939, p <0.05), showing that derivatives use is more efficient 
value-enhancing activity after the crisis. More interestingly, we notice that the home country’s 
level of corruption is more associated with the impact of derivatives usage on firm value of 
domestic MNCs than on domestic firms, and its low corruption level rewards domestic MNCs 
with higher firm value (domestic firms = 0.124, p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = 0.0939, p <0.05). In 
addition, we find strong evidence that the use of derivatives decreases firm value of foreign 
affiliates by 9.51%, but MNC subsidiaries are more valuable in host countries where corruption 
is less severe as evidenced by the estimated coefficient on variable derivatives use interacted 
with corruption ( = 0.0154, p <0.05).  
5.5.3. Robustness tests 
5.5.3.1. Instrumental variable (IV) model: controlling for potential endogeneity problem 
To address the potential issue of endogeneity due to omitted variables and reverse causality, 
we implement the instrumental variable (IV) method similar to Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Allayannis et al. (2012), among others. In this approach, derivative use intensity is regarded as 
an endogenous variable. The first stage of IV regression is an OLS regression model of 
derivatives use on all of other explanatory variables in equation 6.1; in the second stage, we 
apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain efficient estimators for endogeneity. 
(INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE) 
In the first stage, to identify instrumental variables, we employ some instruments suggested 
by previous studies that are potentially related to derivatives use, but are unrelated to firm value. 
More specifically, based on the idea of Campello et al. (2011) about a tax-based instrumental 
approach, we use first difference of tax rate, defined as income taxes to pre-tax income, as the 
instrument. On one hand, the theoretical research linking derivatives use and tax benefits suggest 
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that progressive marginal tax rates, together with the existence of tax shields such as tax credits, 
tax loss carry forwards are closely related to the decision to hedge (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Stulz, 1996, among others). On the other hand, Campello et al. (2011) express that tax convexity 
is a non-linear function of taxable income, tax codes, and various tax credits. Thus, this measure 
exhibits characteristics of tax system and structure, ultimately lead to an exogenous variation to 
identify the unbiased influence of derivatives use on firm value.  
In accordance with Allayannis et al. (2012), we use exchange rate regime dummies to 
indicate whether a country has an independently floating, managed floating or fixed exchange 
rate regime. The type of exchange rate regime is likely to be the strongest factor affecting 
exchange rate volatility as Kocenda and Valcachy (2006) discussed, consequently affects firms’ 
decision to use derivatives, especially foreign currency derivatives. However, exchange rate 
regime is a part of monetary policy, and may differ among countries due to differences in 
exchange rate regime which can be explained by factors such as different parties having different 
macroeconomic preferences, the timing of election, the degree of central bank independence, and 
the type of political system (Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein, 2001; 
Setzer, 2005). Therefore, it may be unrelated with firm value. In this study, we define three types 
of dummy variables regarding to whether a firm is located in a country following the floating 
exchange rate regime (Japan, Indonesia, and Philippines), whether an observation is based in a 
country insisting on the managed floating exchange rate regime (Thailand, Singapore and 
Malaysia), and whether a firm belongs to a country that using the fixed exchange rate regime 
(China and Hong Kong). 
For brevity, we only report the results of the second-stage IV estimation in the table 5.6. To 
substantiate if the instruments are weak instruments, we estimate Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F 
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statistic. The F statistics are always greater than Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value (or greater 
than 10), implying rejection of null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. In addition, the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank LM statistics are strongly significant (p < 0.01), indicating that the 
IV model does not have an under-identification issue.  
There are consistent estimates of the second-stage valuation results controlling for potential 
endogeneity issue and our OLS results obtained from table 5.4. We find statistically and 
economically significant hedging premium for both domestic firms and domestic MNCs 
operating in low corrupt countries, indicating that countries with low corruption induce domestic 
firms and domestic MNCs to use financial derivatives for hedging and rewards those firms with 
higher value. However, we observe that after accounting for potential endogeneity issue, the 
estimated coefficients on derivatives use and interaction term between derivatives usage and 
corruption in the case of domestic MNCs (0.0733 and 0.1203 respectively) are higher in 
magnitude than OLS estimate (0.0494 and 0.0778), but in the case of domestic firms, these 
coefficients are lower (0.0371 and 0.0429 compared to 0.0418 and 0.0759 in OLS).  
More importantly, these results indicate that intensifying derivatives use enables domestic 
MNCs to increase firm value more efficiently than domestic firms. It also supports the views of 
international business and finance researchers that domestic MNCs can attain higher 
performance capitalizing on their FSAs (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977, Chung 
et al. 2010; Lee and Rugman, 2012), and domestic MNCs with derivative policies outperform 
domestic firms due to their superior ability to engage in financial and operational hedging, which 
should be able to offset some risk exposures they face (Lin, Pantzalis, and Park, 2009; Choi and 
Jiang, 2009). 
 144 
On the other hand, in line with the previous findings, we find that the use of financial 
derivatives decreases firm value of foreign affiliates by 5.28%, which is lower than hedging 
discount of 7% found in OLS estimation. More importantly, we find interesting evidence that 
low corruption enhances effects of derivatives use on foreign affiliates’ value, coefficient on 
derivatives use ranges from -0.0528 to 0.0082 (p < 0.01). These results altogether strongly 
support our hypothesis that in low corruption environment, the use of derivatives is likely to 
increase firm value, and it rewards domestic MNCs with higher value than domestic firms and 
foreign affiliates. Critically, the results from IV estimation imply that our inferences from OLS 
estimation are robust. 
5.5.3.2. Heckman treatment model: controlling for self-selection bias 
In this section, following Chen and King (2014), Lievenbruck and Schmid (2014) we 
execute treatment effects model as in Heckman (1979) to control for self-selection bias. The 
corresponding results for the second stage estimations for domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and 
foreign affiliates are reported in the Table 5.7. 
(INSERT TABLE 5.7 HERE) 
Heckman treatment model confirms our previous findings that the use of derivatives is 
associated with an increase in firm value of domestic firms and domestic MNCs with hedging 
premiums of 4.2% (p < 0.1), and 11.1% (p < 0.1), respectively. We notice that after controlling 
for self-selection bias, magnitude of value effect of derivatives use is higher than OLS estimation 
and it strongly supports findings of previous studies that domestic MNCs outperform domestic 
firms (e.g., Lin et al. 2009). We also find that firms in low corrupt countries are more valuable 
than those in highly corrupt countries, but home country’s lower level of corruption favors 
domestic MNCs than domestics firms (Domestic MNCs = 0.1186, p <0.01; domestic firms = 0.0457, p 
 145 
<0.1). With regard to foreign affiliates, we find that derivatives use decreases firm value by 
6.89%, although lower corruption level of host country rewards foreign affiliates with higher 
value ( = 0.0077, p <0.05). These results are consistent with those findings reported from OLS 
estimation in table 5.4. 
5.5.3.3. An additional test: Firm market value and derivatives use 
Finally, we replicate OLS model with firm market value in thousand USD, which is defined 
as a firm’s share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue, as an alternative 
proxy for Tobin’s Q. The regression results are reported in the table 5.8. 
(INSERT TABLE 5.8 HERE) 
In the case of domestic firms and domestic MNCs, our primary explanatory variable – 
derivatives use – shows positive coefficients that are statistically significant (domestic firms = 
41.75, p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = 48.32, p <0.1). It is consistent with our previous findings and 
hypothesis 1 that the use of derivatives enhances value of firms. Additionally, the coefficients of 
interaction terms between derivatives use and corruption show positive and significant results 
(domestic firms = 0.472, p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = 0.540, p <0.1), indicating that the home country’s 
level of corruption related to value effect of derivatives use and those firms are more valuable in 
low corrupt countries.  
In contrast, regarding foreign affiliates, we are unable to find any link between derivatives 
use and firm value, although it shows negative effect on firm value ( = -99.82, p >0.1). The 
interaction term between derivatives usage and corruption, in addition, does not show a 
statistically significant result ( = 1.613, p > 0.1). Thus, our hypotheses are not supported. 
However, the overall results of robustness tests altogether indicate that our main inferences 
are mostly robust to various estimation techniques and alternative proxy for firm value. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
We explored the impacts of derivatives use on firm value of domestic firms, domestic 
MNCs and foreign affiliates under influence of corruption environment in eight East Asian 
countries during the period of 2003-2013 that encompasses the global financial crisis, thereby 
differing from previous works and contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature as below  
The primary conceptual contribution of this study is to take an institution-based view of 
value effect of derivatives use. In particular, we apply the institutional theory and 
internationalization theory in IB to risk management in finance; we integrate country-level 
factors into research design and explain why and how value implication of derivatives use differs 
across firm types in light of home and host countries’ corruption environment. It is because all 
East Asian firms are embedded in the corruption environment of home and/or host country, 
while firm-specific factors alone cannot fully explain firms’ behaviors, so an analysis of the 
influence of corruption levels provides an additional perspective on the drivers of value effects of 
derivatives use. This study is one of the first to examine how institutional factor, i.e. corruption 
environment, and derivatives use jointly affect a firm value, which is a necessary and highly 
promising approach. 
Our first empirical contribution is to find strong and significant evidence that low corruption 
level of home country rewards domestic firms and domestic MNCs with higher value (hedging 
premiums are from 9.87% to 11.77%, and 10.78% to 12.72% respectively). Although derivatives 
use always decreases firm value of foreign affiliates in all models, we also find that foreign 
affiliates are more valuable in host countries where corruption is less severe. These findings 
underline the importance of institutional incentives in encouraging value-enhancing derivative 
activities. 
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The other distinction of this study is that it compares impacts of derivatives use on firm 
value for different firm types to answer whether hedging activities of domestic MNCs perform 
better in terms of firm value than domestics firms and foreign affiliates; and what level of 
corruption in home or host country rewards firms with higher value. We notice that empirical 
results, even after controlling for endogeneity and self-selection bias, consistently support that 
domestic MNCs outperform domestic firms and foreign affiliates. We also find that home 
country’s low corruption level favors domestic MNCs than domestics firms, while low 
corruption environment of host country enhances effect of derivatives use on foreign affiliates’ 
firm value.  
Furthermore, we shed new light on the current literature on corruption and provide new 
insights into firms’ hedging activities when firms are affected by the global financial crisis. We 
observe that during the crisis, benefit of derivatives use does not gain, and the effect of low 
corruption levels on mitigating negative impacts of the crisis on derivatives usage is very 
moderate. However, we find strong link between the low corruption level of home country and 
hedging premiums of domestic firms and domestic MNCs in the post-crisis. 
There are also practical implications of this study for firm managers and policy-regulators. 
The finding that firms using derivatives are more valuable in countries with low corruption levels 
particularly provides useful and practical insights to firms’ managers to increase their firms’ cash 
flows and firm value through derivative activities. Firm managers should not only include 
measures for firm-specific factors when determining hedging policy, but also for home/host 
country’s corruption levels. On the other hand, these results clearly suggest that regulators or 
policy-makers want to foster performances of non-financial firms with hedging activities in a 
country, they should be more actively in cracking down corruption levels. Finally, due to 
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characteristics of our sample firms and sample countries, the results of this research can be 
applicable and easily generalized into any developing and developed countries in which there are 
non-financial firms using financial derivatives, and corruption exists. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of derivatives use of sample firms 
This table shows the number of firms and the percentage of firms that use derivatives by country, by derivative use 
information, and by year for all firms. We present the percentage of firms using any financial derivatives (foreign 
currency derivatives and/or interest rate derivatives and/or commodity price derivatives). Panel A presents the use 
of derivatives based on firm-year observations by country. Panel B reports the information about the use of 
derivatives by derivative users, non-users and notional value of derivatives contracts. Panel C shows the trend of 
derivatives use over time. 
 
Panel A: Derivatives use by country 
Countries Total      Any derivatives 
 N N % 
Indonesia 429 158 36.83 
Philippines 352 352 100.00 
Singapore 1639 651 39.72 
Japan 1661 1661 100.00 
Hong Kong 1606 382 23.79 
Malaysia 1760 669 38.01 
China 1111 179 16.11 
Thailand 1133 1133 100.00 
Total 9691 5185 53.50 
Panel B: Firms’ derivatives use information 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Any derivative dummy 9691 0.4903519 0.4999327 
Notional value of any derivative 6070 339721.1 4300822 
Panel C: Derivatives use by year 
Years Total Any derivatives 
 N N % 
2003-2006 3524 1752 49.72 
2007-2008 881 477 54.14 
2009-2013 4405 2462 55.89 
Total 9691 5185 53.50 
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Table 5.2: Definitions of variables 
This table defines the dependent and independent variables, and control variables that we examine 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Dependent variable  
Tobin’s Q (Book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of 
equity) / book value of total assets (Natural logarithm) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Main independent variables  
USE Derivative use intensity (notional value of derivatives contracts in 
thousand USD / total assets) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Corruption index Corruption Perception Index (CPI): Inverse ranking of country 
corruption levels on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) 
(from Transparency International) 
Transparency 
International 
Control variables   
Firm size Natural logarithm of market value of total assets scaled by Producer 
price index (PPI) 
Datastream 
Leverage Total debt to total assets Datastream 
ROA Return on assets (net income / book value of total assets) Datastream 
Capital expenditures Market value of a firm’s common equity divided by book value of 
common equity  
Datastream 
Quick ratio (Cash + short-term investments) / total current liabilities Datastream 
Dividend yield (Common dividend per share / fiscal year end share price) Datastream 
FORSALES Foreign sales to total sales  Datastream 
GEOMARKT Dummy variable which has a value of one for firms that have sale 
markets in foreign countries, and zero otherwise 
Authors’ 
construction 
Industrial 
diversification 
Dummy variable which equals one for firms operating in more than one 
business segment in the SIC industry classification, and zero otherwise 
Authors’ 
construction 
GDP per capita Gross domestic products (GDP) / midyear population World Bank 
Financial system 
deposits to GDP 
The demand, time, saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP 
World Bank 
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics: derivatives users versus non-users 
This table presents a summary statistics of characteristics between firms using derivatives and those firms do not. Panel A reports 
summary statistics for the variables for the domestic firms that use either foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives or 
commodity price derivatives (derivative users) and firms that do not (derivatives non-users). Panel B displays the mean, standard 
deviation for variables of domestic MNC only separately for derivatives users and non-users. Panel C presents these values for foreign 
affiliates only. P-values for testing the difference in means are also reported. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Varisables  
General derivatives use 
            Users          Non-users 
p-value  
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Panel A: Domestic firms      
Tobin’s Q 0.509 0.557 0.418 2.067 0.0541* 
Corruption index 61.277 21.091 60.65 19.685 0.3164 
Firm size 5.7169 2.357 5.1739 2.060 0000*** 
Leverage 23.824 36.615 26.072 97.296 0.3092 
ROA 5.752 12.976 6.460 84.848 0.6980 
Capital expenditures 16.534 250.908 15.712 103.039 0.8919 
Quick ratio 3.987 48.974 2.337 9.990 0.1417 
Dividend yield 2.757 4.033 3.433 37.732 0.4008 
FORSALES 42.566 36.835 41.147 41.150 0.3231 
GEOMART 0.501 0.500 0.526 0.499 0.1247 
Diversification indicator 0.404 0.491 0.386 0.487 0.2415 
Financial system deposits to GDP 129.44 62.39 153.86 83.45 0.000*** 
Ln (GDP per capita) 38364 26320 39578 25122 0.0183** 
Panel B: Domestic MNCs      
Tobin’s Q 0.798 0.657 0.443 0.467 0.0004*** 
Corruption index 64.338 17.417 54.881 19.252 0.0000*** 
Firm size 7.013 2.376 5.686 2.257 0.0000*** 
Leverage 22.890 29.243 24.697 49.795 0.1371 
ROA 5.888 16.213 5.275 36.569 0.4693 
Capital expenditures 8.906 17.694 33.219 629.862 0.0704* 
Quick ratio 3.983 81.245 2.518 29.299 0.4095 
Dividend yield 2.324 4.783 2.424 3.132 0.3984 
FORSALES 32.843 31.083 30.830 34.832 0.0906* 
GEOMART 0.785 0.411 0.755 0.430 0.0183** 
Diversification indicator 0.545 0.498 0.513 0.673 0.0688* 
Financial system deposits to GDP 158.95 72.37 122.41 85.44 0.0000*** 
Ln(GDP per capita) 34824 18838 30202 22790 0.0000*** 
Panel C: Foreign affiliates      
Tobin’s Q 0.702 0.397 0.715 0.322 0.0615* 
Corruption index 55.556 18.651 58.028 16.625 0.0695* 
Firm size 5.672 2.382 5.250 2.095 0.0497** 
Leverage 24.466 26.385 33.699 236.710 0.4309 
ROA 6.330 10.099 4.091 20.670 0.0584* 
Capital expenditures 10.851 27.618 14.387 34.774 0.1349 
Quick ratio 1.519 1.834 3.927 19.499 0.0136** 
Dividend yield 3.974 26.894 2.322 2.749 0.3013 
FORSALES 36.440 35.003 32.752 36.156 0.2453 
GEOMART 0.621 0.486 0.684 0.466 0.0981* 
Diversification indicator 0.330 0.471 0.487 0.500 0.0000*** 
Financial system deposits to GDP 147.55 83.39 159.88 93.41 0.0651* 
Ln(GDP per capita) 30790 20418 33903 20114 0.0444** 
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Table 5.4: Firm value and derivatives use under influence of corruption environment 
This table reports the effects of derivatives use on firm value from an OLS estimation split up with regard to 
domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is Ln(Tobin’s Q), which is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity over book value of total assets. Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of any derivative contract 
in thousand USD (foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price derivatives) scaled by total assets. All other 
independent variables definitions are reported in Table 5.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Variabless Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Derivative use 0.0418** 0.0494*   -0.0700*** 
 
(0.029) (0.057)    (0.000)    
Derivative*corruption 0.0759*** 0.0778**  0.0570*** 
 
(0.003) (0.018)    (0.001)    
Corruption index 0.154* 0.0590*** 0.0943    
 
(0.176) (0.004)    (0.134)    
Firm size 0.945*** 0.202*** 0.804*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001)    (0.001)    
Leverage 0.0719** 0.0651*   -0.0906    
 
(0.019) (0.081)    (0.112)    
ROA -0.0555** -0.0360    -0.0492    
 
(0.029) (0.626)    (0.745)    
Capital expenditure 0.0307 0.0304**  -0.0885    
 
(0.242) (0.015)    (0.836)    
Quick ratio -0.0612 -0.0264    -0.0119*** 
 
(0.647) (0.127)    (0.002)    
Dividend yield -0.0104 0.0306**  0.0149    
 
(0.577) (0.014)    (0.256)    
FORSALE -0.0466* 0.0350    -0.0685    
 
(0.077) (0.643)    (0.994)    
GEOMART -0.211 0.0335    0.0913    
 
(0.166) (0.570)    (0.776)    
Diversification indicator -0.0566 -0.0578    -0.835**  
 
(0.747) (0.289)    (0.013)    
GDP per capita 0.0676 -0.6170   0.479**  
 
(0.967) (0.188)    (0.010)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.0033 -0.0038*   0.0069    
 
(0.883) (0.091)    (0.261)    
Intercept -2.915 3.472    -62.01***  
 
(0.812) (0.422)    (0.002)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1420    1431    272    
R-square 0.413    0.367    0.533    
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Table 5.5: Value effects of derivatives use under corruption before, after, and during the global financial crisis 
This table reports the effects of derivatives use on firm value before, after and during the global financial crisis from an OLS estimation split up with regard to domestic firms, domestic MNCs, 
and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is Ln (Tobin’s Q), which is calculated as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity over book value of total assets. Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of any derivative contract in thousand USD (foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price 
derivatives) scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are reported in Table 5.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables 
Domestic firms                     Domestic MNCs   Foreign affiliates 
2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2013 2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2013 2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2013 
Derivative use -0.0337*** -0.0749** 0.1245*   -0.0124 -0.1379* 0.0939**  -1.350 -0.134    -0.0951**  
 
(0.001) (0.023) (0.076)    (0.993) (0.090) (0.039)    (0.332) (0.880)    (0.014)    
Derivative*corruption 0.0154*** 0.0014** 0.0285**  -0.0575 0.0038* 0.0167*** 0.0091 0.0795    0.0106**  
 
(0.001) (0.013) (0.034)    (0.737) (0.087) (0.008)    (0.645) (0.885)    (0.015)    
Corruption index -0.0357 -0.0308 0.554**  -0.139 0.239 0.148*** 0.100 -0.514    0.0334    
 
(0.203) (0.813) (0.035)    (0.617) (0.527) (0.001)    (0.783) (0.884)    (0.829)    
Firm size 0.969*** 0.894*** 0.962*** 0.885*** 0.799*** 0.826*** 0.749*** 0.7220    0.865*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.267)    (0.000)    
Leverage 0.00331 -0.00398 -0.00647    0.0063** 0.0055 -0.0038    -0.0018 -0.0681    -0.0398    
 
(0.184) (0.633) (0.908)    (0.021) (0.512) (0.410)    (0.273) (0.990)    (0.362)    
ROA -0.00413** -0.0186 -0.0069*** 0.0133 0.0278 -0.0043   -0.0106 -0.0384    0.0049    
 
(0.024) (0.152) (0.010)    (0.277) (0.206) (0.366)    (0.831) (0.849)    (0.637)    
Capital expenditure 0.00393 -0.0173*** 0.0028    0.0062** -0.0025 0.00478*** 0.0271** -0.0099    0.0047    
 
(0.162) (0.010) (0.308)    (0.029) (0.772) (0.002)    (0.041) (0.682)    (0.291)    
Quick ratio -0.00957 -0.0617* 0.0394**  0.0366 0.0117 0.0401    -0.0286 0.106    -0.0109*** 
 
(0.220) (0.063) (0.039)    (0.463) (0.442) (0.161)    (0.311) (0.619)    (0.001)    
Dividend yield -0.0633*** 0.0238 0.00176    -0.0135 -0.0021 0.0209    0.00958 0.216    -0.0144    
 
(0.003) (0.742) (0.916)    (0.819) (0.969) (0.266)    (0.575) (0.462)    (0.795)    
FORSALE 0.0098* 0.0047* 0.0026    0.0041 0.0064 -0.0029    0.0104 0.0197    0.0036***    
 
(0.056) (0.085) (0.206)    (0.385) (0.414) (0.134)    (0.656) (0.616)    (0.007)   
GEOMART -0.149 0.0847 -0.187    -0.155 0.432 -0.111    0.236 -0.112    -0.493    
 
(0.311) (0.682) (0.279)    (0.500) (0.343) (0.536)    (0.623) (0.970)    (0.477)    
Diversification indicator -0.109 0.0825 -0.0902    -0.204 -0.133 -0.228    -0.1006*** 0.3981    -0.727**  
 
(0.518) (0.676) (0.645)    (0.262) (0.432) (0.227)    (0.004) (0.774)    (0.026)    
GDP per capita -0.612 0.885 0.818    -0.796 0.7168 -0.9273    0.3738 0.2635    0.6566    
 
(0.248) (0.653) (0.463)    (0.757) (0.289) (0.324)    (0.790) (0.846)    (0.417)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.0017 -0.0082 -0.0016    -0.0232 -0.0567 -0.0019    -0.0019 -0.186    0.0011    
 
(0.924) (0.824) (0.977)    (0.261) (0.272) (0.828)    (0.981) (0.837)    (0.975)    
Intercept -1.769 -31.94 -6.455    6.133 -89.32 -3.007    -45.76 -224.2    -69.96    
 
(0.697) (0.562) (0.695)    (0.836) (0.230) (0.726)    (0.687) (0.837)    (0.305)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 571 191 1063    496 230 1248    99 38    207    
R-square 0.593 0.682 0.613    0.509 0.588 0.687    0.864 0.932    0.720    
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Table 5.6: Instrumental variable (IV) model 
This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on firm value from an instrumental variable model (IV) split up with regard to 
domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is Ln (Tobin’s Q), which is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity over book value of total 
assets. Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of any derivative contract in thousand USD (foreign currency, interest 
rate and commodity price derivatives) scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are reported in Table 5.2. 
Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-values are in parentheses. 
Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Derivative use 0.0371* 0.0733*** -0.0528*** 
 
(0.076) (0.000) (0.000)    
Derivative*corruption 0.0429* 0.1203*** 0.0610*** 
 
(0.080) (0.000) (0.000)    
Corruption index 0.0157 0.0440*** -0.0707*** 
 
(0.256) (0.000) (0.001)    
Firm size 0.232*** 0.295*** 0.298**  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.044)    
Leverage 0.0065* 0.0110** 0.0265*** 
 
(0.076) (0.020) (0.001)    
ROA -0.0073*** -0.0204*** -0.0214    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.101)    
Capital expenditure 0.0056 0.0016 -0.0097**  
 
(0.400) (0.128) (0.023)    
Quick ratio -0.0519** -0.0114 -0.0240*** 
 
(0.012) (0.317) (0.000)    
Dividend yield -0.0021 0.0078 0.0011  
 
(0.823) (0.576) (0.140)    
FORSALE 0.0017 -0.0078 0.0055   
 
(0.896) (0.652) (0.226)    
GEOMART -0.0521 0.0721* -0.504*** 
 
(0.714) (0.087) (0.009)    
Diversification indicator 0.162 0.181 0.145    
 
(0.137) (0.443) (0.208)    
GDP per capita -0.109 0.685** 0.638    
 
(0.763) (0.010) (0.145)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP 0.0063 0.0084 0.0055*** 
 
(0.402) (0.265) (0.002)    
Intercept 1.021 -5.383** -4.051    
 
(0.729) (0.021) (0.254)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic   39.538 164.916 38.700 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.0044 0.0031 0.0057 
No of observations 1275 1005 174    
R-square 0.512 0.682 0.485    
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Table 5.7: Heckman treatment model 
This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on firm value from a Heckman treatment model split up with 
regard to domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is Ln (Tobin’s Q), 
which is calculated as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity over book value of total assets. Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of any 
derivative contract in thousand USD (foreign currency, interest rate and commodity price derivatives) scaled by 
total assets. All other independent variables definitions are reported in Table 5.2. Standard errors are clustered 
by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Derivative use 0.0422*    0.1110*** -0.0689**  
 
(0.071)    (0.000)    (0.018)    
Derivative*corruption 0.0457*    0.1186*** 0.0077**  
 
(0.054)    (0.000)    (0.023)    
Corruption index 0.0579    0.0160*  -0.0924    
 
(0.798)    (0.072)    (0.614)    
Firm size 0.935*** 0.142*** 0.712*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Leverage 0.0041    0.0022*   0.0124    
 
(0.408)    (0.084)    (0.160)    
ROA 0.0236*   -0.0128*** 0.0377    
 
(0.064)    (0.000)    (0.235)    
Capital expenditure 0.0047    -0.0074    -0.0375*   
 
(0.169)    (0.731)    (0.078)    
Quick ratio -0.0033  -0.0736*** 0.521*** 
 
(0.916)    (0.000)    (0.002)    
Dividend yield -0.0347    0.0252*** -0.0019  
 
(0.264)    (0.006)    (0.535)    
FORSALE -0.0017   -0.0012**  -0.0044    
 
(0.472)    (0.048)    (0.512)    
GEOMART 0.212    -0.0322    0.0011  
 
(0.141)    (0.357)    (0.997)    
Diversification indicator -0.1618    -0.7673    -0.1763*** 
 
(0.286)    (0.633)    (0.000)    
GDP per capita -0.0057    0.0032    -0.0765*** 
 
(0.961)    (0.325)    (0.000)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP 47.70    6.581    -161.1*** 
 
(0.392)    (0.678)    (0.000)    
Intercept -0.335    -0.317**  0.550    
 
(0.620)    (0.047)    (0.393)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1086    1405    202    
Mills ratio 0.422*    0.1110*** -0.2689**  
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Table 5.8: Firm market value and derivatives usage under corruption 
This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on firm market value from an OLS estimation split up with regard 
to domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. The dependent variable is firm market value in thousand 
USD, which is calculated as a firm’s share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in use of that firm. 
Derivatives use is calculated as the notional value of any derivative contract in thousand USD (foreign currency, 
interest rate and commodity price derivatives) scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are 
reported in Table 5.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Derivative use 41.75* 48.32* -99.82    
 
(0.079) (0.054) (0.233)    
Derivative*corruption 0.472* 0.540* 1.613    
 
(0.086) (0.061) (0.133)    
Corruption index 24.34 37.87*** 107.6*** 
 
(0.351) (0.001) (0.000)    
Firm size 709.7*** 801.4*** 706.9*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Leverage 1.018* -0.0811 3.963    
 
(0.074) (0.929) (0.195)    
ROA 0.0548** 0.352 0.752    
 
(0.023) (0.197) (0.931)    
Capital expenditure 0.0401 0.0395*** 0.292    
 
(0.547) (0.001) (0.874)    
Quick ratio 1.291*** 0.244 1.128*** 
 
(0.006) (0.971) (0.008)    
Dividend yield 6.799* 9.400 -1.526*** 
 
(0.093) (0.265) (0.003)    
FORSALE -0.0047 -0.579 0.0236    
 
(0.991) (0.593) (0.984)    
GEOMART 53.70 -20.64 -50.66    
 
(0.144) (0.675) (0.499)    
Diversification indicator -22.28 2.899 70.66    
 
(0.340) (0.899) (0.327)    
GDP per capita -2001.2** 363.2 -1147.7    
 
(0.015) (0.427) (0.235)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP -2.695*** 1.892 -2.909    
 
(0.006) (0.538) (0.451)    
Intercept 17605.2** -2325.1 14983.8    
 
(0.017) (0.581) (0.117)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 1472 1573 290    
R-square 0.797 0.830 0.831    
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN 
DERIVATIVES USE AND EXPOSURES 
6.1. Introduction 
For the past decades, the strong development of financial derivatives as the most cost-
effective instrument to manage market risks has aroused substantial interests of researchers to 
empirically investigate firms’ hedging behaviors. However, while the determinants of derivatives 
use have been relatively thoroughly investigated on both theoretical and empirical aspects, the 
impact of financial derivatives use on firms’ exposures has only recently become a subject for 
empirical analysis, and the research remains occasional.  
Specifically, most of previous studies focus on exchange rate exposure and provide unclear-
cut evidence on the relationship with derivatives use (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Choi and 
Jiang, 2009; Yip and Nguyen, 2012), while interest rate exposure is not examined in-depth. As a 
matter of fact, empirical research in East Asia context is very rare22, although firms in East Asian 
countries have been increasingly using derivatives to manage risks over the last decades23. The 
                                                     
22 To the best of our knowledge, up to date there is only study by Ameer, Matisa, and Abdullah (2011) directly 
investigating the link between derivatives use and exchange rate exposure for a sample of 60 Malaysian firms in 
Malaysia from 2007 to 2008.  
23 Accoring to the annual survey of the Future Industry Association, in 2015, the derivative trading volume of those 
firms account for about one-third of global volume 
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question whether the use of derivatives among non-financial firms in these countries reduces 
exposures to market risks, therefore, becomes a great interest. 
Building upon the gaps in the existing literature, we explore the unique link between 
derivatives use and exposures to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks by 
comparing domestic firms, domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates from different aspects of 
exposures with new hand-collected dataset of derivatives use of 881 non-financial firms from 8 
East Asian countries for the period of 2003 to 2013. We make the following contributions. 
First, while we have long learnt over the last decades about exposures to exchange rate, and 
sometimes interest rate exposures; to the best of our knowledge, the research linking derivatives 
use with exposure to country risks is nonexistent in the current literature. This is surprising as 
country risks have implications for taxation, spending, monetary and trade policy and industry 
regulation (Huang et al., 2015; Glover and Levine, 2015), ultimately influence directly on firms’ 
performances. Relatedly, country risks may have impacts on firm fundamentals such as 
investment opportunities, cash flows or risk-adjusted discount factors (Nonnenberg and 
Mendonca, 2004), leading to a possibility that firms may use derivatives to hedge exposures to 
country risks. Our study, therefore, aims to measure exposure to home (host) country risks and 
investigate a relationship between derivatives use and that type of exposure. In particular, we 
address the following question: Do non-financial firms use financial derivatives to reduce 
exposure to country risks? 
Second, most of earlier studies on exposures and derivatives use rule out domestic firms by 
explicitly focusing on MNCs simple because MNCs engage more in overseas operation and trade 
(see Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Faff and Marshall, 2005). However, a purely domestic firm still is 
exposed to market risks, even exchange rate risk, if its competitor engages in international 
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business (Pantzalis, Simkins, and Laux, 2001; Choi and Jiang, 2009). Thus, whether MNCs are 
more exposed than domestic firms and other firms is not well understood. Relatedly, although 
the benefits of hedging from reducing exposures are well established, little has been done to 
investigate whether derivative activities of MNCs are associated with more significant reduced 
level of exposures than other firms. In this study, we propose that different firms have diverse 
objectives in managing risks, different views on the importance of various types of exposures, 
and those different hedging strategies determine how derivatives use influences level of 
exposures that firms face. Our study fully examines the link between derivatives use and 
exposures on the comparison of three types of firms (domestic firms, MNCs and foreign 
affiliates). 
Furthermore, we investigate how effects of derivatives usage on exposures differ across 
domestic firms, domestic MNCs and foreign affiliates when they faced exogenous shocks caused 
by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Although there are numerous studies on that crisis, 
little has been done to analyze its impacts on derivatives use. Our study covers the 2003-2013 
period, which provides a natural experiment of financial risks and risk management, to examine 
the dynamic of relationship between derivatives use and exposures before, during and after the 
crisis.  
Third, although in recent years many interest rates exhibit as volatile as exchange rates, 
presenting a comparably important source of risk to firms as exchange rate risks, up to date there 
is a dearth of comprehensive studies on impacts of derivatives use on interest rate exposures. As 
a matter of fact, a large body of previous studies focuses on the link between derivatives usage 
and exchange rate exposure (e.g., Pantzalis et al., 2001; Zhou and Wang, 2013; Hutson and 
Laing, 2014), while majority of studies on interest rate exposures has neglected the effects of 
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derivative use (e.g., Bartram, 2002). Additionally, while exposure to interest rate risks is a 
potentially considerable issue in corporate risk management not only for financial institutions but 
also for other firms, there is little attention to interest rate exposure of non-financial firms. Thus, 
in this study, we present comprehensive analysis of the link between derivatives use and interest 
rate exposure for a large sample of cross-country non-financial firms.  
We summarize main findings of our study as follows. We provide a novel evidence that the 
use of financial derivatives by domestic firms and domestic MNCs significantly contribute to a 
reduction in exposure to home country risks by 11.4% and 13.4% per 1% increase in notional 
derivative holdings, respectively. We also find the outperformance of domestic MNCs in 
mitigating exposures compared to domestic firms and foreign affiliates. Domestic MNCs using 
foreign currency and interest rate derivatives experience 18.2% and 19.0% decline in exposures 
to exchange rate, and interest rate risks for each 1% increase in notional derivative holdings, 
respectively. Meanwhile, 1% increase in foreign currency and interest rate notional holdings of 
domestic firms contributes to 10.4% decrease in exchange rate exposure, and 11.8% in interest 
rate exposure. Notably, derivatives use of foreign affiliates is not effective in alleviating 
exposure to host country risks, and exchange rate risks, but is associated with 3.07% lower 
interest rate exposure. In addition, we notice that the financial crisis weakens the hedging benefit 
of derivative usage, and the effect of financial hedging on exposures in the post-crisis period, in 
general, is stronger than those in pre-crisis period. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as below. Section 2 provides a review of current 
literature by discussing the relevance of exposures to exchange rate, interest rate risks to firms’ 
hedging behaviors, country risks, and financial crisis. On that basis, we develop hypotheses 
regarding the association between derivatives use and exposures. Sections 3 and 4 describe the 
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sample, exposure estimation, model specifications, and information of variables. Empirical 
results are discussed in the section 5. Section 6 draws conclusion. 
6.2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis  
The use of derivatives and exposures 
The increasing fluctuation of exchange rates, and interest rates create an additional source of 
uncertainty and risk, and ultimately affect profitability and value of firm. Hedging theory and 
risk management theories imply that if financial derivative contracts are value-enhancing 
instruments, then an increase in the use of derivatives in accordance with exposures to market 
risks should reduce individual exposure24. Thus, greater efforts in the use of derivatives may call 
forth smaller exposures if hedging activities are effective.  
Economic theory implicates that all firms, from purely domestic firms to MNCs, are subject 
to exposures to exchange rate risk as their cash flows are affected by movement in exchange 
rates directly or indirectly (Heckman, 1985; Levi, 1994; Shapiro, 1975). The direct exposure 
refers to transaction exposure of expected future cash flows in foreign currencies, while the 
indirect exposure derives from the effect of changes in exchange rates on the competitiveness of 
the firm (i.e. from competitors, suppliers). Dumas (1978) and Hodder (1982) define exchange 
rate exposure as a regression coefficient of the value of a firm on exchange rate across states of 
nature. 
Yet, the extant literature finds a puzzling relationship between exchange rate exposure and 
the use of financial derivatives. Many studies find that derivatives use is related to a significant 
reduction in exposure, but effects ranging from as low as 2.387% to as high as 54% (e.g., Adam 
                                                     
24 A firm is subject to exposure to market risks if changes in market prices or indexes such as exchange rates, 
interest rates may negatively influence that firm’s future cash flows and ultimately firm value. 
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and Fernando, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Bartram, Brown, and Minton, 2010). Following 
Jorison (1990), Allyannis and Ofek (2001) apply the market model and find out a negative 
relationship between a firm’s exchange rate exposure and its ratio of foreign currency derivatives 
intensity. In line with early studies, recent study by Zhou and Wang (2013) figure out that the 
use of foreign currency derivatives is effective in reducing firms’ risk exposure to varied 
degrees. However, Li and Marinc (2014) find that derivatives use by bank holding companies in 
the U.S is associated with higher exchange rate exposure. Meanwhile, the arguments that firms 
use derivatives to hedge their exchange rate exposure and such usage efficiently reduce firm’s 
exposures are questioned by some other empirical studies when they are unable to find any 
significant link (e.g., Choi and Jiang, 2009). Building upon the insights into theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7a: The use of foreign currency derivatives reduces exchange rate exposure  
As for interest rate exposure, the discounted cash flow model of firm valuation predicts that 
an increase in interest rate exposure reduces the present value of future cash flow. This is 
because interest rate movements influence the investment behavior of a firm through cost of 
capital (Bartram, 2005), impact firms’ financial assets and liabilities and ultimately share prices 
(Solnik, 1984). Given the theoretical expectation, it is interesting to examine a relationship 
between derivatives use and exposure to interest rate risks. Yet, that relationship has gained little 
attention in the existing literature. Nguyen and Faff (2010) provide mixed results. They report 
that among moderate derivative users with an extent of usage of less than 40%, the use of interest 
rate derivatives results in a risk reduction of approximately 2.387%. Yet, in the case of extensive 
derivative users, derivative use seems to increase firm risk. By contrast, Guay (1999) finds 
decline in interest rate exposure by 22% after the period of initiating interest rate derivative 
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positions. Relatedly, Gay, Lin, and Smith (2011), Brewer III, Deshmukh, and Opiela (2014) find 
a negative association between interest rate derivatives use and interest rate exposure. 
We therefore propose that there is a negative relationship between the use of derivatives and 
interest rate exposure. 
Hypothesis 7b: The use of interest rate derivatives reduces exposure to interest rate risk 
Exposures to country risks and the use of derivatives  
Shapiro (1999) defines country risk as a general level of political and economic uncertainty 
in a country influencing the value of investments in that country. Allien and Carletti (2013) 
further indicate that the interaction of institutions and markets determine country risk that drives 
firms’ activities (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010).  Relatedly, the important insights from 
Pástor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) is that policy-related uncertainty cannot be diversified away, 
and uncertainty is made up of a large fraction of risk premium, so it generally depresses asset 
prices by raising discount rate when the new policy is announced. Thus, it is reasonable to 
anticipate that derivatives use possible to influence exposure to country risks.  
Indeed, based on argument of pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), Durnev 
(2011) and Huang et al. (2015) argue that if information asymmetry is time-varying and stock 
prices become less informative during the time of high political uncertainty which is associated 
with uncertainty about future government policies, then firms’ cost of external capital may 
increase in that period. This is because higher idiosyncratic and aggregate volatility increases the 
probability of distress and consequently increases the cost of external financing as Glover and 
Levine (2015) notice. On the other hand, uncertainty with respect to future economic policies 
makes managers less informed, they are less willing to base their decisions on the revealed 
information (Durnev, 2011), while Labmert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2009) find that information 
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precision is a primary determinant of cost of capital. Regarding foreign affiliates, under the 
influence of host country’s uncertainty, an increase in production of a MNC subsidiary decreases 
the production of other subsidiaries within the same MNC network (Lee and Song, 2012). 
Although the literature on the political and economic uncertainty has been investigated 
extensively, both the economic theories and prior literature largely have been silent on the link 
between derivatives use and country risk. Batram et al. (2009) state that firms located in 
countries with greater economic, financial and political risks are more likely to use derivatives. 
On the other hand, firms based in less risky countries may have lower expected financial distress 
costs, and less need for risk management. Recently, Azad, Fang, and Hung (2012) find evidence 
that higher degree of economic, financial and political risks encourages firms to use derivatives 
more intensively.  
Taken both literature on association between derivatives use and exposures, and theoretical 
and empirical studies on country risks together, our hypothesis is yielded as below: 
Hypothesis 8: There is a negative relationship between the use of financial derivatives and 
exposure to country risk 
Derivatives use and exposures for different firms 
In the preceding sections, we hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between the 
use of financial derivatives and exposures. Yet, the use of financial derivatives does not have the 
same impact on exposures for different firm types. Institutional literature provides evidence that 
firms are not equally influenced by market and country risks. That heterogeneity derives from 
firms’ differential resources, capabilities, and stock of experience in the same and or similar 
environment (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). 
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In particular, such difference can be attributed to firm-specific advantages (FSAs) 25 . 
Following internationalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977), international 
business (IB) scholars have found that MNCs would be able to exploit cost differentials on a 
global scale due to operation cross borders (e.g., Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Chung, Lee, 
Beamish, and Isobe, 2010). MNCs, by virtue of their global scope and strategy, and their ability 
to span both internal and external business networks across national boundaries (Scott-Kennel 
and Giroud, 2015), can have further advantages in hedging exposures to specific market or 
country risks. Financial researchers, additionally, point out one of the keys to success of MNCs 
is their advantages in accessing international capital markets and abilities to exploit market 
imperfections through internal capital markets or their networks of international subsidiaries 
(Park, Suh, and Yeung, 2013), thereby possibly overcoming such challenges as exchange rate 
fluctuations, transfer of capital limits set up by home/host countries’ regulations, and potential 
double taxation. Thus, MNCs can achieve superior performance of hedging against market risks 
on their FSAs. 
In comparison with domestic firms, central to the OLI paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008) is the notion that by means of multinationality, MNCs have far greater opportunities than 
domestic firms to utilize a combination of organizational and external resources to spread the 
market risks and enhance performance. Most of early financial studies (e.g., Hughes, Logue, and 
Sweeney, 1975; Fatemi, 1984; Michel and Shaked, 1986) also evidence that internationalization 
is risk-reducing and MNCs have lower systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk vis-à-vis 
domestic firms. Consistently, in their analyses, Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Choi and Jiang 
                                                     
25 FSAs are benefits and strengths specific to a firm as compared to rivals, such as management and administrative 
knowledge, know-hows, marketing, innovation (Rugman, 1981) 
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(2009) find that MNCs may possess superior capability for reducing exposures to market risks 
such as exchange rate risks by using financial derivatives. Dunning and Rugman (1985) further 
indicate that MNCs have greater degree of freedom than domestic firms restricted in one 
country. While domestic firms have to rely on limited financial instruments to hedge their 
exposures, MNCs have superior ability to engage in additional hedging tools (Pantzalis et al., 
2001).  
Furthermore, IB literature emphasizes the importance of country-specific advantages 
(CSAs) such as economies of scale, access to natural resources in operation of MNCs and show 
that MNCs are better at exploiting CSAs than their domestic counterparts (Bhaumik, Driffied, 
and Zhou, 2016). These advantages increase competitive advantage of MNCs over domestic 
firms, and may attribute to a reduction in exposure to country and market risks that MNCs face. 
It is consistent with finding of Choi and Jiang (2009) that MNCs face smaller and less significant 
exchange rate exposures than non- MNCs.   
In terms of foreign affiliates, recent IB and finance studies suggest that foreign affiliates 
tends to be at a disadvantage as they often suffer from liability of foreignness, in which they are 
likely to bear higher cost of capital, lower liquidity and less analyst coverage vis-à-vis local firms 
(Blass and Yafeh, 2001; Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed, 2012). Foreignness is usually associated 
with the issues such as foreign affiliates’ lack of knowledge about local cultures and networks 
connecting them with important actors in host country’s economy, and their weak link to local 
institutional setting (Zaheer, 2002; Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012). Thus, it is reasonable to 
suggest that foreignness adds more difficulties in implementing derivatives activities for MNC 
subsidiaries than domestic firms and domestic MNCs.  
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Further, foreignness is largely determined by institutional distances between home and host 
countries referring to differences in regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutions of 
two countries (Salomon and Wu, 2012). This, in turn, increases foreign affiliates’ cost of doing 
business in the host country (Riaz et al., 2015). In particular, the inconsistencies in the decision-
and law- making by a particular host country’s regulatory institutions and governments increase 
variations in the immediate task environments of foreign affiliates (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), 
which possibly undermines implementation of derivative contracts. Additionally, by virtue of 
facing conflicting conformity pressures arising from regulations in the home country and policies 
of the parent company (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova et al., 2008) foreign affiliates bear 
additional costs from hedging exchange rate exposure26.  
From a different aspect, foreign affiliates could benefit from the access to a broad range of 
resources such as knowledge, networks, and knowhow due to diversity of the MNC as a whole. 
However, coordination, governance, and administrative costs may reduce the benefits or even 
make costs outweigh benefits (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), which eventually potentially increases 
hedging costs and dampens the effectiveness of derivative activities. Furthermore, Andersson, 
Forsgren, and Holm (2002) show that external embeddedness is not always in the best interest of 
the entire MNC, as it may alleviate incentives of subsidiaries to contribute to performance of 
MNCs (Oehmichen and Puck, 2016). As such, it possibly reduces the effect of foreign affiliates’ 
derivative activities in hedging exposure to host country risks. 
                                                     
26 For example, financial reporting could be structured conforming to home country’s law and codes or by the parent 
company in order to have consistency across subsidiaries in different countries, although the law and regulations in 
host countries may not warrant them, thereby increasing governance and monitoring cost associated with hedging 
exchange rate exposure, more especially translation exposure. 
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In all, based on the extant research in the realm of domestic MNCs, domestic firms, and 
foreign affiliates, and on the arguments developed above, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 9: The use of derivatives by domestic MNCs decreases a larger magnitude of 
exposure than domestic firms and foreign affiliates 
Financial crisis, exposures, and derivatives usage 
Finally, we analyze impact of the global financial crisis (2007-2008) on the relationship 
between derivatives use and exposures. It has been well established that there are two separate 
and sequential effects of a crisis on firms. On the one hand, a crisis brings about serious 
consequences, particularly turbulence in the foreign exchange and capital markets, with a rapid 
reduction in value and international transactions of major currencies, and exacerbated volatility 
of interest rates (Dufrénot and Keddad, 2014; Caporale, Hunter, and Ali, 2014), as well as 
increased risks for firms operating globally (Horta, 2013). Likewise, Patti and Sette (2016) 
evidence that the tightening capital supply of banks to non-financial firms during the financial 
crisis period translated into lower credit growth, lower probability of approving loan 
applications, and higher level of exchange rate fluctuation. Overall, this leads to a sharp rise in 
exposures to interest rate and exchange rate risks that non-financial firms face during crisis. On 
the other hand, firms restructure to adjust to a new environment and to reduce risk exposures 
after the crisis. Therefore, we theorize that effect of derivatives use on exposures is likely to be 
worse during the crisis period, but it is better in post-crisis period. 
The logic of this argument, additionally, is based on the view that facing sudden and major 
external shocks, firms have difficulty in adjusting their risk management activities to mitigate 
contagion risks during a crisis period (Syriopoulos, Makram, and Boubaker, 2015). The benefits 
of hedging behavior may not gain during this period as the crisis results in significant exchange 
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rate fluctuations, rapid increase in financial costs and prices (Singh and Yip, 2000), and in risks 
of financial derivatives (Li and Marinc, 2014)27. Furthermore, firms with more complicated 
organizational structures will get into greater difficulties when big shock occurs (Hanna, Polos, 
and Carroll, 2003; Chakrabarti et al., 2007). As a result, those difficulties increase hedging costs, 
eventually impede benefits of derivatives use in hedging exposures. 
Building upon all arguments above, we predict: 
Hypothesis 10a: The global financial crisis weakens the relationship between derivatives 
usage and exposures. 
Hypothesis 10b: Derivatives use is negatively related to exposures in the post-crisis 
period 
6.3. Sample and descriptive statistics  
Our sample consists of 9691 firm-year observations; it is balanced panel data set of 881 non-
financial firms across 34 different industries in 8 countries in East Asia, namely China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia over the period of 2003-
2013. We exclude financial firms, as they are likely to have different incentives for using 
derivatives than non-financial firms.  
All data set on derivatives contracts is hand-collected. We strived to verify the data accuracy 
by searching through a subset of firms’ annual reports, or from Morningstar 28, an independent 
                                                     
27 According to the report on Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms in 2010 of the Financial Stability 
Board, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 presented the potential for contagion deriving from the 
interconnectedness of OTC derivatives market participants and the limited transparency of counterparty 
relationships (pp.1) 
28 http://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/ 
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investment research, which provides a direct link to each company’s annual reports, or from 
Stock exchanges of each country. As eight countries in our sample have different local 
currencies with different values, it could have resulted in sampling bias. Hence, we decided to 
use a common currency for the amount of derivatives use and all other financial data and we 
chose the United States dollars (USD). For annual reports in which reporting currency is not 
USD, all hand-collected data are converted into USD using exchange rates on the Datastream 
database.  
We augmented this database on derivatives usage from annual reports with financial data on 
control variables from the Datastream database. For data not available on Datastream, we 
searched annual reports of firms to fill in as much missing data as possible. Some country 
specific data such as country risks are obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit, while 
proxies for economy and financial system development are obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. All financial data are yearly and in thousand of USD. 
In the sample, 389 domestic firms, 427 domestic MNCs and 65 foreign affiliates are 
identified. We use Corporate Affiliations database to classify firm types. Following Pantzalis, 
Simkins, and Laux (2001), we consider firm as a domestic MNC, if that firm has at least one 
majority owned foreign subsidiary, otherwise it is domestic firm. Foreign affiliate is defined as 
an independent organizational unit, which is located in any sample country, wholly or partially 
managed and controlled by a foreign parent MNC. 
Summary statistics on the use of derivatives by the sample firms is reported in the table 7.1. 
Across all countries, approximately 53.5% of our sample observations use at least one type of 
derivatives, while usage rate in Japan, Philippines or Thailand is 100%, indicating that the use of 
derivatives is common among non-financial firms in East Asian countries. Firms using foreign 
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currency derivatives account for 42.55%, while 2495 firm-observations are using interest rate 
derivatives. 
(INSERT TABLE 6.1 HERE) 
In Panel B, we present the information about the use of particular types of financial 
derivatives for both derivative users and non-users. Our sample has a mean value of foreign 
currency derivative contracts is about $245.11 million, and the average notional amount of 
interest rate derivatives is $328 million. These numbers speak themselves that while foreign 
currency derivatives are the most commonly used instruments; non-financial firms in East Asian 
countries use interest rate derivative contracts with greater value for hedging purposes.  
Panel C exhibits the trend of derivatives use across the entire sample firm over time. There 
is obvious change in the use of derivatives before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. In particular, derivatives usage increase remarkably after 2009 in response to the crisis, 
which is shown by the number of foreign currency derivatives users in post-crisis period is 
46.08% compared to 36.71% in the pre-crisis period. 
6.4. Models for investigating association between the use of derivatives and exposures, and 
variable construction 
6.4.1. Measuring dependent variables and empirical specifications 
In this paper, we apply the two-stage approach, which is similar to recent papers in this area 
(e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Clark and Mefteh, 2011; Zhou and Wang, 2013; Berghofer and 
Lucey, 2014). The dependent variables are exposures to country risks, exchange rate risk, and 
interest rate risk, i.e. the coefficients that are estimated by the market model29 in the first stage. 
                                                     
29 Market model is developed by Adler and Dumas (1984), and augmented by Jorion (1990) 
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In the second stage, we conduct econometric regressions with the exposure coefficients 
estimated in the first stage as the dependent variables. 
6.4.1.1. Stage one: Exposure estimation 
We use the total monthly sample from January 2003 to December 2013 to estimate 
augmented market model (cross-sectional) regressions including returns on country risks, 
exchange rates, and interest rates30. For individual firms, we calculate stock returns in USD, the 
USD returns of corresponding national stock market index, the percentage change in trade 
weighted effective exchange rate (in local currency relative to one unit of USD), interest rates 
and country risks. We use 1 year Interbank offered rate, which is compounded monthly, in each 
country obtained from Datastream as proxy for interest rate. We use the average scores for 
sovereign risk, currency risk, banking sector risk, and economic structure risk of each country on 
a scale from 0 (minimum risk) to 100 (maximum risk), which is obtained from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit to measure country risk. In particular, we estimate for each firm in the 
following equations: 
                                  Rijt= β0i + β1ijtRmjt + β2ijtCRjt + εijt                               (6.1)  
                                  Rijt= 0i + 1ijtRmjt + β3ijtFXjt + εijt                               (6.2)  
                                  Rijt= γ0i + γ1ijtRmjt + β4ijtIRjt + εijt                                  (6.3) 
i = 1,..,n; j= 1 – 8, t = 1,.., k        
Where: 
Rijt: The rate of return on stock of firm i located in country j in period t 
Rmjt: The rate of return on country j’s benchmark stock index in period t 
CRjt: The rate of change in country j’s overall risk index in period t 
                                                     
30 Daily and wekly data is noisier and usually are afflicted by nonsynchroneity problems (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) 
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FXjt: The rate of change in trade weighted effective exchange rate in country j in 
period t 
IRjt: The rate of change in Interbank offered rate in country j in period t 
β2ijt: Exposure to country risk of firm i located in country j in period t 
β3ijt: Exchange rate exposure of firm i located in country j in period t 
β4ijt: Interest rate exposure of firm i located in country j in period t 
εitt: Error term clustered by country 
The coefficients β2ijt, β3ijt, and β4ijt represent exposures to country risks, exchange rate, and 
interest rate, respectively. The exposure to exchange rate measures the percentage change in the 
rate of return on a firm’s common stock against a 1% change in the exchange rate (Allayannis, 
and Ofek, 2001). Similar to the exchange rate exposure, the exposure to country risk and to 
interest rate measures the percentage change in the rate of return on a firm’s common stock 
against a 1% change in country risks, and 1% change in the interest rate, respectively. 
6.4.1.2. Stage two: Model estimated exposures 
In the second stage, potential effects of firms’ derivatives use on exposure to country risks, 
and impacts of the use of specific derivative types on equivalent exposures will be investigated. 
In particular, absolute values of the estimated exposure coefficients in the equations (6.1), (6.2), 
(6.3) act as dependent variables in multivariate analysis31. In testing the above stated hypotheses, 
our baseline models can be written in condensed forms in equations (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6) as 
below 
                                                     
31 In the multivariate tests, we use absolute rather than actual estimated exposures because the sign of exposures just 
measures the direction of risk exposures, while the magnitude of exposures are more important (Faff and Marshall, 
2005) 
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|?̂?2ijt|  = 0 + 1DERijt + ∑ 𝜶𝒌𝒕=𝟏 𝑽𝒊𝒋𝒕  + εijt                                       (6.4)       
|?̂?3ijt| = γ0 + γ1FCDijt + ∑ 𝜸𝒋𝑿𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒌
𝒕=𝟏  + εijt                                              (6.5) 
|?̂?4ijt| = θ0 + θ1IRDijt + ∑ 𝜽𝒕𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒌
𝒕=𝟏  + εijt                                   (6.6) 
          i =1…n, j = 1- 8,  t = 2003-2013 
Where: 
|?̂?2ijt|, |?̂?3ijt|, |?̂?4ijt|: Absolute values of exposures to country risks, exchange rate risks, 
and interest rate risks estimated from equations (6.1), (6.2), and (6.3) of firm i located 
in country j in year t, respectively 
DERijt, FCDijt, IRDijt: General derivative, foreign currency, interest rate derivative 
intensity of firm i located in country j in year t, measured by notional amount of 
derivative contracts scaled by total assets, respectively 
Vijt, Xijt, Yijt: Vector of firm- and country-specific variables in year t, including 
operational hedging, international involvement, firm size, leverage, and country-level 
variables (GDP per capita, financial system deposits to GDP, and rule of law) 
εijt: Error terms clustered by country  
In our initial tests, we use pooled regression model for equations from (6.4) to (6.6) with the 
subsamples of domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. To control for unobserved 
time-varying effects and measure within-country and within-industry differences in the effect of 
derivatives use on exposures, we use country, industry and year dummies. Furthermore, it is 
likely that standard errors are inflated due to dependence at the firm level at a pooled cross-
section regression, so we employ clustering method, which is developed by Rogers (1993) to 
adjust for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of standard errors.  
 175 
We then assess robustness of our results by carrying out additional investigations. First, we 
acknowledge that the observed relationship is possible to be subject to endogeneity. To address 
this concern, we implement instrumental variable (IV) model. Second, we carry out panel data 
regressions with random effect specification to estimate equations from 6.4 to 6.6. Although the 
regression results from both fixed effect and random effect specifications are comparable, the 
Hausman (1978) test shows a preference for the random effect model over the fixed effect 
model. 
6.4.2. Independent variable – the use of derivatives 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) state that the ideal measure of derivative usage is hedging 
ratio of contracts being used for managing risk. According to this argument, we measure hedging 
activity by derivative intensity rather than derivative dummy variable as this method provides a 
direct view about effect of derivatives usage on exposures. Following prior studies (e.g. Aabo 
and Ploeen, 2014; Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014) we limit ourselves to analysis of notional 
values as in general fair values do not reflect the amount that has been secured through a 
contract.  
We then construct derivative intensity by using notional amount of derivatives scaled by 
firm size. Consistent with the literature, we use the natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
to proxy for firm size (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Lievenbruck 
and Schmid, 2014). In case a firm is not considered a derivative user, we set the notional 
derivative value to zero. This derivative intensity is censored at zero by construction. Further, in 
this study, we classify derivatives by underlying assets and investigate general derivatives use 
including foreign currency, interest rate, and commodity price derivatives, and two specific 
types: foreign currency, and interest rate derivatives. 
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6.4.3. Control variables 
1. Operational hedging: Empirical research documents that many firms actively manage 
exposures to market risks though the use of operational hedging (e.g., Choi and Jiang, 2009; 
Pantzalis et al., 2001; Berghofer and Lucey, 2014), as Pantzalis et al. (2001) argue that operating 
exchange rate exposure could be best managed by operational hedging. Taking into 
consideration of the extensive use of operational hedging and its potential effects on exposures, it 
is necessary to control for operational hedging in trying to understand firms’ exposures. In this 
study, we use dummy variable GEOMARKT, which has a value of one for firms that have sale 
markets in foreign countries, and zero otherwise, as a measure for geographic diversification. In 
addition, we control for effect of industrial diversification on exposures by using diversification 
dummy, which equals one for firms operating in more than one business segment in the SIC 
industry classification, and zero otherwise.  
2. International involvement: It is well established in the existing literature that foreign sale 
ratios are important determinants of exposures (Jorion, 1990; Bodnar and Wong, 2000; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) as they indicate that firms with large proportion of foreign sales tend 
to be more exposed to market risks. Following Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we use the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales, denoted as FORSALES, to measure a firm’s degree of international 
involvement in this study. We expect that it is positively associated to exposures. 
(INSERT TABLE 6.2 HERE) 
3. Firm size: Previous studies have identified that smaller firms are more subject to market 
risk exposures than larger firms (Pantzalis et al., 2001; Choi and Jiang, 2009; Hutson and 
Stevenon, 2010). Early studies (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand, 1997) argue that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives because of economies of 
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scale. Recent empirical studies find that firms operating across more countries face less exchange 
exposure (Pantzalis et al., 2001), and MNCs are associated with smaller and less significant 
exchange rate exposures than non-MNCs (Choi and Jiang, 2009). Therefore, we use the natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets as a proxy for firm size, and expect a negative effect for 
firm size.  
4. Leverage: The extent to which a firm is exposed to market risks has been shown to 
depend on leverage (He and Ng, 1998). There are at least two reasons for it. First, highly levered 
firms have more incentive to use derivatives, because the use of derivatives reduces expected 
financial distress and bankruptcy costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 
1993). Second, He and Ng (1998) find that a firm with high leverage ratio tends to have smaller 
exposures. We therefore use the ratio of total debts to total assets as our definition of leverage 
and hypothesize a negative relationship between leverage and exposures. 
5. Country-level control variables: We control for country effects and country’s time 
invariant characteristics by using GDP per capita to proxy for relative performance of the 
countries, and financial system deposits to GDP, which is defined as demand, time, saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP, to proxy for 
financial market development. These variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. An increase in GDP per capita and financial system deposits to GDP 
gestures growth in the economy and tends to signal a reduction in market risks. Thus, a negative 
relationship between exposures and these variables is expected. Additionally, Hutson and 
Stevenon (2010) find a significant negative link between a firm’s exposure and the extent of 
creditor protection in the country where firms are operating. Thus, we use rule of law, which 
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measures the quality of law enforcement, to proxy for country-governance quality. It is retrieved 
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
6.5. Empirical results and analysis 
6.5.1. Univariate results 
Table 6.3 displays the benchmark exposure estimation of equations (6.1), (6.2), (6.3) and 
summary statistics for the data used in this study, divided by domestic firms (panel A), domestic 
MNCs (panel B), and foreign affiliates (panel C) in accordance with the classification discussed 
above. While the results in table 6.3 only present general derivatives, the tests also are 
implemented separately for foreign currency derivatives, and interest rate derivatives, and 
differences are mentioned in the text where appropriate.  
(INSERT TABLE 6.3 HERE) 
In this section, our first interest is comparing the estimated exposures to country risks, 
exchange rate, and interest rate risks that each type of firm faces. The means of exposure 
coefficients reported in the second column show that domestic firms have the highest overall 
exposures, while domestic MNCs have smaller exposures than domestic firms and foreign 
affiliates. In particular, the average exposure to country risks |?̂? 2ijt| of domestic MNCs is 
approximately 25% lower than domestic firms, and about 8% lower than foreign affiliates. 
Likewise, exchange rate and interest rate exposures are smaller and less significant for domestic 
MNCs than other firms. The averages |?̂?3ijt| and |?̂?4ijt| of domestic MNCs are 48.47% and 38.95% 
lower than domestic firms, while they are 33.85% and 74.31%, respectively, lower than foreign 
affiliates. These results provide some support for the Hypothesis 9, and are consistent with Choi 
and Jiang (2009), and Hutson and Laing (2014), who found that MNCs have lower levels of 
exchange rate exposure than non-multinational firms. 
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We then investigate whether the use of derivatives is associated with a reduction in 
exposures by running t-test for differences in means of estimated exposures for derivative users 
and non-users. For domestic firms, as expected, the panel A shows that derivative users have 
lower average exposure to country risks than non-users (0.1484 versus 0.2004). This, however, is 
not statistically significant at any standard level. Yet, we observe that derivative users have both 
lower average exposures to exchange rate and interest rate risks than non-users (0.2012 versus 
0.3442, and 0.5604 versus 0.9068), and the mean differences are both significant (p<0.05, and 
p<0.01).  
For domestic MNCs, the results indicate that derivative users have lower overall exposures 
than non-users – as expected. All exposures of derivatives users represent lower relative to non-
users, and statistically significant differences in means at standard level. Similarly, for foreign 
affiliates, derivative users have lower exposures to country risks and interest rate risks than non-
users. A rather unexpected finding is that derivative users have higher exchange rate exposure 
than non-users. The mean difference, however, is not significant at standard levels. Thus, on a 
univariate basis, the use of derivatives appears to reduce exposures in general. 
Moreover, we examine whether firm-specific resources and capabilities differ across firm 
types and between derivative users and non-users. On the whole, we find that domestic MNCs 
are larger, but they have lower degree of international involvement than domestic firms and 
foreign affiliates. On the other hand, we observe that derivative users are larger, lower levered, 
and have higher level of international involvement than non-users as shown by firm size, 
leverage and foreign sales to total sales. The univariate tests are robust to analyzing the use of 
derivatives separately on exchange rate and interest rate derivatives. 
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6.5.2. Multivariate analysis 
6.5.2.1. Exposures and derivatives use on the comparison of domestic firms, domestic 
MNCs, and foreign affiliates 
In terms of exposure to country risks in the panel A, we find some interesting results. For 
domestic firms, we observe that derivatives use variable is significant and negatively related to 
exposure to country risks ( = -0.114, p< 0.1). It indicates that firms using derivatives reduce 
exposure by 11.4% for each 1% increase in notional value of general derivatives. It is also clear 
that in the case of domestic MNCs, exposure to country risks decreases when the general 
derivatives notional amount increases. Particularly, exposure declines by 13.4% for each 1% 
increase in notional holdings ( = -0.134, p< 0.01), which is higher than domestic firms.  
(INSERT TABLE 6.4 HERE) 
However, for foreign affiliates, we cannot find any evidence supporting a relationship 
between derivatives use and exposures to host country risks, though derivative usage has a 
negative effect on exposure ( = -0.038, p> 0.1). In general, the overall results reported in the 
panel A support the Hypotheses 9 & 8, and our study is one of the first to find that the use of 
financial derivatives significantly alleviate exposure to home country risks, and domestic MNCs 
outperform domestic firms and foreign affiliates in terms of reducing exposures.  
Similar results are found with regard to exchange rate exposure. The findings presented in 
panel B indicate that the use of foreign currency derivatives is inversely associated to exchange 
rate exposure in the case of domestic firms and domestic MNCs (domestic firms = -0.104, p <0.01; 
Domestic MNCs = -0.182, p <0.1). We also notice that derivatives use of foreign affiliates has a 
negative effect on exposure, though it is not significantly different from zero ( = -0.138, p> 
0.1). They are consistent with the notion from prior studies that derivative usage is effective in 
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reducing firms’ exchange rate exposures (e.g., Clark and Mefteh, 2011; Zhou and Wang, 2013; 
Chang, Hsin, and Shiah-Hou, 2013).  
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients show a decrease in the exposure of 10.4% and 
18.2% per 1% increase in notional holding for domestic firms and domestic MNCs, respectively, 
which supports the Hypothesis 9. The findings are in contrast to those of Pantzalis et al. (2001), 
Aggarwal and Harper (2010), who find that domestic firms have similar level of exchange rate 
exposure to MNCs. They are, however, consistent with the view of many international business 
and finance scholars that domestic MNCs can attain higher performance capitalizing on their 
FSAs (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977, Chung et al. 2010; Lee and Rugman, 
2012), and due to their superior ability to engage in financial hedging, which should be able to 
offset some risk exposures they face (Lin, Pantzalis, and Park, 2009; Choi and Jiang, 2009). 
In respect of interest rate exposure, we find that regression results comply with Hypothesis 
7b, insofar as the negative and significant signs on the use of interest rate derivatives show that 
derivative usage has significant impact on mitigating interest rate exposure, irrespective of 
whether firms are domestic firms, domestic MNCs, or foreign affiliates (domestic firms = -0.118, p 
<0.01; Domestic MNCs = -0.190, p <0.1; foreign affiliates  = -0.0307, p <0.1). The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the use of derivatives decreases interest rate exposure by 11.8%, 19%, 
and 3.07% per 1% increase in notional derivative holdings for domestic firms, domestic MNCs, 
and foreign affiliates, respectively, which is consistent with the Hypothesis 9. 
The control variables are found to be generally statistically significant and at the expected 
signs. Exposures show a positive relation with firms’ international involvement as measured by 
FORSALES, and a negative association with firm size and leverage- as expected and in line with 
the previous studies. Meanwhile, a negative link between the development of country and 
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financial system and exposures is also found in the table 6.4. However, operational hedging is 
found to be insignificant in all specifications, which is similar to findings of Kim, Mathur, and 
Nam (2006), Chang et al. (2013).  
6.5.2.2. Exposures and the use of derivatives across firm types in the pre-, during-, and 
post- crisis periods 
We repeat pooled regression models when analysis is conducted separately on three sub-
periods: 2003-2006, 2007-2008, and 2009-2013 in order to examine how effects of derivatives 
use on exposures differ across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates due to 
exogenous shocks caused by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The results are presented in 
the table 6.5. 
(INSERT TABLE 6.5 HERE) 
In terms of exposure to country risks reported in panel A, before the onset of the global 
financial crisis, we observe a significant negative relation between derivatives use and exposure 
to home country risks in the case of domestic firms, and domestic MNCs (domestic firms = -0.0749, 
p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = -0.0936, p <0.01), while estimated coefficient of derivative usage is 
found to be insignificant at any standard level for foreign affiliates, though it is inversely 
associated with exposure to host country risks (foreign affiliates  = -0.0663, p>0.1). It indicates a 
reduction in exposure of 7.49% and 9.39% per 1% increase in notional derivative holdings for 
domestic firms and domestic MNCs, respectively, which supports the Hypotheses 8 and 9. 
During the crisis period, in response to the high volatility in market prices and indexes, 
derivatives users are found to intensify the extent of derivatives use and there is substantial 
increase in the proportion of derivatives users as shown in the table 6.1. However, we can note 
that the global financial crisis seems to be associated with a loss of effectiveness in derivatives 
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hedging. Specifically, we are unable to find evidence that derivatives use significantly reduce 
domestic firms and foreign affiliates’ exposure to country risks (domestic firms = -0.0307, p >0.1; 
foreign affiliates  = -0.0142, p >0.1). Meanwhile, in the case of domestic MNCs, the use of 
derivative shows a significant negative association with exposure to home country risks, but that 
effect is modest ( = -0.0297, p<0.05).  
These findings support the Hypothesis 10, and are consistent with finding of Hutson and 
Laing (2014). One possible explanation is the finding of Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) 
that most of East Asian non-financial firms conduct selective hedging. Thus, in the times of 
financial crisis, market price and indexes are largely unpredictable in the short-term and highly 
increased volatility around the crisis make derivative hedging ineffective for many firms. 
In the period after the global financial crisis, conforming to the Hypothesis 10, the use of 
derivatives is more effective in reducing exposure to country risks, irrespective of domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs, or foreign affiliates. The statistically significant estimated coefficients of 
derivative usage show a decrease in exposure of 10.4%, 14.6%, and 10.74% for each 1% 
increase in notional derivative holdings for domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign 
affiliates, respectively (pdomestic firms <0.1; pDomestic MNCs <0.01; pforeign affiliates <0.1). This finding 
also supports the hypothesis 9 that domestic MNCs with derivative activities reduce higher 
degree of exposure than other firms. 
With regard to exchange rate exposure presented in panel B, we find that regression results 
are somewhat similar to those obtained in the panel A. In the pre-crisis period, foreign currency 
derivative usage of domestic MNCs is negatively associated with exposure ( = -0.114, p<0.05), 
while we are unable to find significant evidence supporting a negative relation between the use 
of derivatives and exchange rate exposures that domestic firms and foreign affiliates face 
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(domestic firms = -0.121, p >0.1; foreign affiliates  = -0.0164, p >0.1). During the crisis period, we also 
notice that the results are consistent with the hypotheses 8 and 10, insofar as domestic MNCs 
using derivatives are shown to reduce exposure by small percent, that is 1.49% ( = -0.0149, 
p<0.1), while derivatives use of domestic firms, and foreign affiliates has a negative effect on 
exposure, but it is not significantly different from zero at any standard level (domestic firms = -
0.0307, p >0.1; foreign affiliates  = -0.0142, p >0.1). In the post crisis period, the results confirm a 
significant negative relation between derivatives use and exposure for all firm types, and the 
outperformance of domestic MNCs in reducing exposures relative to domestic firms and foreign 
affiliates (domestic firms = -0.1426, p <0.1; Domestic MNCs = -0.1781, p <0.01; foreign affiliates  = -
0.0100, p <0.1).  
In respect of interest rate exposure reported in the panel C, the results are different from 
those of panel A and B to some extent, though they conform to the Hypotheses 7b, 8, and 10. 
Before the crisis, the use of interest rate derivative is always strongly significant and negatively 
related to exposure regardless of whether firms are domestic, domestic MNCs, or foreign 
affiliates (domestic firms = -0.1327, p =0.05; Domestic MNCs = -0.157, p <0.01; foreign affiliates  = -
0.0448, p <0.01). During the crisis, derivative hedging is still effective in reducing exposure to 
interest rate risks in the case of domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates (Domestic MNCs = -0.0950, p 
<0.01; foreign affiliates = -0.0127, p <0.01), although it is found to be insignificant at any standard 
level in the case of domestic firms ( = -0.0463, p>0.1). These estimated coefficients show that 
derivatives use’s effect on exposure varies significantly across domestic MNCs, and foreign 
affiliates, and in times of high interest rate volatility around the crisis, benefits of derivative 
usage lessen compared to the previous period. After the crisis, consistent with the findings in the 
table 6.4, we observe a significant negative link between interest rate derivatives usage and 
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exposures in all cases, and there is greater magnitude of reduction in exposure relative to the 
crisis period (domestic firms = -0.0998, p <0.05; Domestic MNCs = -0.1234, p <0.01; foreign affiliates  = -
0.0941, p <0.1). 
6.5.3. Robustness tests 
6.5.3.1. Instrumental variable (IV) model: controlling for potential endogeneity problem 
We notice that in regressions, the use of derivatives and exposures may be endogenously 
determined due to omitted variables and reserve causality. In view of such potential endogeneity 
problem, we undertake the instrumental variable (IV) method similar to Gay et al. (2011), Chang 
et al. (2013), among others. In this approach, derivative intensity is regarded as an endogenous 
variable. The first stage of IV regression is an OLS regression model of derivatives use on all 
explanatory variables in equations 6.4 – 6.6; in the second stage, we apply the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) to obtain efficient estimators for heteroskedasticity. 
(INSERT TABLE 6.6 HERE) 
In the first stage, the choice of instrumental variables, which are potentially related to 
derivatives use, but are unrelated to exposure, is mainly suggested by previous studies on 
hedging theories and those on exposures. Specifically, based on the idea of Campello et al. 
(2011) about a tax-based instrumental approach, we use first difference of tax rate, defined as 
income taxes to pre-tax income, as an instrumental variable. The theoretical research linking 
derivatives use and tax benefits suggest that progressive marginal tax rates, and tax shields such 
as tax credits, tax loss carry forwards are closely related to the decision to hedge (e.g., Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1996, among others). However, tax convexity is a non-linear function of 
taxable income, tax codes, and various tax credits (Campello et al., 2011). Therefore, this 
 186 
measure exhibits characteristics of tax system and structure, eventually lead to an exogenous 
variation to identify the unbiased influence of derivatives use on exposures.  
Furthermore, following Magee (2013), Chang et al. (2013), we use R&D expenditures 
scaled by total sales, first difference of R&D expenditures, and ROA as instrumental variables. 
Hedging theory and many previous empirical studies suggest that firms with substantial R&D 
expense are more likely to hedge (Froot et al., 1993; Géczy et al., 1997; Clark and Judge, 2009; 
Aabo and Ploeen, 2014). A negative relation between ROA and foreign currency hedging is 
found by some studies such as Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009), 
which suggests that the likelihood of financial distress increases for firms that fail to fully hedge. 
On the other hand, R&D expenditure is a proxy for growth opportunity and found to be 
positively related to firm value (Allayannis, Lel, and Miller, 2012; Marami and Dubois, 2013), 
while ROA measures a firm’s profitability and positive association with firm value is found 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001, Belghitar et al, 2013). Thus, they may be unrelated to exposures. 
For conciseness, we only report results of the second-stage IV estimation in the table 6.6. To 
substantiate if the instruments are weak instruments, we estimate Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F 
statistic. The F statistics are always greater than Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value (or greater 
than 10), implying rejection of null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. In addition, the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank LM statistics are strongly significant (p < 0.05, or p < 0.01), 
indicating that the IV model does not have an under-identification problem.  
We observe that our main findings presented in the table 6.4 still hold after accounting for 
potential endogeneity reported in the 2SLS regressions. In panel A for exposure to country risks, 
we observe a significant negative relation between derivatives use and exposure when firms are 
domestic firms ( = -0.0761, p<0.05), or domestic MNCs ( = -0.1654, p<0.01), while in the 
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case of foreign affiliates, the estimated coefficient on derivative use variable is found to be 
insignificant at any standard level ( = -0.0344, p>0.1). In panels B and C, we find conforming 
results with prior section when the analysis is conducted separately on exposure to exchange rate 
and interest rate risks. The coefficients on foreign currency derivatives in panel B for domestic 
firms and domestic MNCs are -0.1498 (p<0.1) and -0.1558 (p<0.05), but it is not different from 
zero at any conventional significance level for foreign affiliates ( = -0.167, p>0.1). In panel C, 
we note that there is a significant inverse relationship between the use of interest rate derivatives 
and interest rate exposure regardless of firm types (domestic firms = -0.125, p <0.05; Domestic MNCs = 
-0.1667, p <0.05; foreign affiliates  = -0.0910, p <0.01).  
6.5.3.2. Additional test: random effects model 
In this section, we conduct panel data regressions with random effect specification in 
analyzing the impact of derivatives use on exposures from different aspects. The results are 
presented in table 6.7. 
(INSERT TABLE 6.7 HERE) 
For domestic firms, the estimated coefficients on general derivative, foreign currency, and 
interest rate derivative intensities are significantly negative at -0.1104, -0.1010, and -0.1630 (p < 
0.1, p < 0.01, and p <0.05), respectively, indicating that in all cases the use of derivatives 
contributes to an reduction in exposures to home country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate 
risks. For foreign affiliates, we obtain the findings very similar to those found in table 7.4, in 
which only coefficient on the use of interest rate derivatives is significantly inverse to interest 
rate exposure ( = -0.0307, p<0.1), while we fail to find any significant evidence supporting a 
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negative link between derivatives use and exposures to host country risks and exchange rate 
exposures (in panel A = 0.2559, p >0.1; in panel B = -0.138, p >0.1). 
For domestic MNCs, similar findings to those found in table 6.4 are observed as we again 
evidence that general derivatives use, the use of foreign currency, and interest rate derivatives 
separately are associated with lower degrees of equivalent types of exposures (in panel A = -
0.1430, p <0.01; in panel B = -0.1311, p <0.1; in panel C  = -0.1750, p <0.05). We also notice that 
the estimated coefficients on derivatives use for domestic MNCs are larger in magnitude than 
domestic firms and foreign affiliates, conforming to findings in the previous section that the 
negative relation between derivatives use and exposures is strongest for domestic MNCs. 
In short, the overall results of robustness tests altogether indicate that our main inferences 
are mostly robust after controlling for endogeneity issue, and using various regression 
specifications. 
6.6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the impacts of derivatives use on multifaceted exposures 
including exposures to home/host country risks, exchange rate exposure, and interest rate 
exposure by utilizing a large unique hand-collected data set containing information of derivatives 
activities of non-financial firms in eight East Asian countries over the period of 2003-2013. To 
our knowledge so far, this study is one of the first to explore that dynamic relationship on the 
comparison of different firm types: domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates.  
The primary theoretical contribution of this study is to apply the market model into 
estimating exposures to home and host country risks. As such, we demonstrate how country risk 
exposures can be measured using well-know linear regression techniques, and in the way 
conforming to the interests of policy-makers, stockholders, investors, and analysts. The concept 
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that exposure to country risks can be measured as a regression coefficient should hold good 
attraction for that group, as firms are not free from country risks, efforts must be made by each 
firm to approximate and quantify their exposure. 
The first and major empirical contribution of this research is to provide strong evidence that 
the use of financial derivatives by domestic firms and domestic MNCs significantly contribute to 
a decline in exposure to home country risks at the rate of 11.4% to 13.4% per 1% increase in 
notional derivative holdings, respectively. Yet, financial hedging of foreign affiliates cannot 
reduce exposure to host country risks. These findings are robust after accounting for endogeneity 
and many specifications. 
We then complement and shed new light on the current literature on hedging when we 
evidence the outperformance of domestic MNCs in reducing exposures to exchange rate and 
interest rate risks vis-à-vis domestic firms and foreign affiliates. We first reports that derivative 
users have, on average, a lower degree of exposures than non-users; and domestic MNCs have 
smaller exposures to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks relative to domestic 
firms and foreign affiliates. In all models we find observed reductions in exposures is more 
striking for domestic MNCs, while domestic firms using derivatives experience smaller decline 
in their exposures, and the use of derivatives by foreign affiliates is only able to reduce interest 
rate exposure.  
Additionally, we provide new insights into firms’ hedging activities when there is 
exogenous shock by taking into consideration the global financial crisis. We observe that the 
financial crisis with unexpected high volatility in market prices and indexes lessens benefits from 
derivatives use. Domestic firms and foreign affiliates are unable to reduce exposures to country 
risks, and exchange rate risks, while domestic MNCs experience moderate reduction in 
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exposures. However, we find the strongest negative association between derivatives use and 
exposures for all firms in the post-crisis. 
Our study also has direct practical and meaningful implications for firms’ managers on 
decision regarding capital structure. In particular, the research provides new evidence that in East 
Asian countries, besides the effectiveness of domestic firms and domestic MNCs’ derivatives use 
in reducing exposures to home country risks, and exchange rate risks, regardless of firm type, a 
firm’s exposure to interest rate movements is mitigated to varied degrees, ranging from 3.07% to 
19% for each 1% increase in notional derivative holdings. These findings suggest that firms 
could influence cost of capital in particular, and capital structure in general by the use of 
financial derivatives, thus firm managers better perform the important tasks of strategic capital 
planning and managing risks. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of derivatives use of sample firms 
This table shows the number of firms and the percentage of firms that use derivatives. We present derivatives users separately for any 
derivatives, foreign currency derivatives (FCD), and interest rate derivatives (IRD). Panel A presents derivatives use based on firm-year 
observations by country. Panel B reports the information about the use of derivatives by derivative users, non-users and notional value of 
derivatives contracts. Panel C shows the trend of derivatives use over time. 
 
Panel A: Derivatives use by country 
Countries             Total      Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives 
        N                N %           N            %                N    % 
Indonesia 429 158 36.83 122 28.44 111 25.87 
Philippines 352 352 100.00 139 39.49 99 28.12 
Singapore 1639 651 39.72 735 44.98 434 26.58 
Japan 1661 1661 100.00 1293 78.22 1020 61.71 
Hong Kong 1606 382 23.79 350 21.88 265 16.56 
Malaysia 1760 669 38.01 661 37.58 219 12.46 
China 1111 179 16.11 202 18.20 100 9.01 
Thailand 1133 1133 100.00 613 54.10 247 21.84 
Total 9691 5185 53.50 4115 42.55 2495 25.81 
Panel B: Firms’ derivatives use information    
 Observations             Mean      Standard Deviation 
Notional value of FCD 8842     245118.4                                        2121091 
Notional value of IRD 9095     328000.5                                        4793611 
Notional value of any derivative 6070     339721.1                                        4300822 
Panel C: Derivatives use by year 
Years             Total      Any derivatives Foreign currency derivatives Interest rate derivatives 
                N               N %           N            %                N    % 
2003-2006     3524           1752 49.72         1293 36.71          782 22.20 
2007-2008          881         477 54.14       387 43.98          225 25.57 
2009-2013      4405             2462 55.89         2021 46.06            1261 28.77 
Total     9691           5185 53.50            4115 42.55             2495 25.81 
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Table 6.2: Definitions of variables 
This table defines the dependent and independent variables, and control variables that we examine 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Dependent variables  
|?̂?2ijt| Absolute value of exposure to country risks estimated from equation 
(7.1) of firm i located in country j in year t 
Authors’ 
estimation 
|?̂?3ijt| Absolute value of exposure exchange rate risks estimated from equation 
(7.2) of firm i located in country j in year t 
Authors’ 
estimation 
|?̂?4ijt| Absolute value of exposure to interest rate risks estimated from 
equation (7.3) of firm i located in country j in year t 
Authors’ 
estimation 
Main independent variables  
DER General derivative intensity (notional value of derivatives contracts in 
thousand USD / total assets) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
FCD Foreign currency (FC) derivative intensity (notional value of FC 
derivatives contracts in thousand USD / total assets) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
IRD Interest rate (IR) derivative intensity (notional value of IR derivatives 
contracts in thousand USD / total assets) 
Authors’ 
calculation 
Control variables   
Firm size Natural logarithm of market value of total assets scaled by Producer 
price index (PPI) 
Datastream 
Leverage Total debt to total assets Datastream 
FORSALES Foreign sales to total sales  Datastream 
GEOMARKT Dummy variable which has a value of one for firms that have sale 
markets in foreign countries, and zero otherwise 
Authors’ 
construction 
Industrial 
diversification 
Dummy variable which equals one for firms operating in more than one 
business segment in the SIC industry classification, and zero otherwise 
Authors’ 
construction 
GDP per capita Gross domestic products (GDP) / midyear population World Bank 
Financial system 
deposits to GDP 
The demand, time, saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP 
World Bank 
Rule of law Index measuring the confidence of agents in and abide by the rules of 
society, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights with -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
World Bank 
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics: Derivatives users versus non-users 
This table presents a summary statistics of characteristics between firms using derivatives and those firms do not. Panel A reports 
summary statistics for the variables for the domestic firms that use either foreign currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives or 
commodity price derivatives (derivative users) and firms that do not (derivatives non-users). Panel B displays the mean, standard 
deviation for variables of domestic MNCs only separately for derivatives users and non-users. Panel C presents these values for 
foreign affiliates only. P-values for testing the difference in mean are also reported. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  General derivatives use 
Variables 
All firms Users Non-users Difference in means 
P- value 
Obs       Mean Mean      Mean Non-users – Users 
Panel A: Domestic firm            
β country risks 3959 0.1761 0.1484 0.2004 0.0521 0.161 
β FX risks 3959 0.2772 0.2012 0.3442 0.1429 0.022** 
β IR risks 3959 0.7445 0.5604 0.9068 0.3463 0.007*** 
Firm size 4218 5.4300 5.7169 5.1739 -0.5430 0.000*** 
Leverage 4237 25.016 23.823 26.072 2.2484 0.309 
FORSALES 2952 41.836 42.566 41.147 -1.4191 0.323 
GEOMART 3787 0.5147 0.5014 0.5263 0.0249 0.124 
Diversification indicator 4158 0.3942 0.4035 0.3857 -0.0177 0.241 
Panel B: Domestic MNCs           
β country risks 4390 0.1405 0.1324 0.1495 0.0169 0.311** 
β FX risks 4390 0.1867 0.1681 0.2074 0.0393 0.431* 
β IR risks 4390 0.5358 0.4310 0.6528 0.2217 0.017** 
Firm size 4603 6.3791 7.0131 5.6861 -1.326 0.000*** 
Leverage 4620 23.754 22.890 24.697 1.8069 0.137 
FORSALES 3219 31.995 32.842 30.830 -2.0124 0.091* 
GEOMART 4368 0.7704 0.7850 0.7549 -0.0300 0.018** 
Diversification indicator 4565 0.5301 0.5454 0.5131 -0.0322 0.068* 
Panel C: Foreign affiliates           
β country risks 679 0.1523 0.1337 0.1462 0.0325 0.043 
β FX risks 679 0.2499 0.2513 0.2488 -0.0024 0.967 
β IR risks 679 0.9340 0.8793 0.9749 0.0956 0.766** 
Firm size 704 5.4215 5.6719 5.2502 -0.4216 0.015** 
Leverage 702 29.937 24.466 33.699 9.2331 0.431 
FORSALES 507 34.418 36.440 32.752 -3.688 0.245 
GEOMART 675 0.6592 0.6212 0.6836 0.0624 0.098* 
Diversification indicator 704 0.4218 0.3298 0.4866 0.1567 0.000*** 
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Table 6.4: Exposures and derivatives use 
This table reports the effects of derivatives use on exposures across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates 
from pooled regression models split up with regard to exposure to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks. The 
dependent variable are absolute values of exposures to country risks |?̂?2ijt| (panel A), exchange rate risks |?̂?3ijt| (panel B), and 
interest rate risks |?̂?4ijt| (panel C). DER is the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousand USD scaled by total 
assets. FCD is the notional value of foreign currency derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional 
value of interest rate derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are 
reported in Table 6.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-
values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables      Domestic firms    Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Panel A: Exposure to country risks           
DER -0.114* (0.058) -0.134*** (0.007) -0.038 (0.343) 
Firm size -1.239 (0.482) -0.776** (0.018) -0.494 (0.251) 
Leverage -0.034 (0.477) -0.0386 (0.686) 0.069 (0.373) 
FORSALES 0.068 (0.215) 0.0563* (0.073) 0.096** (0.029) 
GEOMART -0.368 (0.570) -0.295 (0.204) 0.142 (0.963) 
Diversification indicator -0.288 (0.359) -0.347 (0.126) -0.820 (0.780) 
GDP per capita 0.568 (0.946) 0.121 (0.136) 0.629** (0.011) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.819*** (0.006) -0.116 (0.130) -0.073* (0.083) 
Rule of law 4.911 (0.853) 10.58 (0.528) -0.388* (0.051) 
Intercept 20.21 (0.860) -148.8 (0.196) -958.7** (0.012) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 2007 
 
1136 
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 R-square 0.323 
 
0.256 
 
0.404 
 Panel B: FX exposures           
FCD -0.104*** (0.000) -0.182* (0.051) -0.138 (0.917) 
Firm size -0.1456* (0.056) -0.188 (0.111) -0.163 (0.347) 
Leverage -0.0101 (0.500) -0.0416* (0.086) 0.051 (0.312) 
FORSALES 0.0107 (0.778) 0.0326 (0.377) 0.034 (0.875) 
GEOMART 0.238 (0.919) -0.0313 (0.347) 0.1491 (0.547) 
Diversification indicator 0.165 (0.404) -0.0414 (0.146) 0.1297 (0.933) 
GDP per capita 0.126*** (0.006) 0.202* (0.070) 0.3659 (0.156) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.410*** (0.010) -0.0462*** (0.009) -0.197*** (0.002) 
Rule of law -0.306* (0.079) 0.160 (0.482) -0.4365 (0.691) 
Intercept -214.9*** (0.002) -2.645* (0.072) -3335.6 (0.167) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 1053 
 
1250 
 
410 
 R-square 0.225 
 
0.290 
 
0.308 
 Panel C: IR exposures           
IRD -0.118*** (0.005) -0.190* (0.051) -0.0307* (0.087) 
Firm size -0.0196 (0.364) -0.0832* (0.061) -0.0596 (0.107) 
Leverage -0.0254** (0.038) -0.0143 (0.308) -0.0327** (0.045) 
FORSALES 0.0736** (0.041) 0.0682 (0.727) 0.0780 (0.846) 
GEOMART 0.0205 (0.934) -0.253 (0.346) 0.265 (0.419) 
Diversification indicator 0.134 (0.630) -0.100 (0.373) -0.321 (0.290) 
GDP per capita -0.119 (0.905) -1.639 (0.234) -1.729 (0.509) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.0445* (0.059) -0.0226** (0.013) -0.0465*** (0.000) 
Rule of law -0.5790 (0.173) -0.1654 (0.148) -0.3139 (0.197) 
Intercept -5.395 (0.618) -15.50 (0.220) 21.97 (0.583) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 591 
 
2398 
 
430 
 R-square 0.326  0.278  0.362  
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Table 6.5:  Exposures and derivatives usage before, after, and during the global financial crisis 
This table reports the effects of derivatives use on exposures across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates before, after and during the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 from pooled regression models split up with regard to exposure to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate 
risks. The dependent variable are absolute values of exposures to country risks |?̂?2ijt| (panel A), exchange rate risks |?̂?3ijt| (panel B), and interest rate 
risks |?̂?4ijt| (panel C). DER is the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousand USD scaled by total assets. FCD is the notional value of foreign 
currency derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional value of interest rate derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total 
assets. All other independent variables definitions are reported in Table 6.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables 
Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-13 2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2013  2003-2006 2007-2008 2009-2013 
 Panel A: Exposure to country risks 
DER -0.0749*    -0.0307 -0.104*   -0.0936*** -0.0297** -0.146*** -0.0663  -0.0142 -0.1074*   
 
(0.096)    (0.264) (0.064)    (0.003)    (0.023) (0.009)    (0.179)    (0.161) (0.055)    
Leverage -0.148    -0.0344 0.0236*** -0.0161**  0.0290 -0.0396    -0.0526*** 0.0585*** -0.00117    
 
(0.288)    (0.775) (0.003)    (0.026)    (0.306) (0.814)    (0.006)    (0.005) (0.947)    
FORSALES 0.135    0.431* 0.0653    0.0188**  0.0306** 0.0869    -0.0522    -0.0960 -0.0920    
 
(0.447)    (0.100) (0.186)    (0.015)    (0.035) (0.246)    (0.986)    (0.182) (0.353)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.4906**  -0.0118* -0.0175    -0.109    -1.202 0.0793*** 0.0656    -0.0925*** -0.0796    
 
(0.014)    (0.093) (0.131)    (0.228)    (0.124) (0.002)    (0.201)    (0.004) (0.295)    
Intercept -1211.2    241.9 -34.63*   -46.33    50.48 -2.664**  -6.775    -0.109 10.54    
 
(0.553)    (0.163) (0.054)    (0.565)    (0.117) (0.018)    (0.443)    (0.938) (0.975)    
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 566    104 511    633    228 1214    110    41 191    
R-square 0.243    0.252 0.147    0.364    0.396 0.435    0.610    0.763 0.354    
Panel B: FX exposures 
FCD -0.121 -0.0136 -0.1426*   -0.114**  -0.0149*    -0.1781*** -0.0164 -0.0454 -0.0100*   
 
(0.483) (0.761) (0.058)    (0.018)    (0.081)    (0.000) (0.484) (0.128) (0.068)    
Leverage -0.0314 -0.0343* -0.0221    0.0206 0.0409 -0.0125    -0.0438    -0.0106 -0.0625*** 
 
(0.104) (0.0723) (0.826)    (0.558) (0.529) (0.315)    (0.127)    (0.627) (0.000)    
FORSALES 0.7375* 0.159 0.5024    0.0527 0.0111 0.107    0.0416*    0.2317*** 0.3492*   
 
(0.096) (0.520) (0.130)    (0.886) (0.990) (0.426)    (0.092)    (0.006) (0.054)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.1600** -0.225* -0.898*   -0.0971* -0.0182* -0.0638*   -0.0364    -0.0294 -0.1270*   
 
(0.022) (0.069) (0.079)    (0.098) (0.061) (0.087)    (0.563)    (0.322) (0.068)    
Intercept -567.4* 6.836 -806.0    -15.23*** 1.473** -7.590    -6.106**    3.370* 3426.4*** 
 
(0.064) (0.770) (0.540)    (0.004) (0.016) (0.340)    (0.045)    (0.073) (0.004)    
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 331 107 1413    863 107 1601    110    41 220    
R-square 0.223 0.241 0.332    0.475 0.859 0.435    0.737    0.384 0.549    
Panel C: IR exposures                   
IRD 0.1327** -0.0463 -0.0998**  -0.157*** -0.0950*** -0.1234*** -0.0448*** -0.0127*** 0.0941*   
 
(0.050) (0.987) (0.042)    (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.055)    
Leverage -0.0534 0.139 0.0104    -0.0604 0.0448 -0.0386*   0.0421 -0.0731 0.0626    
 
(0.381) (0.340) (0.838)    (0.594) (0.572) (0.069)    (0.102) (0.989) (0.404)    
FORSALES 0.0316 0.332* 0.0847**  0.0499 0.0583** 0.0143    0.0273*** 0.0943 -0.0181    
 
(0.796) (0.085) (0.013)    (0.547) (0.013) (0.617)    (0.004) (0.318) (0.301)    
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.0374 -0.592*** -0.0110*** -0.0811* 0.0503 -0.0181**  -0.0785 -0.0943** 0.0820    
 
(0.500) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.095) (0.143) (0.011)    (0.173) (0.015) (0.373)    
Intercept -5.610 185.2 4.240    -0.217 1.818*** 0.968    -27.24 -0.256 95.21    
 
(0.432) (0.110) (0.309)    (0.449) (0.002) (0.661)    (0.915) (0.865) (0.487)    
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 195 199 329    752 75 1215    46 40 193    
R-square 0.254 0.473 0.366    0.329 0.428 0.472    0.969 0.795 0.543    
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Table 6.6: Instrumental variable (IV) model 
This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on exposures across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates from 
instrumental variable models (IV) split up with regard to exposure to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks. The 
dependent variable are absolute values of exposures to country risks |?̂?2ijt| (panel A), exchange rate risks |?̂?3ijt| (panel B), and interest 
rate risks |?̂?4ijt| (panel C). DER is the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousand USD scaled by total assets. FCD is the 
notional value of foreign currency derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional value of interest rate 
derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are reported in Table 6.2. Standard 
errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Panel A: Exposure to country risks           
DER -0.0761** (0.038) -0.1654*** (0.003) -0.0344 (0.508) 
Firm size 0.0444 (0.224) -0.855*** (0.002) -0.0134*** (0.001) 
Leverage 0.0341 (0.432) -0.0126 (0.221) -0.0119 (0.362) 
FORSALES 0.0162** (0.029) 0.0362*** (0.000) -0.0285 (0.586) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.0347 (0.279) -0.0333** (0.019) 0.0112 (0.938) 
Rule of law 0.0190 (0.321) -0.2870** (0.027) 0.0180 (0.924) 
Intercept 4.453*** (0.000) -5.468** (0.035) -9.510*** (0.001) 
Other control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic   132.00 
 
49.16 
 
125.13 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.0064 
 
0.0291 
 
0.0042 
 No of observations 1437 
 
965 
 
241 
 R-square 0.210 
 
-0.249 
 
0.172 
 Panel B: FX exposures        
FCD -0.1498* (0.063) -0.1558** (0.022) -0.167 (0.915) 
Firm size -0.4228 (0.215) -0.0736*** (0.000) -0.065 (0.970) 
Leverage -0.0315 (0.682) 0.0505 (0.952) -0.092* (0.058) 
FORSALES -0.241 (0.177) -0.0323 (0.763) -0.0514 (0.111) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.100 (0.102) 0.0605 (0.358) 0.0114 (0.366) 
Rule of law 0.1592 (0.111) -0.161** (0.036) -0.146 (0.328) 
Intercept -108.4 (0.369) -11.398** (0.024) -5.136*** (0.002) 
Other control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic   121.54 
 
141.79 
 
127.13 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.0039 
 
0.0071 
 
0.0423 
 No of observations 1025 
 
1173 
 
243 
 R-square -0.167 
 
-23.611 
 
-0.112 
 Panel C: IR exposures        
IRD -0.125** (0.033) -0.1667** (0.043) -0.0910*** (0.000) 
Firm size -0.0707 (0.256) -1.225** (0.025) -0.0462 (0.110) 
Leverage -0.0258 (0.154) -0.0356** (0.029) -0.0119* (0.061) 
FORSALES 0.0184 (0.495) -0.0107 (0.263) -0.0170 (0.473) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.0404** (0.020) -0.0471** (0.041) -0.0315 (0.249) 
Rule of law -0.279*** (0.009) -1.750 (0.245) 0.280 (0.366) 
Intercept -1.185 (0.193) -12.43 (0.162) 3.418*** (0.000) 
Other control variables Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic   142.23 
 
55.71 
 
122.09 
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 0.0061 
 
0.0308 
 
0.0002 
 No of observations 426 
 
1853 
 
238 
 R-square 0.218  -0.306  0.337  
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Table 6.7: Random effects model 
This table presents the impacts of derivatives use on on exposures across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign 
affiliates from random effects models split up with regard to exposure to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks. 
The dependent variable are absolute values of exposures to country risks |?̂?2ijt| (panel A), exchange rate risks |?̂?3ijt| (panel B), 
and interest rate risks |?̂?4ijt| (panel C). DER is the notional value of any derivative contracts in thousand USD scaled by total 
assets. FCD is the notional value of foreign currency derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. IRD is the notional 
value of interest rate derivatives in thousand USD scaled by total assets. All other independent variables definitions are 
reported in Table 6.2. Standard errors are clustered by country to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. P-
values are in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables Domestic firms Domestic MNCs Foreign affiliates 
Panel A: Country risks 
DER -0.1104* (0.087) -0.1430*** (0.005) 0.0259 (0.585) 
Firm size -0.1391 (0.470) -0.302* (0.073) -0.645 (0.102) 
Leverage -0.0346 (0.401) 0.0449 (0.563) -0.0343** (0.024) 
FORSALES 0.068* (0.065) 0.0108 (0.536) 0.0707** (0.049) 
GEOMART 0.3688 (0.468) 0.2841 (0.111) -0.2539 (0.334) 
Diversification indicator -0.2883 (0.361) 0.2369* (0.088) -0.0984 (0.965) 
GDP per capita 0.568** (0.046) -0.1033 (0.457) -0.0302 (0.976) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.819 (0.340) -0.120** (0.038) -0.0689** (0.039) 
Rule of law 0.4911 (0.912) 0.1339 (0.536) -0.6676** (0.021) 
Intercept 20.21 (0.859) 189.8 (0.349) 3.372 (0.786) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 2007 
 
2506 
 
438 
 Panel B: FX exposures 
FCD -0.1010*** (0.007) -0.1311* (0.088) -0.138 (0.957) 
Firm size -0.2095*** (0.003) -0.0178* (0.066) -0.1636* (0.057) 
Leverage -0.0778 (0.604) -0.0395* (0.056) 0.0515 (0.868) 
FORSALES 0.0258 (0.335) 0.0391 (0.476) 0.0340 (0.949) 
GEOMART -0.767 (0.631) -0.0323 (0.435) 0.1491 (0.516) 
Diversification indicator 0.1579 (0.469) -0.0395 (0.177) -0.1297 (0.973) 
GDP per capita -0.3777 (0.105) 0.185** (0.049) 0.651** (0.025) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.103*** (0.006) -0.0472** (0.020) -0.1971 (0.409) 
Rule of law -0.4592 (0.291) 0.159 (0.430) -0.4365 (0.878) 
Intercept 51.52 (0.135) -2.404* (0.067) 149.4 (0.396) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 1053 
 
1250 
 
410 
 Panel C: IR exposures 
IRD -0.1630** (0.018) -0.1750** (0.046) -0.0307* (0.092) 
Firm size -0.565 (0.878) -0.0737** (0.041) -0.0659 (0.470) 
Leverage -0.0960 (0.911) -0.0235** (0.012) -0.0217* (0.100) 
FORSALES 0.397** (0.037) 0.0110 (0.594) 0.0747 (0.924) 
GEOMART -0.186 (0.989) -0.107 (0.433) 0.2165 (0.454) 
Diversification indicator 0.1757 (0.860) -0.107 (0.253) -0.3521 (0.493) 
GDP per capita -0.1909*** (0.000) -0.876 (0.516) -0.2480** (0.041) 
DEPOSITSTOGDP -0.4486*** (0.000) -0.0432*** (0.000) -0.0563** (0.044) 
Rule of law -0.2236*** (0.002) 0.420 (0.320) -0.3139 (0.115) 
Intercept 1522.9*** (0.000) 8.560 (0.487) 6.953 (0.836) 
Country dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 No of observations 2061  2398  430  
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
In this thesis, we aim to explore the link between macro environment and firm specifics in 
deriving firms’ hedging behavior. To do so, we have conducted comprehensive empirical 
analyses of determinants of financial derivatives use by non-financial firms, as well as the 
relationship between derivatives use, firm value, and exposures. The study has employed a wide 
range of empirical techniques to investigate whether cross-firm differences in hedging behaviors 
can be explained by differences in country-level governance quality. We then have examined 
whether derivatives use increases firm value of non-financial firms, and how value effect under 
influence of corruption environment differs across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign 
affiliates. We further have provided empirical evidence to answer the following questions in East 
Asia context. (1) Does financial hedging through derivatives use reduce exposures to country 
risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks that firms face? (2) How are derivatives activities of 
domestic MNCs, domestic firms, and foreign affiliates different from each other in terms of 
effects on exposures? 
To fulfill the research questions and objectives, we have undertaken the unique hand-
collected data set of derivatives activities from 881 non-financial firms in eight East Asian 
countries over the period of 2003-2013. The data of derivatives use are collected from the 
relevant disclosures in annual reports by using keyword search approach. The main measure of 
derivatives behavior is derivative intensity, which is notional amount of derivatives use scaled by 
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firm size at a fiscal year end. Besides, in chapter 4, we also constructed derivative dummy, which 
takes a value of one if a firm is identified as a derivative user, and zero otherwise. In chapter 5, 
we calculated Tobin’s Q to measure firm value, and estimate different types of exposures in 
chapter 6. Accounting and financial data for explanatory and control variables were obtained 
from Datastream or constructed on the basis of data from Corporate Affiliations database. 
Meanwhile, we collected country-specific data from different sources, e.g., corruption is from 
Transparency International, country’s overall risk rating is from the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
financial system deposits to GDP is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 
consistency and reliability of these data have been checked and described carefully in each 
empirical chapter. 
Regarding literature review, the thesis reviews the hedging theory and institutional theory 
approach, discusses how that theory has been assessed in the empirical literature and whether the 
theories underpin what is observed in practice. We critically examines the existing literature over 
a few last decades from 1993 to present, which has focused on testing hedging theory, and the 
extent to which it supports or refutes hedging theory by reviewing proxy variables used to test 
these hypotheses. We find that the extant literature lacks consistency in measurement of 
variables determining derivatives use. Thus, it leads to complexity in interpreting results and 
makes analyses less powerful. Moreover, we indicate that several recent studies, which consider 
new explanations for firms’ incentives to use derivatives, also provide overall mixed results at 
best.  As such, it is necessary to improve hedging theory (e.g., Modigiliani and Miller, 1958; 
Mayer and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985), as well as the variables to measure determinants 
of derivatives use.  
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Furthermore, we have reviewed empirical studies on relationship between derivatives use 
and firm value outside East Asia and in East Asia from 2001 to the present, separately. We 
divided existing empirical studies into 2 categories, unconditional analyses and conditional 
analyses. We find that in spite of different measures across studies, Tobin’s Q is the most 
popular proxy of firm value in both unconditional and conditional studies, and they provide 
mixed evidence at best. The impact of derivatives use on firm value is, therefore, an open 
empirical issue.  
Finally, after reviewing thoroughly the association between derivatives use and exposures, 
we find that the mixed results of prior studies may be attributed to different choices of models.  
More importantly, we find a great differences in the effects of derivatives use on exposures, 
ranging from 2.387% to 54%. Such variation may derive from the fact that firms use other 
hedging methods besides derivatives, or firms selectively hedge; or the amount of derivatives is 
small, or exposures are time-varying.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main 
inferences from our three empirical studies. Section 3 presents limitations of the thesis, and 
proposes some suggestions for the future research. The contributions then are drawn based on the 
findings in the section 4. 
7.2. Overall discussion and conclusions from empirical analyses 
7.2.1. Determinants of derivatives use 
Most of existing studies consider only firm-specific factors as determinants of hedging 
behavior. Yet, firm specific characteristics alone cannot fully explain firms’ behaviors. Filling 
this gap in the literature, we have focused on the role of country-specific factors in shaping 
firms’ decisions to use derivatives. Specially, we have explored the link between the use of 
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financial derivatives in East Asian non-financial firms and governance quality. Our descriptive 
statistics show that 53.5% of the sample firms use at least one type of derivatives during the 
sample period, in which the most common instruments are foreign currency derivatives 
(42.55%), followed by interest rate derivatives (25.81%), and commodity price derivatives 
(8.99%). The univariate results suggest that the quality of governance mechanism as measured 
by corruption, government effectiveness and country risk could be very important factors. 
The main findings from the pooled probit analysis support the hypothesis that good 
governance increases firm’s inclination to use derivatives. We find a positive and significant 
association between corruption and firms’ likelihood of using derivatives, while there exists a 
significant and positive effect of government effectiveness on the firm’s tendency to use 
derivatives. The estimated coefficient on overall risk rating, in addition, is positively and 
statistically different from zero.  
When we repeat pooled probit models based on corruption levels, we find that the decision 
on using derivatives by firms in highly corrupt countries is quite different from those firms in 
low corrupt countries. Firms located in highly corrupt countries do not use derivatives to reduce 
agency cost of debt; while the more the progressive marginal tax rates are, the less the firms are 
induced to use derivatives. More importantly, the findings show that those firms do not use 
derivatives to eliminate exposures to financial risks, but for other purposes such as speculating or 
self-managerial interests. 
The results from pooled Tobit estimations are consistent with findings from Probit models. 
In particular, corruption index has a significant and positive impact on intensity of derivatives 
use. We also observe a positive effect for government effectiveness. These results altogether 
suggest that good institutions with strong legal enforceability and governance capabilities lower 
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hedging costs; hence facilitating firms to use derivatives. Likewise, we find that the effects of 
some factors vary across types of derivatives. For example, in the case of interest rate 
derivatives, we observe that corruption is significant determinant influencing firm’s extent of 
using derivatives, while we do not find any significant effect of government effectiveness and 
country risk on  firms’ level of derivatives use. 
The findings from pooled Tobit models regarding corruption level conforms to the results 
from pooled probit that factors affecting derivatives use by firms in highly corrupt countries 
somewhat differ from firms in low corrupt countries. Further, to control for endogeneity issue, 
we conducted lagged variables in panel data framework based on corruption levels. We notice 
that firms in countries with low corruption level use derivatives to hedge exposures, while firms 
located in highly corrupt countries use derivatives for selective hedging and not for reasons 
stated by hedging theory. For example, we are unable to find any significant relation between 
derivative intensity and the possibility of firms in highly corrupt countries to use derivatives to 
reduce costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, agency costs of debt, economies of scales, and 
corporate tax burden. But we observe that firms located in low corruption countries use 
derivatives to reduce expected tax liability. 
7.2.2. Derivatives use and firm value 
In chapter 5, improving upon the prior studies, we have scrutinized the value effects of 
derivatives use on domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates from different aspects 
of corruption environments in home and host countries. Following most of previous studies, we 
use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. The univariate tests yield mixed results. For domestic 
firms, the mean of Tobin’s Q for users is 0.509, compared to the mean of Tobin’s Q for non-
users of 0.418, leading to a hedging premium of 0.091. Likewise, we also obtain a positive 
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hedging premium of 0.355 for domestic MNCs, indicating that derivatives users have a higher 
firm value than non-users. However, in terms of foreign affiliates, non-users are characterized by 
higher Tobin’s Q than users, leading to a hedging discount of 0.013. 
The results from the OLS regression indicate that the use of financial derivatives is a value-
enhancing activity for domestic firms and domestic MNCs, a low corruption environment 
facilitates the use of derivatives and rewards those firms with higher firm value. In particular, in 
low corrupt countries, derivatives use increases value of domestic firms from 9.87% to 11.77%. 
Meanwhile, hedging premiums of domestic MNCs in low corrupt countries are from 10.78% to 
12.72%, which supports our hypothesis that domestic MNCs are more valuable than domestic 
firms in light of corruption, though it is not striking. In contrast with domestic firms and 
domestic MNCs, the findings from OLS estimation show that the use of derivatives decreases 
value of foreign affiliates with hedging discount of 7%. However, we still observe that foreign 
affiliates engaging in derivatives use, which reside in a country with a low corruption 
environment, are more valuable than those affiliates residing in a country with a high corruption 
level. 
We then have investigated how value implications of derivatives use under corruption differ 
across domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates due to exogenous shocks brought 
about by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The finding shows that during the crisis period, 
benefits of derivatives use on firm value does not gain for all firm types, and the effect of low 
level of corruption on alleviating negative impacts of the crisis on derivatives use is very 
moderate. Yet, low corruption level of home country is positively associated with hedging 
premiums of domestic firms and domestic MNCs in the post-crisis period, and low corruption 
level rewards domestic MNCs with higher firm value. In terms of foreign affiliates, they are 
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more valuable in host countries where corruption is less severe, even though there exists a 
negative association between derivatives use and firm value. 
We have checked the robustness of our inferences by implementing instrumental variable 
(IV) model to control for potential endogeneity issue, Heckman test to control for self-selection 
bias, and using firm market value as an alternative for Tobin’s Q in OLS model. Overall, the 
results of these tests are consistent with our main previous findings from OLS estimations. 
Specifically, the findings from IV model indicate that countries with low corruption induce 
domestic firms and domestic MNCs to use financial derivatives for hedging and rewards those 
firms with higher value, and the intensifying derivatives use enables domestic MNCs to increase 
firm value more efficiently than domestic firms. Meanwhile, we observe derivatives use 
decreases firm values of foreign affiliates by 5.28%, which is lower than hedging discount of 7% 
found in OLS estimation.  
Likewise, Heckman treatment model confirms our previous findings that derivatives use is 
associated with an increase in firm value of domestic firms and domestic MNCs with hedging 
premiums of 4.2%, and 11.1%, respectively. Regarding foreign affiliates, we find that derivatives 
use decreases firm value by 6.89%, although they are more valuable in low corrupt countries. 
7.2.3. Derivatives use and exposures 
In chapter 6, we have assessed the effect of financial derivatives use on different exposures 
to country risks, exchange rate, and interest rate risks on the comparison of domestic firms, 
domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates. We estimated exposures by applying the market model, 
which is developed by Alder and Dumas (1984), and augmented by Jorion (1990). Specifically, 
to our knowledge so far, we are one of the first to measure the exposure to country risks. The 
results from Univariate test show that domestic firms have the highest overall exposures, while 
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domestic MNCs have smaller exposures than domestic firms and foreign affiliates. In addition, 
the general results suggest that derivatives use is effective in reducing exposures. 
We first have investigated the dynamic relation between derivatives use and exposures by 
implementing pooled regression models. We find that financial hedging through derivatives use 
reduces exposures to home country risks for domestic firms and domestic MNCs by 11.4% and 
13.4% for each 1% increase in notional holdings, respectively. Yet, we are unable to find any 
evidence supporting a relationship between derivatives use of foreign affiliates and exposures to 
host country risks, even though derivatives use has a negative effect on exposure.  
Similar results are found in terms of exchange rate exposure, that is, the use of foreign 
currency derivatives is significantly and inversely associated with exchange rate exposure in the 
case of domestic firms and domestic MNCs, but it is not different from zero at any standard level 
in the case of foreign affiliates. With respect to interest rate exposure, the results are somewhat 
different, insofar as negative and significant signs on the use of interest rate derivatives show that 
derivatives use has significant impact on mitigating interest rate exposure, regardless of domestic 
firms, domestic MNCs, or foreign affiliates. 
When we conduct an analysis of association between derivatives use and exposures before-, 
during-, and after the global financial crisis, we observe that the financial crisis weakens the 
benefits of derivatives use. For example, we are unable to find evidence that derivatives use 
significantly reduces domestic firms and foreign affiliates’ exposure to country risks, while the 
effect of domestic MNCs’ derivatives activities on exposure to home country risks is modest, 
that is 2.97% lower exposure per 1% increase in notional holdings. In contrast, the effect of 
financial hedging on exposures in the post-crisis period, in general, is stronger than those in the 
pre-crisis period. For instance, the statistically significant estimated coefficients of derivatives 
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use show a decrease in exposure of 10.4%, 14.6%, and 10.74% for each 1% increase in notional 
derivative holdings for domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and foreign affiliates, respectively. 
We observe that our main findings obtained from pooled regression models still hold after 
accounting for potential endogeneity by employing IV approach. We find a significant negative 
relation between the use of derivatives and exposures to home country risks, and exchange rate 
risks for domestic firms, and domestic MNCs; while the estimated coefficients on derivatives use 
of foreign affiliates are found to be insignificant at any standard level. We also note that there is 
a significant inverse relationship between the use of interest rate derivatives and exposure to 
interest rate risks regardless of whether firms are domestic firms, domestic MNCs, or foreign 
affiliates. On the other hand, findings from additional robustness test, that is panel data 
regression with random effect specification, are very similar to those found from pooled 
regression models, indicating that our main inferences are mostly robust. 
7.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
There are many potential ways to extend our study in terms of data, empirical methodology, 
and research topic. The following discussion provides some specific suggestions on useful areas 
for future research. 
In this study, we estimate derivative intensity by using notional values of derivatives 
contracts held by each firm, because up to now, regarding derivatives holdings disclosures, the 
sample firms are not required to report detailed information on specific positions of notional 
holdings. Although total notional values effectively measure derivative ownership, it may not 
serve well as an estimate of derivative activities if a firm holds offsetting contracts (Judge, 
2006). Thus, a more appropriate measure in future research would be the absolute value of net 
derivatives positions in each type of derivatives. 
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We focus on analyzing the role of country-specific factors on shaping decisions on using 
derivatives of non-financial firms in 8 East Asian countries. While that number of sample 
countries effectively identifies country effects on derivatives activities, a bigger number of 
countries under consideration could provide a better view and evidence on implications of 
country-specific factors. Thus, a potential direction for future research could cover a broader 
range of countries with more heterogeneous economic, political, and social environments; 
heterogeneity will allow researchers to further explore effects of institutional environments on 
behaviors of various firms, including derivatives use. 
Further, after exploring the relationship between derivatives use and country-level 
governance quality, we stress the importance of incorporating country-level characteristics to 
investigate motivations for using derivatives of non-financial firms. Therefore, it would be 
worthy providing more robust country effects by examining other institutional factors such as 
legal system, financial policy uncertainty or elections. Another area for future research would be 
to develop a model framework, which links governance quality and possibility of using financial 
derivatives by non-financial firms. 
Additionally, it is rather complicated to explore the role of derivatives in the context of 
financial crisis because excessive use of derivatives might actually leads to crisis, and the 
financial crisis occurred globally. As such, most parties were affected (exposed) by the crisis at 
around the same time. Given this, it is tricky to see how derivatives could help gain hedging 
benefits. That limitation opens up an avenue for future research to investigate possibility and/or 
levels that the use of derivatives would lead to a recession or crisis. 
Moreover, based on findings obtained from empirical analysis of relationship between 
derivatives use and firm value, we recognize that firms’ hedging activities significantly affect 
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firm value. Thus, behavioral reasons arising from firms’ managers such as CEO, CFO could be a 
fruitful focus for future research. It is because the interaction between derivatives use and 
managers’ risk attitudes and/or interests is relatively unexplored, whereas obviously firm 
managers determine hedging policies. Selective hedging can be a promising direction that 
deserves further attention as selective hedging can arise from the equilibrium in an optimal 
hedging model when firms’ optional hedging activities entail the total current value of future 
earnings (Wojakowski, 2012). 
Finally, we measure exposures, especially exposures to country risks by applying the market 
model augmented by Jorion (1990). Although the market model is the most common approach to 
estimate exposures to market risks in the existing literature, that measurement is relatively 
subjective, so more research in the future may be needed to improve a model to measure more 
proper exposures to country risks. For example, we could build a model, in which it controls for 
the relationship between the returns of firms and a few country-level institutional factors. 
7.4. Contributions 
7.4.1. Theoretical and methodological contributions 
This research primarily contributes to the theoretical literature in the following ways: 
The first theoretical contribution of this study is to incorporate institutional theory (e.g., 
North, 1990, 1994; Dunning, 2003; Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005) and Dunning’s OLI paradigm 
(Dunning, 1988; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) into the analysis of derivative activities. This 
approach sheds a new light to the hedging theory (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Mayers and 
Smith, 1990; Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993), which 
concentrates mainly on firm-specific characteristics. Through this research approach, we first 
demonstrate that a firm’ decision on using financial derivatives is not only determined by factors 
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within that firm’s boundary, and it is necessary to improve hedging theory as well as variables to 
measure determinants of derivatives use. Further, by joining institutional theory through 
investigating country-level governance quality with hedging theory through controlling firm-
specific factors into one single framework of analysis, our study stresses the importance of 
incorporating country-level factors to explore motivations for using financial derivatives by non-
financial firms. Such understanding also can offer a new explanation for the sources of 
advantages enabling firms in a country to exploit benefits of hedging better than those firms in 
another country. 
Second, our research contributes to theoretical literature by taking an institution-based view 
of value effects of derivatives use for different firm types including domestic firms, domestic 
MNCs and foreign affiliates. It is important to highlight that our study adopts a new approach by 
applying concepts of institutional theory in international business (IB) to the recently developed 
conditional analysis of relationship between derivatives use and firm value in finance (e.g., 
Fauver and Naranjo, 2010, Allayannis, Lel, and Miller, 2012). In particular, improving upon 
recent conditional analysis, which investigates effects of internal firm issues only such as 
corporate governance or agency costs, we integrate country-level factors into research design and 
explain why and how financial derivatives use affects value of different domestic owned, and 
foreign owned firms under influence of home and host countries’ corruption environments. 
Doing so, our research methodology complements and adds a new line to the conditional 
analysis to demonstrate that testing a direct relation between derivatives use and firm value 
might lead to a bias, because there might be additional costs or monitoring problems related to 
the use of derivatives, which increases possibility of reducing firm value at the expense of 
shareholders. More importantly, our approach underlines the role as “rule of games” of 
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institutions in general (North, 1990, 1994), and corruption environment in particular32, in shaping 
firm valuation, and argues that without directly taking into account institutional environment in 
analysis, it will be difficult to determine whether derivatives use is an value-enhancing activity. 
Our empirical findings suggest that this approach is necessary and highly promising, and opens 
up avenue for future research to exploit more in detail how institutions and the level of 
institutional development rewards or adds costs to firms’ financial operations. 
Third, to examine whether the use of financial derivatives can reduce multifaceted exposures 
for different firm types, we apply the market model (Alder and Dumas, 1984; Jorion, 1990) to 
estimate exposures to home and host country risks, which is one of the foremost theoretical 
contributions of this thesis. Starting from the concept of the market model that exchange rate 
exposure can be measured as a regression coefficient, we develop the idea to measure exposure 
to country risks based on the argument that exchange rate risk is not intrinsically different from 
other systematic risks such as interest rate risks. Our idea also derives from the fundamental 
logic that the interaction of institutions and markets determines country risks that drive firms’ 
activities (Shapiro, 1999; Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010; Allien and Carletti, 2013; 
Pástor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013) and firms are not free from country risks.  
                                                     
32 While corruption is considered to be a more costly tax on business operation than legal taxes (Kaufmann and Wei, 
1999), it has become a global phenomenon and firms usually engage in corrupt practices (Beets, 2005). In 2015, the 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent a message that corruption is a threat to the development, 
democracy and stability, it distorts markets, curbs economic growth and discourages foreign investment, and it can 
lead to dissatisfaction with public institutions. Thus, it is likely that high corruption levels increase levels of 
exposures to market risks that firms face, increase hedging and transaction costs, thereby reducing firm value. Under 
such circumstances, an analysis of derivatives usage under influence of corruption is important to find out whether 
derivatives use increases firm value, and why using derivatives differs across countries. 
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The innovation and distinction of our method is to demonstrate clearly how country risk 
exposures can be measured as a regression coefficient by using well-know linear regression 
techniques. To our knowledge so far, we are one of the first to measure exposures to country 
risks, and contribute to the existing literature on this area by providing a quantitative 
measurement, which will open an access for researchers to exploit further perspectives of 
country risk exposures. This approach also conforms to interests of policy-makers, stockholders, 
investors, and analysts firms as efforts must be made by each firm to approximate and quantify 
their exposures. 
Fourth, by investigating value implications of derivatives use in light of corruption 
environments of both home and host countries, and examining the relationship between 
derivatives use and exposures to both home and host country risks, our study complements and 
sheds a new light to the literature on firms’ hedging behaviors, and emerging institution-based 
explanations of firm’s performance that largely concentrate on the role of home-country 
institutions (Wu et al., 2016). Our findings demonstrate that differences in institutional settings 
and systematic risks between a host market and a home market become conductive to implement 
hedging policy, and explain differences in effectiveness of exploiting hedging benefits for 
different firm types in different countries. 
Finally, the fundamental starting point in discussion of conditions under which firms hedge 
and hedging can add value is Modigliani and Miller (MM) theorem. Modiglian and Miller (1958) 
find that under a specific set of assumptions about frictionless markets, equal access to market 
prices, rational investors, and equal access to costless information, hedging is irrelevant and 
cannot contribute to the creation of firm value. This thesis, therefore, improves upon key 
assumptions of MM theorem and contributes to methodological literature by building on 
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institutional conditions and heterogeneity of firm types, i.e. domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and 
foreign affiliates. We find that hedging can add value and rewards firms with higher value if 
there are well-governed and good-functioning institutions, and such effect of hedging somewhat 
depends on heterogeneity of firm types. 
Overall, in this thesis we jointly integrates two strands of literatures i.e., IB and finance into 
one framework of analysis. Doing so, it makes contributions to each strand of literature. 
Regarding finance literature, we show that inconclusive evidence of the existing literature on 
derivatives use in particular, and on finance in general could be attributed to the lack of 
exploring the role of firm type heterogeneity, and institutional environments. We also contribute 
to IB literature by exploring an important instrument of risk management i.e., derivatives use, 
and its effectiveness by firm types. This thesis suggests that this aspect is new in IB literature. 
7.4.2. Empirical contributions 
Our study not only enriches the empirical literature by adding, to our best knowledge, the 
first East Asian evidence on determinants of derivatives use, value effects of derivatives use, and 
the association between the use of derivatives and exposures across 8 East Asian countries 
covering from developed countries to emerging economies, and with differences in terms of 
business, economic and political environments, but also contributes to the extant literature up to 
date in the following ways: 
First, our research provides a comprehensive examination on determinants of derivatives 
use with a focus on country-specific factors that have not been thoroughly examined in the 
existing literature, namely governance mechanism, corruption levels and country risks. Our study 
strongly finds that countries’ governance mechanisms have significant and positive effect on 
firms’ decisions on derivatives use, and corruption levels play a significant role in explaining the 
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use of derivatives. These findings suggest that country-specific characteristics may explain some 
of ambiguity in the existing empirical literature. Combined with the finding that firms in well-
governed countries use derivatives to hedge exposure and overcome their costs arising from 
market imperfections, whereas firms located in weakly governed countries use derivatives for 
speculation and/or selective hedging, our study further suggests that well-developed institutions 
compensate for hedging and other transaction costs, and in fact facilitate firm’s derivatives 
activities.  
 Second, to our knowledge so far, this thesis is one of the first to examine how derivatives 
use affects firm value under influence of corruption environments. Our study evidences that low 
corruption level of home country rewards domestic firms and domestic MNCs with higher value 
(hedging premiums are from 9.87% to 11.77%, and 10.78% to 12.72% respectively), and foreign 
affiliates are more valuable in host countries where corruption is less severe. These findings 
support the view that high corruption levels increase additional costs to firms, thereby reducing 
expected cash flows, and ultimately value effect of firms using derivatives. The results also 
indicate that corruption environments are at different degrees in different countries, and countries 
differ remarkably in the extent to which corruption affects firms’ derivatives activities. 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to measure exposures to country 
risks by using the market model, and focus specifically on answering whether the use of financial 
derivatives can reduce those exposures. We provide a novel finding that derivatives activities of 
domestic firms and domestic MNCs significantly reduce exposures to home country risks by 
11.4% and 13.4% per 1% increase in notional derivatives holdings, respectively, meanwhile 
foreign affiliates with derivatives use fail to mitigate exposures to their host country risks. Our 
study therefore contributes to the literature on exposures by demonstrating the importance of 
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financial derivatives use for domestic firms, and domestic MNCs in understanding and hedging 
exposure to home country risks. These results also support the view that business operations of 
foreign affiliates are more complicated than those of domestic owned firms (Kim and Pantzalis, 
2003), and performance of foreign affiliates in some emerging countries, such as China, 
Indonesia and Thailand, is “high risk, low return” (Chan, Isobe, and Makino, 2008) 
Fourth, our study is different from the prior studies in the way of comparing value effects of 
derivatives use for a wide range of firm types including domestic firms, domestic MNCs, and 
foreign affiliates in order to answer important but unexplored questions: what firm type in which 
value implication of derivatives use is greater; and what corruption level rewards firm with 
higher value. Our findings consistently notice that domestic MNCs outperform domestic firms 
and foreign affiliates, and evidence that home country’s low corruption levels favor domestic 
MNCs than domestics firms. On the one hand, the results demonstrate that domestic MNCs with 
derivatives policies outperform other firms due to their superior ability to engage in financial and 
operational hedging, which should be able to offset some exposures they face. On the other hand, 
they indicate that firms do not equally enable to exploit favorable institutional conditions and 
environments. 
Fifth, we complement and shed new light on the current literature on hedging when we 
evidence the outperformance of domestic MNCs in reducing exposures to exchange rate, and 
interest rate risks relative to domestic firms and foreign affiliates. Domestic MNCs experience 
18.2% and 19.0% decline in exposures to exchange rate, and interest rate risks for each 1% 
increase in notional holdings, respectively, which is higher than the rates of 10.4% and 11.8% 
decrease in those respective exposures in the case of domestic firms. Notably, derivatives use of 
foreign affiliates is only effective in alleviating exposure to interest rate risk by 3.07%. 
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Finally, our study uses a new hand-collected data set of derivatives use and provides greater 
statistical power. Data spans the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which provides us the 
unique natural experiment of derivatives use and financial risks, and allows us to provide new 
insights into firms’ hedging activities during that turbulent period. Our study observes that 
during the crisis, benefits of derivatives use do not gain. However, there are strong links between 
derivatives use and firm value, and exposures for domestic firms and domestic MNCs in the 
post-crisis. These findings support the view that the financial crisis causes a sudden and big 
exogenous shock, firms are unable to adjust to new system (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, Enikolopov 
et al., 2014), so the use of derivatives cannot reduce exposures to market risks while hedging 
costs are higher due to fluctuation in exchange rates and escalation in financial costs and prices.  
7.4.3. Managerial implications 
While firms in East Asian countries have been playing an important role as active 
participants in derivatives markets and account for one third of global trading volume33, the 
reasons why East Asian non-financial firms hedge are not well explored. Likewise, the 
fundamental questions whether the use of derivatives increases firm value and/or reduces 
exposures that firms face are still unknown. On the other hand, even though there is vast 
evidence on derivatives use by firms in U.S and European developed firms, these countries have 
quite similar economic, financial and social environments. Our sample of East Asia countries, in 
contrast covers both developed and developing countries with heterogeneity in institutional 
environments, which enables us to exploit comprehensively multifaceted hedging behaviors of a 
wide range of firm types. As such, this thesis provides important practical implications to firm 
managers, country-level regulators, and policy makers as below: 
                                                     
33 FIA. 2015. FIA annual volume survey. Future Industry Association 
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First, our research approach and findings propose some avenues for further theoretical and 
empirical research on institutional environments and firms’ hedging activities aimed at 
elucidating firms’ decision on using derivatives. Additionally, the study provides important 
policy implications emphasizing the role of policy makers in institutional development to 
facilitate firms to explore benefits of hedging such as enhancing legal systems, and improving 
government efficiency. 
Second, the empirical findings provide useful and practical insights to firms’ managers to 
increase their firm value through derivative activities, and clearly suggest that they should 
include measures for home/host country’s corruption levels when determining hedging policy. 
Additionally, our findings provide direct implications for firms’ managers on decision regarding 
capital structure. It suggests that firms could influence cost of capital in particular, and capital 
structure in general by using financial derivatives, thus firm managers better perform the 
important tasks of strategic capital planning and managing risks. 
Third, our findings also have practical and meaningful implications for policy-makers and 
regulators. The study first proposes that regulators or policy-makers should be more active in 
cracking down corruption levels in order to enhance performances of non-financial firms using 
derivatives. Further, the finding that a firm’s exposure to home country risk is mitigated through 
the use of financial derivatives suggests that effective management of derivative markets is 
necessary to ensure stability of financial system and economy in general. 
Fourth, due to characteristics of our wide range sample firms including both domestic-
owned, and foreign-owned firms, and our sample countries covering both developed and 
developing countries, the results of this thesis can be easily generalized into any other 
developing and developed countries in which there are non-financial firms using financial 
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derivatives, as well as country-level governance and corruption exist. Further, our sample 
consists of Japan- the world’s third largest economy, and China- the second largest economy and 
a key player in the world economy and markets, thus the results of this thesis can be applicable 
to various aspects of international business and finance.  
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Table 7.1: Summary of hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
Empirical findings 
support/oppose 
Hypothesis 1: Firms located in countries with higher corruption levels are less likely to use 
derivatives 
Support 
Hypothesis 1a: High levels of corruption discourage firms from using derivatives to reduce    
exposure as stated by hedging theory 
Support 
Hypothesis 2: Firms located in countries with higher governance quality are more prone to 
use derivatives  
Support 
Hypothesis 3: Firms in countries with higher country risk have more incentive to use 
derivatives 
Support 
Hypothesis 4: The lower is the corruption level; the higher is the likelihood that the use of 
financial derivatives increases firm value 
Support 
Hypothesis 5a: In light of corruption environment, the use of financial derivatives is more 
valuable in domestic MNCs than in domestic firms 
Support 
Hypothesis 5b: Under influence of corruption environment, the use of financial derivatives 
rewards domestic MNCs with higher value than foreign affiliates 
Support 
Hypothesis 6a: The global financial crisis worsens the value effect of derivatives usage under 
corruption environment, and there is positive relationship between derivatives use and firm 
value in post-crisis period 
Support 
Hypothesis 6b: Low level of corruption mitigates negative impacts caused by the global 
financial crisis on the value effect of derivatives use 
Support 
Hypothesis 7a: The use of foreign currency derivatives reduces exchange rate exposure Support 
Hypothesis 7b: The use of interest rate derivatives reduces exposure to interest rate risk Support 
Hypothesis 8: There is negative relationship between the use of financial derivatives and 
exposure to country risk 
Support 
Hypothesis 9: The use of derivatives by domestic MNCs decreases a larger magnitude of 
exposure than domestic firms and foreign affiliates 
Support 
Hypothesis 10a: The global financial crisis weakens the relationship between derivatives 
usage and exposures 
Support 
Hypothesis 10b: Derivatives use is negatively related to exposures in the post-crisis period Support 
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